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In this research, the main focus is the educational role of art in the 
individual’s moral life. I begin by offering an account of Murdoch’s moral theory 
and discuss the concepts central to this theory. I argue that Murdoch’s moral 
theory is a form of virtue ethics, to demonstrate why moral education is important 
in her philosophy. I will then discuss the unique elements of Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy, especially her discussion of the concepts of imagination and fantasy, 
which is directly related to her theory of art and the role art plays in moral 
education. 
Drawing on my discussion of imagination and fantasy, I will go on to 
discuss Murdoch’s theory of art, focusing on her discussion of unity and disunity 
in art. I critically examine this view and discuss its drawbacks and show how, 
with a bit of modification, her view can be applied to most art forms. Finally, I 
draw on Murdoch’s moral view and her theory of art to develop a Murdochian 
view of the morally educational role of art, drawing on the few comments or 
suggestions that are found scattered throughout her work. I argue that both the 
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As a young child, I had a secret place where I would sometimes hide. It 
was a closet filled with spare mattresses and bedding. I would hide myself in the 
closet and press my face against the mattresses so that no one could hear me 
weeping. It was wartime and we had fled to another city as my hometown was 
constantly being bombarded by Iraqi missiles. My father had to stay behind to 
work and make a life for us. Whenever the radio announced which areas of my 
hometown had been bombarded that day, I could hear my heart pounding in my 
chest, so hard that I could hardly hear my mum singing out loud in order to 
distract us from the terrifying news. When I grew a bit older and the war finally 
ended, we were left with nothing but a sad grey city and thousands of martyrs and 
devastated families. 
I grew up and got busy with the usual day-to-day engagements and 
problems of a young girl. One day, to my great surprise, I found myself reading a 
newspaper article about wars and horrific crimes committed against small children, 
women, and men, but after moving to the next page, I noticed that I felt nothing. 
However, when I picked up The Brothers Karamazov by Dostoyevsky I was 
moved to tears. There is a particular passage that moves me, a conversation 
between two brothers. They discuss human suffering and, in particular, the value 
of human suffering for the greater good. Ivan cries about the pain of a small child, 
arguing that nothing can justify the tears of one, not even the purchase of truth: 
This poor child of five was subjected to every possible torture by 
[her] cultivated parents. They beat her, thrashed her, kicked her for 
no reason till her body was one bruise. Then, they went to greater 
refinements of cruelty—shut her up all night in the cold and frost in 
a privy, and because she didn't ask to be taken up at night … they 
smeared her face and filled her mouth with excrement, and it was 
her mother, her mother did this. And that mother could sleep, 
hearing the poor child's groans! Can you understand why a little 
creature, who can't even understand what's done to her, should beat 
her little aching heart with her tiny fist in the dark and the cold, and 
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weep her meek unresentful tears to dear, kind God to protect her? 
Do you understand that, friend and brother, you pious and humble 
novice? … Why, the whole world of knowledge is not worth that 
child's prayer to ‘dear, kind God’! I say nothing of the sufferings of 
grown-up people, they have eaten the apple, damn them, and the 
devil take them all! But these little ones! I am making you suffer, 
Alyosha, you are not yourself….1 
Reading this passage, I could see and feel the pain of the child. It enabled 
me to connect my childhood pain to the suffering of the child. I could not be 
indifferent anymore. The brothers’ discussion changed something in me. It 
fostered empathy and led me to appreciate the power of art in making visible 
some aspects of reality that were invisible to me due to my being too absorbed in 
my own day-to-day concerns. It connected me to the experiences of other people 
and enabled me to experience what they were going through in my imagination. I 
could imagine the ‘secret closet’ of the other child in Dostoyevsky’s novel, the 
place where she would go to hide from her pain. I realised that if it was not for my 
appreciation of art, I would not be able to put myself in other people’s shoes and 
feel their pain the way I did. 
Over time, this idea became so fascinating to me that I began to explore 
different philosophies examining art and how it helps us see other individuals and 
to be more compassionate towards them. In my exploration of these ideas, I 
discovered the work of Iris Murdoch. It was through Murdoch’s work that I 
learned how art in general, and literature in particular, provide places where the 
individual can be seen. Through the appreciation of art, the individual and their 
selfish desires become absent and other aspects of life presented in that art 
become visible and real. The nature of attention involved in genuinely 
appreciating art is similar to what is involved in paying careful attention to other 
people, or as Murdoch would term it, in carefully attending to other people. This 
is nicely illustrated in Murdoch’s description of the experiences of Effingham, a 
character in her novel The Unicorn: 
                                                
1 Fyodor  Dostoyevsky, "The Brothers Karamazov," (New York: The Project Gutenberg, 
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Something had been withdrawn, had slipped away from him in the 
moment of his attention and that something was simply himself…. 
What was left was everything else, all that was not himself, the 
object which he had never before seen and upon which he now 
gazed with the passion of a lover…. This then was love, to look 
and look until one exists no more, this was the love which was the 
same as death. He looked, and knew with a clarity which was one 
with the increasing light, that with the death of the self the world 
becomes quite automatically the object of a perfect love.2 
Murdoch demonstrates how attention to art provides an opportunity for its 
audience to be more present. It teaches one to be more attentive and to experience 
morally relevant situations by diverting the focus of attention away from the self 
and its egoistic desires. It is where one recognises the existence of other people, 
identifies their challenges, their vulnerability, their familiarity and obscurity. By 
attending to a work of art, one does not suspend one’s judgment, but rather aligns 
oneself to the artist’s vision of the world. By using one’s imagination, one sees 
things differently, ideally more lovingly and empathetically. So art provides one 
with a kind of vision and imagination by which one can see the chancy and 
contingent realities of life. If the individual develops the required imagination to 
picture the reality of other people and what they go through in situations like war, 
and to develop the sensitivity to be able to feel their suffering and pain, the 
individual cannot be indifferent to them. This is the inevitable ‘love’ that is ‘to 
look and look until one exists no more’. It is this Murdochian love – a just and 
careful attention to the reality of others and acceptance of them in their otherness 
– that is worthy of careful consideration.  
In my exploration of Murdoch’s ideas, I found that until recently, her 
philosophical work, in particular her ethical views and her theory of art, has not 
received the critical attention and acclaim that it deserves.3 There are a number of 
                                                
2 Iris Murdoch, The Unicorn (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963). 161. 
3 Even Murdoch’s private life and her personal relationships have attracted more attention than 
her intellectual work. Marije Altorf explains this point and argues that biographies written on 
Murdoch mostly highlight her sexual life and her Alzheimer’s disease rather than her literary and 
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reasons for this. Murdoch’s moral theory, which is at the centre of her 
philosophical discussion, is sometimes vague and obscure, and does not easily fit 
into the categories recognised in modern moral philosophy. But it should be 
acknowledged that Murdoch herself is not very keen to categorise her view as a 
moral theory. Besides, her success as a novelist has, for a long time, 
overshadowed her philosophical work.4 Though undoubtedly that philosophical 
work, which includes The Sovereignty of Good, The Fire & the Sun: Why Plato 
Banished the Artists, Acastos: Two Platonic dialogues, Metaphysics as a guide to 
Morals, Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature,5 
occupies a remarkable place in contemporary philosophy, especially moral 
philosophy. So I decided to explore Murdoch’s philosophical work to discover the 
ways in which a work of art can contribute to one’s moral development. 
                                                                                                                                 
philosophical work. Altorf argues that this is mainly due to the unacknowledged gender-bias in 
and outside the academic world. See Marije Altorf, "After Cursing the Library: Iris Murdoch and 
the (in) Visibility of Women in Philosophy," Hypatia 26, no. 2 (2011). 384-402. 
4 See Elizabeth Dipple, Iris Murdoch: A Work for the Spirit (London: Methuen, 1982). Hilda 
D. Spear, Iris Murdoch, Modern Novelists (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Antonia Susan 
Byatt, Degrees of Freedom: The Novels of Iris Murdoch (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965). 
Harold Bloom, ed. Iris Murdoch, Modern Critical Views (New York: Chelsea House, 1986). 
Barbara Stevens Heusel, Patterned Aimlessness: Iris Murdoch's Novels of the 1970s and 1980s 
(London: University of Georgia Press, 1995). Donna Lorine Gerstenberger, Iris Murdoch, The 
Irish Writers Series (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1975). David J. Gordon, Iris 
Murdoch's Fables of Unselfing (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995). Richard C. Kane, 
Iris Murdoch, Muriel Spark, and John Fowles: Didactic Demons in Modern Fiction (Rutherford: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988). Deborah Johnson, Iris Murdoch, Key Women 
Writers (Brighton: Harvester, 1987). Bran Nicol, Iris Murdoch: The Retrospective Fiction (New 
York: Macmillan Palgrave, 1999). Barbara Stevens Heusel, Iris Murdoch's Paradoxical Novels: 
Thirty Years of Critical Reception (Rochester: Camden House, 2001). Afaf Jamil Khogeer, The 
Integration of the Self: Women in the Fiction of Iris Murdoch and Margaret Drabble (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2006). Lisa M. Fiander, Fairy Tales and the Fiction of Iris Murdoch, 
Margaret Drabble, and A.S. Byatt, Studies on Themes and Motifs in Literature (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2004). Richard Todd, Iris Murdoch: The Shakespearian Interest (London: Vision, 1979). 
Cheryl Browning Bove, Understanding Iris Murdoch (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1993). Miles Leeson, Iris Murdoch: Philosophical Novelist (London: Continuum, 2010). 
Frank Baldanza, Iris Murdoch, Twayne's English Authors Series (New York: Twayne Publishers, 
1974); Priscilla Martin and Anne Rowe, Iris Murdoch: A Literary Life, Literary Lives (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Peter Wolfe, The Disciplined Heart: Iris Murdoch and Her Novels 
(Columbia,: University of Missouri Press, 1966). Guy Backus, Iris Murdoch: The Novelist as 
Philosopher, the Philosopher as Novelist : 'The Unicorn' as a Philosophical Novel, European 
University Studies (Berne: P. Lang, 1986). Peter J. Conradi, The Saint and the Artist: A Study of 
the Fiction of Iris Murdoch (London: HarperCollins, 2001). 




The significance of Murdoch’s philosophy lies in her distinctive account 
of the self and human consciousness, and in the inherently evaluative function that 
she assigns to this consciousness. Her account of consciousness is intertwined 
with another philosophical theme that recurs throughout her work, namely the 
uniqueness of every person’s experiences and the contingency and pointlessness 
of their life seen against the background of a universal Good. Murdoch’s revival 
of the Platonic concept of ‘the Good’ is aimed at demonstrating that moral values 
are real and that all people have an a priori conception of them – moral judgments 
are objective. The reason why some people can make better moral judgments and 
moral decisions is that they make a successful effort to attend to other individuals 
more closely and more justly. They use their imaginations to picture different 
possibilities in every situation and pick a picture that seems to be closer to reality. 
They avoid quick judgments, which are likely to be influenced by their biases and 
preconceptions. This effort leads to the expansion of the individual’s moral vision 
and helps them to have a more realistic and, ideally, more sympathetic approach 
to others. In her moral philosophy, Murdoch challenges those anti-metaphysical 
approaches to ethics according to which the focus of moral philosophy is the 
individual’s observable actions rather than the state of their consciousness. While 
the individual’s external behaviour is not insignificant for Murdoch, she believes 
that moral philosophy should engage itself with the background (the individual’s 
vision, thought processes, emotions, intentions, motives, and so on) for these 
behaviours. Morality does not only reside in the action, but also in the internal 
processes and struggles that lead to that action.  
Murdoch’s moral realism leads her to discussions of art throughout her 
philosophical work and to regard art as a truth-seeking activity. To Murdoch, art 
and morals are “two aspects of a single struggle”.6 Both these activities reflect the 
individual’s effort to explore the complexities of human life and to develop a 
better vision of reality, especially the reality of other people. It is the concern for 
truth that unites art and philosophy. In Murdoch’s words: “Good art ‘explains’ 
                                                
6 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 2002). 39-40. 
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truth itself, by manifesting deep conceptual connections”.7 While marrying moral 
philosophy and art, at the same time, Murdoch recognises a clear division between 
the two: the former deals with universal theories and concepts and the latter with 
what is particular and what is contingent and ordinary. In other words, philosophy 
extrapolates general principles from particular instances, whereas art deals with 
real people in their particularity.8 Art’s ability to present contingent and particular 
realities of human life, and to provide individuals with an opportunity to 
experience these realities in their imagination, gives it a distinctive role in human 
life. That is why for Murdoch, art is “the most educational of all human activities 
and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen”.9 Art contributes to the 
individual’s moral growth in different ways, for example by making the reality of 
human life more accessible and visible to them, or by strengthening their 
imagination. An artwork such as The Brothers Karamazov is capable of attracting 
the full attention of the reader. Attention to the details of the novel is an unselfish 
sort of attention, which impartially absorbs the reality presented in it.  The ability 
of Dostoyevsky’s novel to call for this form of unselfish and loving attention, and 
for the reader’s submission to the beauty of the novel and the reality depicted in it, 
makes the novel an effective tool for moral education. It allows the reader to 
experience things in their imagination they would not otherwise experience – at 
least not with this level of intensity. This helps the reader to become more 
conscious of the suffering of others and more sensitive towards them. 
Murdoch’s fascination with nineteenth-century realist literature (primarily 
prose and novels, and not poetry and drama) and her low regard for most 
contemporary literature is rooted in her conviction that realist literature is the best 
way to illustrate the randomness and chanciness of life and the lived realities of 
people’s lives.10 In Murdoch’s view, engaging with the different characters facing 
                                                
7 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Chatto & Windus, 1992). 321. 
8 Murdoch prefers to approach the issue of ethics through aesthetics, rather than the familiar 
categories of moral philosophy. Yet she does not downplay the significance of moral philosophy. 
See for example Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 74. 
9 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 85. 
10 Murdoch admires the works of nineteenth-century novelists, such as Sir Walter Scott, Jane 
Austen, George Eliot and Tolstoy. She also greatly praises Greek tragedies and works of 
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different circumstances in these literary works can enhance the reader’s 
understanding of morality. For her, most novels fail to portray a realistic image of 
the individual. She does not spare the philosophy of her day from the accusation. 
She thinks most of these philosophies (in particular, moral philosophies) fail to 
present a realistic picture of human being. The human individual depicted in these 
philosophies is “thin as a needle, [and] appears in the quick flash of the choosing 
will”.11 Murdoch opposes the view that the human will is sovereign over moral 
values. In Murdoch’s view, moral values are not decided by the act of choice by 
the human will, but rather by something God-like, something higher than human 
will, namely ‘the Good’. That is why in her moral philosophy and her theory of 
art, Murdoch argues that if the individual practices obedience to reality and to the 
authority of the Good (and beauty in art), they will be able to develop the vision 
required for acquiring moral virtues.  
My intention in this thesis is to offer something that existing critical 
studies of Murdoch’s philosophical and literary works have not examined. By 
drawing on Murdoch’s moral theory, I construct an account of her theory of art 
and of the importance of art in the individual’s moral development. Some of 
Murdoch’s critics have tried to explain the relation between art, especially 
literature, and philosophy in her work. However, most of these critics lean more 
towards an analytical, linguistic approach when discussing this relationship, and 
usually only in passing. As Floora Ruokonen states, “… when it comes to 
exploring the exact relationship between philosophy and literature in Murdoch’s 
philosophy ... most commentators … [seem] to employ a strategy of avoidance”.  
12 According to Ruokonen, focusing too much on the status of language, as Maria 
Antonaccio does, or avoiding Murdoch’s philosophical discussions of literature 
altogether, as she claims Patricia O’Connor does, overlooks an important aspect 
                                                                                                                                 
Shakespeare. See Iris Murdoch, "Against Dryness," in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on 
Philosophy and Literature, ed. Peter J. Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1999); "The Sublime and the 
Beautiful Revisited," in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and Literature, ed. 
Peter J. Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1999); "Existentialists and Mystics." 
11 The Sovereignty of Good. 52. 
12 Floora Ruokonen, "Iris Murdoch and the Extraordinary Ambiguity of Art," The Journal of 
Value Inquiry 42, no. 1 (2008): 78. 
xiv 
 
of her philosophy.13 These commentators avoid discussing the true status of 
literature in her work and the ambiguity of this view. 
In this thesis, the main focus is on the educational role of art in the 
individual’s moral life. I begin by offering an account of Murdoch’s moral theory. 
Doing so is especially important when discussing her philosophical views, as she 
is not always very clear or systematic in presenting them and is prone to very 
different, and occasionally opposing, ways of expressing her ideas. Developing 
my reading of Murdoch’s moral views lays the groundwork for the elaboration of 
her theory of art (especially good art) and the role good art can play in the 
individual’s moral life. Moreover, Murdoch’s theory of art is so intertwined with 
her moral theory that it cannot be properly understood in isolation from her moral 
views.  
I argue that Murdoch’s moral theory is a form of virtue ethics. Through 
highlighting the virtue ethical elements of her view, I demonstrate why moral 
education becomes important in Murdoch’s philosophy. However, I argue that the 
unique elements of Murdoch’s moral theory, especially her discussion of the 
concepts of imagination and fantasy, have a great deal to offer to mainstream 
virtue ethical philosophies. Her discussion of imagination and fantasy is also 
                                                
13 Ruokonen is referring to Antonaccio’s earlier volume on Iris Murdoch [Maria Antonaccio, 
Picturing the Human: The Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000).] In her recent work A Philosophy to Live By, Antonaccio takes a similar linguistic 
approach, arguing that the reason some thinkers turn to literature is the rise of antitheory. 
Criticising the assumptions of antitheorists, she defends what she calls Murdochian ‘reflexivity’. 
This reflexive approach to literature and ethics shifts the focus to language as a medium of moral 
reflection: “The relation of the individual to language is the place where aesthetics and ethics 
meet”. A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 97. Anil Gomes takes a similar but more analytical, linguistic approach. He draws on 
Murdoch’s Sovereignty of Good to demonstrate the role of joint or communal attention to a work 
of art in coming to understand the ethical framework of another person. According to him, the 
beliefs and values that structure one’s aesthetic concepts overlap the beliefs and values that 
structure one’s ethical concepts. He argues that understanding an aesthetic concept requires the 
individual to understand the evaluative framework of its application. So if an individual is able to 
grasp an aesthetic conceptual scheme, they can partially grasp the evaluative point of view through 
which ethical qualities are recognised. He suggests that Murdoch’s tendency towards unity applies 
to values and virtues across both ethical and aesthetic domains. Anil Gomes, "Iris Murdoch on Art, 
Ethics, and Attention," British Journal of Aesthetics 53, no. 3 (2013): 321-37. By contrast, Patricia 
O’Connor distinguishes between Murdoch’s (moral) philosophy, and her literary theory, implying 
that Murdoch’s discussions about literature are not philosophical as such. She maintains, though, 
that Murdoch does in some places “enhance her literary theory via a substantial philosophical 
discussion of aesthetics”.  Patricia J. O'Connor, To Love the Good: The Moral Philosophy of Iris 
Murdoch, American University Studies Series V, Philosophy (New York: P. Lang, 1996), 156. 
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directly related to her theory of art and the role it plays in moral development. As 
I argue, in Murdoch’s view, only good art, which is the kind of art that is the 
product of imagination rather than of fantasy, and thus, in touch with reality, can 
contribute to moral education. I go on to critically examine Murdoch’s view of art 
and the drawbacks of this view, and how, with some modification, her view can 
be applied to most art forms. I then draw on Murdoch’s moral views and her 
theory of art to show that art is one of the most effective human products for 
making a significant contribution to an individual’s moral development. I develop 
a Murdochian view of the morally educational role of art, drawing on some of the 
comments and suggestions that are scattered throughout her work. I argue that 
both the artist, in creating art, and the audience, in receiving art, play important 
roles in making an artwork morally educational.14 My discussion is structured 
across seven chapters as follows: 
In Chapter 1, I explain that Murdoch’s concept of the Good has a key 
place in her moral theory. I argue that in spite of how this concept is commonly 
understood, the Good is located in the individual’s mind and is the very condition 
for the possibility of moral experience. I argue that this reading of Murdoch’s 
concept of the Good explains two important aspects of Murdoch’s view: 1) the 
dissolution of the fact-value distinction and the claim that all experience of the 
facts is value-laden, and 2) Murdoch’s moral realism, according to which the 
Good is an objective condition of everyone’s moral experiences. 
In Chapter 2, I explain why the main focus of Murdoch’s moral theory is 
the individual and their moral improvement. I argue that Murdoch focuses on the 
transformation of the individual’s consciousness or vision by suggesting that if the 
individual seeks to attain an impartial and unbiased grasp of other individuals, 
                                                
14 I do not intend to discuss Murdoch’s novels. But in my discussions of her theory of art, I use 
Murdoch’s novels as examples of good artworks. While Murdoch’s theory of art, despite her 
intention, seems to be too narrow in that it only incorporates narrative arts, and even in the case of 
narrative arts, it excludes most contemporary novels, I intend to draw on a variety of artworks to 





they should make an effort to go beyond their selfish tendencies and truly attend 
to them. Developing this habit is the prerequisite to being loving and 
compassionate towards other people. 
Drawing on the Aristotelian concepts of virtue, eudaimonia, and practical 
wisdom, in Chapter 3, I argue that Murdoch’s moral theory is a form of virtue 
ethics, which despite its unique features, shares some of the main characteristics 
of the Aristotelian account of virtue ethics. I explain that appreciating Murdoch’s 
virtue ethics is crucial for understanding and developing a Murdochian account of 
moral education.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss Murdoch’s account of imagination and fantasy and 
the Platonic and Kantian aspects of these two concepts. I argue that Murdoch’s 
account of the role of imagination in the individual’s moral life is a unique aspect 
of Murdoch’s virtue ethics. Through recognising and foregrounding the role of 
imagination, Murdoch demonstrates that moral understanding, or a realistic 
understanding of other people, is a creative process. That is why art, as the 
product of the creative faculty of consciousness, is closely related to morality and 
moral progress. 
In Chapter 5, I offer an account of Murdoch’s theory of art, by discussing 
the two contradictory concepts of unity and disunity that appears in various places 
in her work. As I develop a Murdochian theory of art, I argue that an artwork 
should present the disunified and messy aspects of life, and do so within the unity 
imposed by an art form. While experiencing the disunity and chanciness of life 
can be traumatic, the unity of form makes the experience of the recipient of art an 
uplifting one.  
In Chapter 6, drawing upon Murdoch’s theory of art, I argue that on 
Murdoch’s view, it is only a ‘good artwork’, that is an artwork with good moral 
character, that can contribute to the individual’s moral development. I offer an 
objection to Murdoch’s account of good art and argue that some works of art that 
have a bad moral character can still be considered good in the sense that they can 
contribute to moral development. 
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In Chapter 7, drawing upon my account of good art as a kind of art that 
can contribute to one’s moral development, regardless of its moral character, I 
explore the ways in which good art can contribute to one’s moral education. I 
consider Murdoch’s concept of attention and the role it plays in the individual’s 
moral life to argue that attention to art is a form of disinterested attention that can 
help the individual practice selflessness and love. It strengthens and enlarges their 
imagination, enabling them to picture different possibilities in every situation. 
This allows the individual to see the reality of other people more justly and 
accurately, put themselves in other people’s shoes, and, empathise with them 
provided that they deserve such empathy. 
So I conclude by arguing that for Murdoch, the beauty of art can engage us 
intellectually with all aspects of reality, even with what we might find appalling in 
real life. Our full attention to an artwork and our obedience and submission to the 
authority of reality depicted in that work leads to a deep and lasting change in our 
vision of the world, or as Murdoch puts it, in our ‘fabric of being’.15 By 
appreciating beauty in good art, we begin to develop an appreciation of what is 
good. Engaging with the imagination of the artist through their work helps our 
own imagination to grow. This enables us to see other people in their otherness. It 
helps us to be more attentive and more sensitive towards others, because we are 
able to picture what others may be going through, and thus, to empathise with 
them. 
                                                




Murdoch’s Moral Realism and ‘the Good’ 
Introduction 
The research literature on moral education includes various approaches to 
the issue of moral development. Iris Murdoch’s views are not often discussed in 
connection with this issue, but I argue that her moral philosophy, in particular her 
views on moral development as a continuous effort to improve one’s state of 
consciousness, makes an important contribution to the current debate on moral 
education. In order to tease out a coherent Murdochian theory of moral education 
and ultimately to consider the role art can play in the individual’s moral 
development, I begin this research by exploring a key concept of her moral view, 
namely, ‘the Good’. Obtaining a coherent understanding of this concept enables 
us to understand other concepts central to Murdoch’s moral theory: attention, 
vision, imagination and love, which are in turn essential for understanding 
Murdoch’s view of moral development and moral education. 
I will explain that the Good in Murdoch’s view, like the Sun in Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave, guides the individual in their moral development. As Peter 
Conradi puts it: “Plato’s ‘great Allegory’ of the Cave and the Sun… becomes in 
Iris’s handling of it an account of how the lonely human soul struggles towards 
enlightenment”.16 Nevertheless, I am going to argue that unlike Plato’s Sun, 
Murdoch’s concept of the Good is located in the individual’s mind and is the very 
condition for the possibility of moral experience. I will show that this is a Kantian 
understanding of the Good, which leads to two important aspects of Murdoch’s 
view: 1) Murdoch’s attempt to dissolve the fact-value distinction by claiming that 
almost all experiences of the facts are value-laden. 2) Her moral realism, 
according to which the Good is an objective condition of almost all of our moral 
experiences. I will discuss each of these points in turn. 
                                                




Murdoch on the Good: Kantian and Platonic Influences  
In this section I discuss the Platonic and Kantian features of Murdoch’s 
concept of the Good. Murdoch’s account of the Good forms the foundation of her 
moral realism, according to which every perception or cognition of the world is 
value-laden. The individual’s moral judgment is true insofar as their perception of 
the world is true. As I will discuss later, from this, Murdoch concludes that in 
order to gain good moral vision and become a better person, one needs to develop 
a more ‘objective’ understanding of the world. 
Allegory of the Cave 
In his Allegory of the Cave Plato describes an image of a cave in which 
people have been bound by chains since childhood, seeing only that which is in 
front of them. There is a fire burning far above and behind them. Between the fire 
and the prisoners there is a track along which some people are carrying a variety 
of objects. The prisoners, however, can only see the shadows of these objects 
projected on the wall in front of them. Plato describes a man who, once released, 
is compelled to walk and look into the light of the fire. The man is dazzled, 
feeling pain in his eyes. But then he turns and sees the objects causing the 
shadows. He is dragged outside the cave and faces the Sun. Initially, he feels 
annoyed by being dragged into the severe light of the Sun. But after a while he 
gets accustomed to the light and is finally able to look at the Sun.17  
The real objects in the Allegory stand for what Plato speaks of as the 
Forms. Forms are unchanging universals that participate in particulars and give 
them their reality. For Plato, the Sun is a metaphor of the Form of the Good.18 
                                                
17 Plato, Republic, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 
514a-16b. 
18 Plato writes: “The realm revealed through sight should be likened to the prison dwelling, and 
the light of the fire inside it to the sun’s power. And if you think of the upward journey and the 
seeing of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you won’t 
mistake my intention – since it is what you wanted to hear about.… But this is how these 
phenomena seem to me: in the knowable realm, the last thing to be seen is the form of the good, 
and it is seen only with toil and trouble. Once one has seen it, however, one must infer that it is the 
cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything”. Ibid., 517b-17c. 
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That is to say, the Sun in the material world functions analogously to the way that 
the Good functions in the intelligible world.19 The Good is light itself, the light 
which is very difficult to look upon, which sheds light on other ideas and makes 
them visible to human beings. 
Murdoch derives three important points from this Allegory. These points 
form the foundations of her moral theory: Firstly, the idea of the Good makes the 
virtues, (and reality in general) visible, while it itself is invisible. Secondly, the 
Good is an ideal or a perfection, which can be appreciated through experiencing 
the hierarchy of values. Thirdly, the Good provides us with a sense of direction in 
the process of our moral development. I explore each of these points here.  
Referring to this Allegory in The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch states: 
We see the world in the light of the Good, but what is the Good 
itself? The source of vision is not in the ordinary sense seen …. 
Asking what Good is is not like asking what Truth is or what 
Courage is, since in explaining the latter the idea of Good must 
enter in, it is that in the light of which the explanation must 
proceed.20 
According to Murdoch, the Good is that in the light of which other virtues 
can be seen. Whenever the individual wonders about the meaning of a virtue, such 
as courage, ‘the idea of Good must enter in’. One needs to have a conception of 
the Good in order to recognise certain traits as virtues. Moreover, to acquire a 
virtue like courage, one needs a conception of the Good, as courage involves 
overcoming fear for the sake of a worthy or good end. In order for the individual 
to appreciate courage as a desirable character trait and become motivated to 
acquire this virtue, they need to have the Good in their sights to guide them along 
the path of moral development. Imagine a passer-by who sees that a dog is 
trapped in a house on fire and there is no one else around to help. He knows that 
                                                
19 The material or sensible world is the world we perceive through our senses and is constantly 
changing. In Plato’s view, Forms inhabit the intelligible world, which is unchanging and 
transcendent. 
20 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 95. 
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the fire fighters are on their way but also that if he waits for them, chances are the 
dog will not survive the heat and smoke. He assesses the situation and runs in the 
house and manages to save the dog. Murdoch would say that the passer-by in this 
example has a grasp of what is good. He knows that saving the dog (assuming the 
passer-by is not putting his own life at risk) is the right thing to do.  
Once the individual has a vision of the Good, it helps them to distinguish 
gradations of good and bad, virtues and vices. In this sense the Good is like the 
Sun that makes all virtues, and in fact all reality, visible. However, it is difficult to 
see the Good itself. While the Good makes the virtues visible, “it cannot be 
experienced or represented or defined”.21 It is impossible for the individual to 
apprehend the Good in its absolute form. Although the Good is the source of light 
through which individuals experience the world and identify certain traits as 
virtues, the Good itself is not an object they can independently experience. In 
Murdoch’s view, the reason why individuals can never experience the Good in its 
absolute form is that looking at the Good or the Sun “is not like looking at other 
things …. it is easier to look at the converging edges than to look at the centre 
itself. We do not and probably cannot know, conceptualize, what it is like in the 
centre”.22 After all, “Good is just not a particular, it is not a thing among others”.23 
What Murdoch is suggesting here is that individuals are unable to 
experience the Good directly in its absolute form, but that they can obtain an 
understanding of it through experiencing the hierarchy and ubiquity of values in 
the world. They see that some things are better and some things are worse; they 
understand that some activities are more pleasant than others and some people are 
more courageous, or respectful or polite. For example, an individual can sense 
that carrying the shopping bags of an old lady, who is struggling to do so, is a 
better thing to do than speeding up and walking past her. Although the Good itself 
is not a particular thing or ‘a thing among others’, the individual has a faint 
understanding of it through experiencing all these particular good things. It is 
                                                
21 Ibid., 68. 
22 Ibid., 97. 
23 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 405. 
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through the Good that they intuitively differentiate between values. Any 
experience of particular values points at the perfect Good. Murdoch writes: 
A deep understanding of any field of human activity (painting, for 
instance) involves an increasing revelation of degrees of excellence 
and often a revelation of there being in fact little that is very good 
and nothing that is perfect. Increasing understanding of human 
conduct operates in a similar way. We come to perceive scales, 
distances, standards, and may incline to see as less than excellent 
what previously we were prepared to ‘let by’.24 
A characteristic of human activity for Murdoch is that it is never perfect, 
but aims at perfection.25 According to her, when we reflect upon the nature of 
values and examine their relations to each other, we notice a hierarchy and an 
order. In our experience of ‘degrees of excellence’ the Good as a perfection is 
always present. So “[t]he proper and serious use of the term [the Good] refers us 
to a perfection which is perhaps never exemplified in the world we know … and 
which carries with it the ideas of hierarchy and transcendence”.26 The Good is a 
perfection that guides the individual through their evaluations and helps them to 
see the order of values. It also helps them to stay on the right track.  
                                                
24 The Sovereignty of Good, 60. 
25 Murdoch uses a version of the Ontological proof to argue for the existence of the idea of the 
Good as perfection (or highest value). This argument demonstrates that the attributes of 
‘perfection’ and ‘necessary existence’ are so closely connected that we might say they are actually 
the same. Ibid. Murdoch explains the Ontological proof as originally established by Anselm of 
Canterbury as follows: God is a being than which nothing more perfect can be imagined. If such a 
being does not exist it fails to be the most perfect being, as if God exists in reality external to the 
mind, this entity is endowed with a quality additional to the entity existing only in the mind. In 
other words, if God exists only in the mind, it will not be the being than which nothing more 
perfect can be imagined. Therefore, if we can understand God as the most perfect concept, we also 
can understand that God exists. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 392-93.  In response to his 
critic Gaunilo, Anselm says that the difference between God’s existence and anything else’s 
existence is that God, by definition, has a unique, necessary existence. It is possible to imagine a 
being whose existence is impossible; but about God alone “it is impossible to conceive of His non-
existence”. Ibid., 394. So according to the Ontological proof, God does not only exist, but His 
existence is also necessary. Ibid., 395. The point Murdoch tries to make through Anselm’s 
argument is that of all the attributes of God, it is only the attribute of goodness that actually 
matters and that we can identify in our everyday experience. Other attributes of God are not 
important, as they just lead to “useless confusion”. Murdoch claims that we can do away with God 
and avoid all of the resulting complex metaphysical implications, but we cannot do without the 
Good. In fact, the proof supports the existence of the Good rather than God. Ibid., 419.  
26 The Sovereignty of Good, 90-91. 
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This leads to the last point Murdoch makes in connection to the Allegory 
of the Cave, namely, the idea of perfection as a direction. In Murdoch’s view, in 
our ordinary experiences we “are not usually in doubt about the direction in which 
Good lies”.27 She argues that we “see differences, we sense directions, and we 
know that the Good is still somewhere beyond”.28 Murdoch suggests that the 
Good in its perfect or absolute form feels distant, yet it gives us a sense of 
direction and occasionally the desire to move in that direction. Just like the 
prisoner in Plato’s Allegory who finds his way out of the cave and moves towards 
the Sun, as it is the perfect source of light, we must attempt to shift our attention 
away from ourselves and instead direct it towards the Good. The Good then 
provides us with a “continuous sense of orientation”.29 
In many situations, we experience degrees of value and apply the idea of 
excellence. We measure and compare things, and we decide some things, some 
people or some states of affairs are better than others. For example, when we look 
at flowers in a garden, we may find that we are attracted to some of them more 
than others. Our perception of the flowers is somehow inevitably accompanied by 
seeing some as more beautiful than others. Or if someone steals money from 
another person, they might think it is good that their financial problems are 
lessened. But they are also likely to sense that their action is nowhere near the 
Good qua perfection. So, for Murdoch, just through scrutinising our own thoughts 
and experiences we realise that our world is hierarchical and some of our activities, 
attitudes, and experiences are better (directed towards the Good) or more 
appealing than others. 
It might be objected that Murdoch has overlooked the fact that some 
people seem never to know what it is good to do, and so it seems that the Good as 
perfection does not give a sense of direction to everyone in their moral 
experiences. Let’s examine this objection through an example. Imagine a person 
(Jill) who has been brought up in an isolated area where her only role models are 
                                                
27 Ibid., 95. 
28 Ibid., 91. 
29 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 260. 
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her parents. The parents happen to be of a rebellious nature in that they are 
inclined to disagree with the values of society, and instead consider to be valuable 
what are commonly regarded as moral evils. Through this upbringing Jill learns 
that all morally bad character traits or actions are good. When she encounters 
other people performing right actions, she instinctively judges them as bad people. 
Therefore, it seems that Murdoch’s idea of the Good as an ideal does not lead Jill 
in the right direction.  
Murdoch can respond to this objection by saying that through the standard 
of perfection Jill still has an idea of the Good and an understanding of the 
hierarchy of values. She evaluates every situation and redefines her approach to it. 
She is able to decide that some traits or some actions are better than others. What 
she fails to do, however, is to identify the right instances of the Good (particular 
good things) in her moral life. On Murdoch’s account, the reason why Jill cannot 
see right from wrong in life is that she lacks the ‘vision’ required to see the world 
truly and to live virtuously. Still, people like Jill are capable of assessing their 
own actions. The idea of perfection plays its role of giving them a sense of 
evaluation, even if the evaluation is not commonly acceptable. Yet due to the lack 
of right moral vision, their moral assessments differ from the assessments made 
by virtuous people. The solution to their problem lies in developing the moral 
vision required for recognising the right direction of the Good. This point will be 
further discussed in Chapter 2. 
So far, I have discussed the way in which Murdoch advocates a Platonic 
conception of the Good as the Sun that sheds light on particular good things and 
virtues, and makes them visible while itself being invisible. Nevertheless, while 
being invisible, the Good can be appreciated through experiencing the hierarchy 
of values in everyday life. The Good as an idea of perfection gives the individual 
a sense of direction that guides them in their moral evaluations and their moral 
development.  
In the next section I argue that there is a Kantian aspect to Murdoch’s 
concept of the Good, according to which the Good is located in the mind of the 
moral agent as the condition for the possibility of moral experience. 
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Good as the Condition of Experience 
As explained earlier, in Plato’s Allegory the man who is dragged out of the 
cave is finally able to look at the Sun. To Murdoch, looking directly at the Good is 
not possible. The Good is not an object of one’s experience because it is not an 
ordinary thing but a “transcendent object”.30 Here I argue that Murdoch only 
tentatively refers to the Good as ‘transcendent’ and that this has led to confusion 
among her critics. As I will show, what she actually means is ‘transcendental’ in 
the Kantian sense of the word. ‘Transcendent’ refers to an ontological mode of 
objects. ‘Transcendental’, on the other hand, refers to an epistemological stance of 
a subject. The transcendental concepts are the ones that constitute the ultimate 
basis for human knowledge.31 
Following Plato, Murdoch emphasises that the Good is “… a transcendent 
source of light. Good is above being, non-personal, non-contingent, not a 
particular thing among other things”.32 However, unlike for Plato, ‘transcendence’ 
in the context of Murdoch’s work does not mean other-worldly. The Good does 
not exist in another realm as does Plato’s Form of the Good. She states:   
If someone says, ‘Do you then believe that the Idea of the Good 
exists?’ I reply, ‘No, not as people used to think that God existed. 
All one can do is to appeal to certain areas of experience pointing 
out certain features, and using suitable metaphors and inventing 
suitable concepts where necessary to make these features visible.33 
To Murdoch, the Good is non-existent as it is not an independent entity 
that exists in the external world. It is a conceptual reality as opposed to an 
external reality.34 It does not have a spatiotemporal location. Our minds carry the 
concept of the Good and this concept enables us to make sense of the world, by 
                                                
30 The Sovereignty of Good, 59. 
31 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A299/B368. 
32 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 37. 
33 The Sovereignty of Good, 73. 
34 By ‘conceptual reality’, I am referring to the reality that is present in all our consciousnesses. 
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enabling us to give a structure to our various and varied experiences of particular 
objects. In this sense the Good is a ‘transcendental’ concept of the mind that is 
present in our experiences of the world. We only perceive this concept through 
experiencing particular good things or acts. The Good is a condition of grasping 
the world. In other words, the Good itself is not the object of our knowledge but a 
necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge and experience. So while it is 
present in almost all our moral experiences, it does not exist externally to our 
consciousness. This transcendental status of the Good is what I take to be the 
Kantian influence on Murdoch’s concept of the Good.  
In Kant’s philosophy, the forms of intuition (space and time) and 
categories of understanding (such as unity and plurality, cause and effect, and so 
on) are conditions for the individual’s experience of the world. Kant argues that 
space and time (for instance) are pure forms of the individual’s intuition and are 
conditions by which objects can be experienced. These conditions do not exist 
independently of individuals, and individuals only perceive them through 
experiencing external objects and their relations both with other external objects 
and with the perceiver. Whenever an individual experiences an object in the world, 
they experience the object as being located in a particular place. There is no way 
for them to experience a real object without its having a location. That is also the 
case with the categories of understanding, such as causality. To give an example, 
when someone sees a child throwing a stone at a cat and then that cat running 
away, they simultaneously experience the throwing of the stone and the 
apprehension that it was the ‘cause’ of the cat’s running away. The concept of 
causality is grounded in the individual’s perception of the sequence of the two 
events, namely the throwing of the stone, and the cat running away. Causality as 
such is not an external thing for one to experience. It is rather how one’s 
experience is constituted through perception.35 
In the same way, the concept of the Good in Murdoch’s theory is the 
condition for the individual’s moral experience (or any experience that demands 
some sort of evaluation). When the individual experiences an object in the world, 
                                                
35 See Kant, chap. 1. 
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they also experience the value they attach to that object. In this sense, the Good is 
not an ordinary thing to be perceived in an ordinary manner. It is a transcendental 
concept of mind through which one experiences the world. In Murdoch’s own 
words “… what is transcendental is not derived from human experience, but is a 
condition of it”.36 The Good is a transcendental concept of the mind that makes 
evaluative experience – for Murdoch almost all experiences – possible. In the 
above example of the courageous passer-by who runs into the fire to save a dog, it 
is the a priori understanding of the transcendental concept of the Good that leads 
the person to know what is the right thing to do in that situation. The Good works 
as a lens through which one sees the world evaluatively. Murdoch says: 
In many familiar ways various values pervade and colour what we 
take to be the reality of our world; wherein we constantly evaluate 
our own values and those of others …. That is, our activity of 
moral discrimination cannot be explained as merely one natural 
instinct among others …. The possession of a moral sense is 
uniquely human.37  
So the individual’s cognitive perception is coloured with values. This 
‘moral colour’ is inherent in almost all individuals’ perceptions of the world.38 
The implication of this understanding of the Good is that the individual’s moral 
experiences are objective in the Kantian sense of the word. In Kant’s philosophy, 
the objectivity of an experience is not in tension with the experience being a 
representation in the individual’s mind. The mind actively generates the 
representational content of the subject’s experience. The representations generated 
by the activity of the mind genuinely deserve to be called cognition, because they 
are the product of the discursive mind which retains its objectivity, rather than 
contingent psychological features of the individual.39 So to Kant the possibility 
that a concept can be situated in the mind does not necessarily lead to 
                                                
36 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 28. 
37 Ibid., 26. 
38 Ibid. 
39A. B. Dickerson, Kant on Representation and Objectivity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 1-3. 
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subjectivism. On Murdoch’s account, the Good as an objective condition of our 
experience plays the same role as Kant’s forms of intuition and categories of 
understanding. The individual’s moral experience may seem subjective, as they do 
not exist independently of the individual’s perception of them. However, they are 
objective because the concept of the Good is shared by all individuals and, as a 
result, the moral experience or the experience of values are shared by all, 
independently of each individual’s particular personal stance. The Good is present 
in the individual’s experiences just as a sense of time and space is present in their 
experience of the world on Kant’s account. So the Good, just as the categories of 
understanding, is not the property of things in themselves, independent of the 
individual’s mind, but rather the structure that their mind imposes on their 
experiences. Thus for Murdoch, the transcendental Good establishes the 
objectivity of moral experiences, which means the idea of the Good provides the 
individual with an objective standard for morality, an ideal that is independent of 
their self-concerned understanding of the world and is shared by all individuals. 
With this presentation of the Good Murdoch avoids the charge of subjectivism, 
even though she locates the Good in the individual’s mind.40 
In summary, in Murdoch’s view, the Good is a value concept that is both 
distant and perfect. It gives the individual a continuous sense of direction and 
moral orientation. I argued that this concept is located in the individual’s mind 
and is the condition for their experiences. All individuals share this objective and 
evaluative standpoint, and thus, on Murdoch’s view, moral values are objective 
values.  
In what follows, I will discuss two implications of Murdoch’s account of 
the Good. 
  
                                                
40 Murdoch’s endeavour to present the Good as a condition of experience and as an objective 
standard for morality is intended to provide an alternative to the voluntarism of modern ethics, 




The Dissolution of the Fact-Value Distinction and Moral 
Realism 
In the previous section, I explored the Platonic and the Kantian features of 
Murdoch’s concept of the Good. I discussed the way in which Murdoch locates 
the concept of the Good (moral value) in human consciousness and considers 
moral concepts to be the moral structure of the world. In this section, I explain 
two important implications of this approach to moral value in Murdoch’s moral 
theory: 1) the dissolution of the fact-value distinction, and 2) Murdochian moral 
realism. 
The Dissolution of the Fact-Value Dichotomy 
In order to offer a realistic presentation of values and to avoid the charge 
of subjectivism, Murdoch rejects the fact-value dichotomy in moral philosophy. 
This aspect of Murdoch’s theory has become so significant that as Cora Diamond 
puts it: “If analytical philosophy no longer accepts as unquestionable the idea of a 
gap between fact and value, this has much to do with Iris Murdoch’s earlier 
writings. The Sovereignty of Good, especially, is often treated as ground-breaking 
in this regard”.41 
The fact-value distinction emerges most clearly after David Hume’s 
famous argument that prescriptive ought statements do not follow from 
descriptive is statements. In other words, it is impossible to deduce moral 
statements from factual ones. 42  In the Nineteenth Century, the fact-value 
distinction tended to be neglected, particularly  due to the belief in the autonomy 
of morality after Kant.43 G. E. Moore argues that it is a ‘Naturalistic fallacy’ to 
                                                
41 As an instance of this point, Diamond cites Hilary Putnam’s Realism with a Human Face. 
Cora Diamond, ""We Are Perpetually Moralists": Iris Murdoch, Fact, and Value," in Iris Murdoch 
and the Search for Human Goodness, ed. Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 104. 
42 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, (Kitchener: Batoche, 1999). 3.1.1. 
43 See Charles R. Pigden, "Introduction," in Hume on Is and Ought, ed. Charles R. Pigden 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 13. 
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attempt to define moral concepts in terms of non-moral ones.44 Since then, the 
fact-value distinction has been a focus of attention for moral philosophers.  
Murdoch, however, rejects the distinction and argues that the ‘anti-
naturalistic argument’, according to which it is not possible to derive values from 
facts, or ought from is, is the most effective argument in modern moral 
philosophy, but still problematic.45 She regards her objection to this idea not as 
‘logical’ or ‘philosophical’, but as purely ‘moral’, because to her, “certain bad 
results follow in practice from thinking about morality in a certain way”.46 In her 
view it is only through considering morality and values as part of a larger 
framework of facts that the agent becomes morally responsive to the world. If we 
do not attach morality to “the substance of the world”, we may be in danger of 
making our morality into a dogma, taking our values for granted, and being 
intolerant of others.47 For Murdoch, what has led philosophers to consider that 
there is a gap between fact and value is a misunderstanding of the cognitive 
function of human consciousness. As Murdoch states: “This originally well-
intentioned segregation [of fact and value] … ignores an obvious and important 
aspect of human existence, the way in which almost all our concepts and activities 
involve evaluation”.48 And again: 
It is certainly often worth saying: Look at the facts! This is a way, a 
way, of directing attention. But what we look at, and attempt to 
clarify and know, are matters in which value already inheres …. 
Value goes right down to the bottom of the cognitive situation.49  
To dismiss the fact-value distinction, Murdoch employs her transcendental 
account of the Good that is located in human consciousness and the metaphysical 
implications of that account. Therefore as explained in the previous section, on 
                                                
44 See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 58-93. 
45 Murdoch, "Metaphysics and Ethics," 64. 
46 Ibid., 66. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 25. 
49 Ibid., 384. 
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Murdoch’s view, the Good is the condition for almost all our experiences of the 
world. The implication of this view is that almost all of our perceptions are value-
laden. We hardly face facts that are completely devoid of our evaluations, for 
values ‘colour’ our perception of the world.50 Our cognitive approach to our 
surroundings almost never lacks evaluation. There are certainly experiences, such 
as hearing my phone ringing, that might not be accompanied by any sort of value 
judgment. However, in Murdoch’s view, at least in most cases, cognition and 
evaluation happen at the same time. For example, when we see a person 
screaming and running away from a little puppy, we (most likely) simultaneously 
see him as cowardly. When we watch our children running around at the 
playground, we are not just looking at them factually, but rather see them as smart 
and energetic, or maybe even smarter and more agile than the other children. Even 
our perception of the weather is accompanied by an evaluation, such as when we 
find some kinds of weather more pleasant than others. 
This is what Murdoch means when she says: “if moral concepts are 
regarded as deep moral configurations of the world, rather than as lines drawn 
round separable factual areas, then there will be no facts ‘behind them’ for them 
to be erroneously defined in terms of”.51 She concludes that if we change our view 
concerning the role of concepts from evaluating the areas that are genuinely 
neutral to those which “determine a vision of the world”, the fact-value distinction 
loses its point.52  If we regard moral concepts as constituting our moral world (due 
to the Good being the condition of the individual’s grasp of the world), we do 
away with the problem of defining facts in terms of values. There is ultimately no 
fact-value distinction, as the individual’s reading of the world is almost always 
value-laden. Moral values are visions and inspirations that stem from a 
transcendental source (the concept of the Good), and not only modes of publicly 
visible activities.53 It is not that we confront the neutral facts and then try to attach 
                                                
50 Ibid., 26. 
51 "Vision and Choice in Morality," in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on Philosophy and 
Literature, ed. Peter J. Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1999), 95. 
52 Ibid., 94. 
53 Ibid., 94-95. 
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some moral concepts to them. Rather, our experience of reality includes values as 
part of the very configuration of the world.54   
Murdochian Moral Realism 
In “On ‘God’ and ‘Good’” Murdoch states that “… morality, goodness, is 
a form of realism”. 55  The concept of the Good is “indefinable and non-
representable”. 56  And “Good … is transcendent”. 57  Murdoch’s apparently 
conflicting depictions of the Good – the Good is a part of reality, but not a thing 
among other things, and that it is a part of reality, yet also transcendent and non-
representable – has led her critics to offer different interpretations of the 
ontological status of the Good, and thus different interpretations of her moral 
realism. In particular, Murdoch’s description of the Good as a “transcendent 
reality” which is “somewhere beyond” has caused the most confusion.58 The 
notion of ‘transcendence’ or ‘beyond’ has led critics to interpret Murdoch’s moral 
realism in two different ways. Some contend that in Murdoch’s view the Good is 
a real aspect of the world, independent of the being and the mind of the 
individual.59 Whereas other critics argue that for Murdoch, the concept of the 
                                                
54 Richard Moran tries to show the association of Murdoch’s dissolution of the fact-value 
distinction with an existentialist view. Moran contends that Murdoch presents a distorted view of 
existentialism, and then tries to distance her theory from this view. As an example, he refers to the 
fact-value distinction and argues that unlike what Murdoch claims, the abolishment of the fact-
value distinction has its roots in existentialist ideas. Thinkers, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Sartre argue that the facts we experience are coloured by our concerns, and this is the individual’s 
inescapable orientation in the world. Richard Moran, "Iris Murdoch and Existentialism," in Iris 
Murdoch, Philosopher: A Collection of Essays, ed. Justin Broackes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 181-88.  This is certainly not what Murdoch claims. On Murdoch’s account, values 
are objective. The facts are not ‘coloured by our concerns’ and our individual conditionings, but 
rather by the concept of the Good that is transcendentally conceived. 
55 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 57. 
56 Ibid., 68. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 73. 
59 Roger Crisp and Margaret Holland, for example, are reluctant to interpret Murdoch’s Good 
as not being in this world. Holland holds that for the Good to be ‘beyond’ may sound esoteric but 
can be understood in a more mundane way by looking at examples such as learning music or a 
new language. She says: “Effort is directed to closing the gap between one’s current understanding 
and a more or less remote standard which transcends one’s present level of accomplishment. The 
standard is intuited as ‘beyond’ and serves to focus and discipline one’s energies. This is similar to 
the magnetic attraction of perfection to which Murdoch refers”. Margaret Holland, "Social 
Convention and Neurosis as Obstacles to Moral Freedom," in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher: A 
Collection of Essays, ed. Justin Broackes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 271. Also see 
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Good is not independent of the individual’s thought.60 Here I discuss some 
readings of Murdoch’s concept of the Good and moral realism to argue in favour 
of my presentation of Murdoch’s moral realism, which is based on my 
understanding of the Good as a transcendental concept. This interpretation I 
believe to be more consistent with other aspects of Murdoch’s moral theory. 
Maria Antonaccio characterises Murdoch’s realism as a ‘reflexive realism’, 
in which the Good is a concept that does not have any referent but itself. 
According to Antonaccio, the starting point of the reflexive realism is to affirm 
that the truth-status of moral claims is internal to consciousness. Although the 
medium for evaluating moral claims is consciousness, the standard is objective.61 
Antonaccio suggests that although Murdoch is critical of the linguistic method of 
contemporary moral philosophers, she takes ‘moral language’ to mediate the 
relation between reality and the evaluative understanding of reality.62 She says: 
“Moral language is the instrument of an individual’s unique cognitive and 
                                                                                                                                 
Roger Crisp, "Iris Murdoch on Nobility and Moral Value," in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher: A 
Collection of Essays, ed. Justin Broackes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 289. 
Furthermore, Patricia O’Connor takes the ‘transcendence of the Good’ literally and holds that the 
Good in Murdoch’s view exercises its authority from somewhere beyond the sensible world. 
O'Connor, 137-44. 
60 Among this group of critics, we can point to Maria Antonaccio and Heather Widdows. 
Widdows acknowledges the difficulty in understanding Murdoch’s concept of the Good. She 
argues that the obstacle to Murdoch’s realism is that of understanding the reality of the Good 
without establishing it as an object. Murdoch’s Ontological proof, for Widdows, establishes the 
Good as something more than simply an idea or metaphor. By that argument, Murdoch intends to 
assign an ontological status to the Good. However, Widdows suggests that the use of the 
Ontological proof, as the proof of the reality of the Good, is confusing in that Murdoch also uses 
the argument to deny the possibility of the Good as an object. Widdows compares this idea to a 
mystical approach in Christianity, according to which God is not an object, but does exist. She 
notes that even though Murdoch regards God as an object, many critics believe that she has simply 
replaced God with the Good. On the other hand, the Good, to Murdoch, is impersonal. Since it has 
no personal characteristics (unlike God), it does not prescribe any specific behaviour to 
individuals. Heather Widdows, "Iris Murdoch's ‘Good’: A Critical Analysis of Its Nature and 
Relevance," New Blackfriars 82, no. 960 (2001): 66-70.  Widdows suggests that it is best to 
disregard Murdoch’s Ontological proof, in order to avoid the impression that the Good is an 
ontological object. So Murdoch’s Good, she argues, “is non-personal, and though it inspires and 
informs the moral life, the good is indifferent to human striving”. The Moral Vision of Iris 
Murdoch (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 81. Also see Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker, 
eds., Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996), 115-23. 
61 Antonaccio, Picturing the Human: The Moral Thought of Iris Murdoch, 118-19. 
62 Ibid., 121. Antonaccio calls this account ‘reflexive realism’. Reflexive in that the Good is in 
the mind, but points to a reality beyond the mind. 
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evaluative grasp of reality”.63  Moral perception is a process of “conceptual 
formation and translation between fact and value”.64 So any experience of the 
empirical world must filter through the consciousness and its language-using 
function. It is the inevitable mediation of moral concepts that leads to the 
individual’s distinctive appreciation of the facts. Due to the centrality Antonaccio 
assigns to moral concepts, she considers Murdoch’s philosophical method “deeply 
‘linguistic’”.65 
David Robjant criticises Antonaccio’s interpretation of Murdoch, 
contending that it is not possible to regard Murdoch’s theory as a reflexive realism. 
He argues that in following Plato, Murdoch’s approach is empirical, in that for her 
“the Good is a reality that our concept of the Good is stretching towards”.66 
According to Robjant, in Murdoch’s theory moral values indicate something 
about the world, however, in Antonaccio’s reading Murdoch’s Good is nothing 
more than a concept. He thus denies the label of realism to Antonaccio’s 
understanding of Murdoch’s Good, for in that reading, the Good is not part of the 
objective world; it is rather in a reflexive space between the mind and the world. 
Robjant expresses his surprise at Antonaccio’s assumption that reality in the 
reflexive space is as real as reality needs to be.67  
My reading of the concept of the Good in Murdoch’s work differs from 
the interpretations given by Antonaccio and Robjant, and, I believe, is more 
consistent with other aspects of Murdoch’s view.68 To begin with, I think Robjant 
overlooks clear indications of Murdoch’s conviction that the Good does not exist 
in a conventional sense – “Good is not a particular, it is not a thing among 
                                                
63 Ibid., 121-22. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 43. 
66 David Robjant, "As a Buddhist Christian; the Misappropriation of Iris Murdoch," The 
Heythrop Journal 52, no. 6 (2011): 997. Elizabeth Burns also suggests that for the Good to be 
transcendent, it must be independent of the individual’s mind. Elizabeth Burns, "Iris Murdoch and 
the Nature of Good," Religious Studies 33, no. 3 (1997): 311. 
67 Robjant,  996-1000.  
68 This will also enable me to explore Murdoch’s concepts of imagination and fantasy in the 
context of her realism. These concepts will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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others”.69 Or as she says (and I quoted above) elsewhere, “If someone says, ‘Do 
you then believe that the Idea of the Good exists?’ I reply, ‘No, not as people used 
to think that God existed’”.70 Murdoch denies the ‘existence’ of the Good. 
However, with the intricate role she assigns to the Good in the individual’s moral 
life, it can be inferred that what she is denying is the external existence of the 
Good as opposed to its conceptual existence. When Murdoch states that the Good 
is not ‘a thing among other things’ she is rejecting the external existence of the 
Good. While to her the Good cannot be “purely subjective” either, she wants to 
avoid “any heavy material connotation of the misleading word ‘exist’”.71 Robjant 
emphasises the evidence of the reality of the Good in our lives, as something that 
exists and is not merely a construction of the philosopher’s mind. Yet, he fails to 
explain how we experience the Good in our lives and what he means by the 
‘earthly’ existence of this reality and how it is evident in our lives.72 
Murdoch does mention the ‘reality’ of the Good. It is real in that it 
influences the individual’s perception of the world. But in its absolute and perfect 
form, it cannot be found anywhere in the external world. What is to be found in 
the world is particular instances of good things, the ‘goodness’ of which is 
assigned to them by the distinctive function of the individual’s mind. So Robjant’s 
reading of Murdoch’s work fails to clarify the ontological status of the Good in a 
way that is consistent with other aspects of Murdoch’s moral view. Thus, his 
criticism of Antonaccio’s view does not apply. 
In this regard, Antonaccio’s reading of Murdoch’s view is more plausible. 
However, other aspects of her reading are less so. While I agree with Antonaccio 
that Murdoch brings the locus of the Good (value) back to the mind of the 
individual and that this reading helps us better explain other aspects of Murdoch’s 
                                                
69  Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 405. (My italics).  
70 The Sovereignty of Good, 73. 
71 Ibid., 62. 
72 See David Robjant, "The Earthy Realism of Plato's Metaphysics, Or: What Shall We Do 
with Iris Murdoch?," Philosophical Investigations 35, no. 1 (2012): 43-67.  See also "As a 
Buddhist Christian; the Misappropriation of Iris Murdoch," 996-1000.  And "Symposium on Iris 
Murdoch: How Miserable We Are, How Wicked; into the 'Void' with Murdoch, Mulhall, and 




thought, I do not agree with her that the Good or moral value is only a linguistic 
function. On my interpretation of Murdoch’s view, her emphasis on inventing 
new concepts and descriptions in moral philosophy (on which Antonaccio bases 
her argument) does not account for the mediating role of moral concepts as 
linguistic phenomena, but rather the mediating role of the concept of the Good as 
a transcendental phenomenon.73 Antonaccio’s reading of Murdoch is a better 
interpretation than any given by those who interpret the Good as an external 
object. I also believe that we should avoid any other-worldly reading of 
Murdoch’s consideration of the Good as a ‘transcendent reality’. Nevertheless, in 
my view we need to take into account the fact that for Murdoch the Good is still 
‘beyond’, which in this context means beyond perceptions and concepts of mind, 
yet nevertheless unifying them. As Murdoch says, the Good is a concept with a 
“unifying power” that has “a peculiar relation to other concepts”.74 It is the 
perfection of other values. Murdoch contends that “…we introduce order into our 
conceptions of the world through our apprehension of Good”.75 So while it is a 
concept, the Good is a transcendental one. It is the condition of an individual’s 
experience, and enables them to experience the hierarchy and ubiquity of the 
values in the world with a sense of unity.  
So offering a linguistic account of the role and position of the concept of 
the Good disregards Murdoch’s Platonic influence, according to which the Good 
is the ultimate truth, shedding light on the path of the truth-seeking moral agent; 
an existence different from and above all other existence. Murdoch states: “The 
mind which has ascended to the vision of the Good can subsequently see the 
concepts through which it has ascended (art, work, nature, people, ideas, 
institutions, situations, etc., etc.) in their true nature and in their proper 
                                                
73 At times Antonaccio’s interpretation of what she calls Murdoch’s ‘transcendental argument’ 
comes very close to my understanding of Murdoch’s concept of the Good as a transcendental 
concept. She refers to the Good as the transcendental Good which is the background condition for 
our evaluations. However, her account of reflexive realism and the emphasis on the linguistic 
aspect of values separates her reading of Murdoch’s work from mine. See, for example, Maria 
Antonaccio, "The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Murdoch's Philosophical Writings," in Iris 
Murdoch, Philosopher: A Collection of Essays, ed. Justin Broackes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 173-74. 
74 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 92. 
75 Ibid. (My italics). 
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relationships to each other”.76 So the Good as a concept beyond other concepts 
enables us to experience particular good things as good, with the unifying sense of 
value.   
Now I return to Murdoch’s statement that, “… morality, goodness, is a 
form of realism”.77 She continues: “The idea of a really good man living in a 
private dream world seems unacceptable .… [H]e must know certain things about 
his surroundings, most obviously the existence of other people and their claims”.78 
According to my reading of Murdoch’s concept of the Good, for morality to be a 
form of realism, moral experience must be inseparable from the cognition of 
reality. The moral cognition of Murdoch’s good man cannot be his purely 
personal understanding of the world affected by his psychological status.79 Moral 
cognition should be an objective understanding of one’s surroundings, and the 
transcendental concept of the Good is the very objective condition of one’s moral 
experience. As I showed previously, while the Good is a concept of the 
individual’s mind, it is a permanent condition for their experiences, regardless of 
their particular responses to particular situations. It is shared amongst all 
individuals and is the objective background condition for their perceptions or 
cognitions of the world. 
By Murdoch’s lights, morality cannot be divorced from reality and moral 
knowledge is knowledge of reality. This is because almost all perceptions of facts 
are ‘coloured’ by values. The more one endeavours to see reality as it really is, the 
better the quality of one’s moral experience, as one acquires a better insight of 
values. In other words, since every understanding of reality is evaluative, a true 
cognition of the world means a true moral understanding of the world with the 
values in it. Moral value is real as all individuals are equally able to experience 
it.80 Since moral judgments can be shared by all individuals, moral value is the 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 57. 
78 Ibid. 
79 That is why, as we will see later in the thesis, Murdoch emphasizes that the individual needs 
to suppress their egoistic desires so that their confrontations with the world be unaffected by them.  
80 As I argued earlier, in Murdoch’s moral theory, moral values are real in the same way that 
causality, space and time are real in Kant’s transcendental idealism.  
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objective condition of almost all individuals’ experiences.81 Evaluative judgments 
may be true or false depending on how truly or factually the individual 
understands the world. Every claim of objectivity is an evaluative understanding 
of the world. Thus a proper moral (evaluative) understanding of one’s surrounding 
is a factual understanding, as facts are almost always accompanied by values. So 
an evaluative understanding of the world aims to manifest the world in some way. 
If it fails to manifest the world the way it really is, it is not a true evaluative 
understanding of the world. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored ‘the Good’ as a concept that is located at the 
centre of Murdoch’s moral theory, and as will become more clear in the chapters 
that follow, plays a crucial role in her view of moral education and moral 
development. I argued that Murdoch considers the Good to be the perfection and 
the source of unity of all moral values. On Murdoch’s view the Good is the very 
condition of the individual’s experience of the world, which means that almost all 
perceptions are value-laden. In other words, almost all human perception is in a 
way moral perception. That is why, for Murdoch, the problem of the fact-value 
distinction which has been extensively discussed among moral philosophers, does 
not make sense. In light of this view of the Good as the condition of cognition or 
perception, Murdoch advocates a form of moral realism according to which moral 
values are real, objective, and independent of the individual’s personal and 
psychological condition in any particular occasion. While values do not exist 
externally to human consciousness, they form the necessary condition of almost 
all our experiences of the world. In this sense, they are real and objective, because 
they are independent of any particular individual’s conditionings. 
In the next Chapter, I will discuss Murdoch’s account of the concepts of 
‘inner life’ as the central focus in the process of moral growth, and ‘love’, as the 
highest virtue.   
                                                
81 See the previous sub-section. Murdoch points out that for individuals to be able to acquire a 
realistic view of their surroundings, they are required to develop a special vision or attitude 
towards the world. The reason why individuals do not seem to share the same moral understanding 




Attention and Inner Life 
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Murdoch reclaims human 
consciousness as the main locus of morality. I argued that ‘the Good’ as the 
condition of the individual’s perception of the world makes for Murdoch’s moral 
realism, according to which moral value is real as all individuals are equally able 
to experience it. Moral cognition should be an objective understanding of reality.  
To consider the implications of Murdoch’s philosophy for the role of art in 
moral development, it is important to obtain first an understanding of her view of 
moral development. Some philosophers think moral development is a matter of 
learning how to behave better, to obey moral rules, or to become more concerned 
about the happiness of others. By contrast, Murdoch insightfully explains that 
what leads some individuals to become morally better people and make better 
moral judgements is the quality of their inner life (their beliefs, emotions, motives, 
and intentions). The education and improvement of one’s inner life becomes so 
important to Murdoch that it can be said that her moral philosophy is an attempt to 
answer the question: ‘How can we become morally better people?’ The focus of 
Murdoch’s theory is principally the ‘moral development’ of the individual, the 
process of improving one’s moral vision – an important aspect of inner life – in 
order to see other people more truly and more lovingly. My aim is to establish that 
on Murdoch’s view, moral education needs to be focused on one’s inner life and 
moral vision, which, as I argue later in the thesis, can be accomplished through 
attention to art.  
In this Chapter, I begin with Murdoch’s famous thought experiment 
involving the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law to show how Murdoch explains 
the process of moral improvement. As I will show, given that moral progress is a 
process occurring in time within the consciousness of the moral agent, the starting 
point for their moral change is their contemplation of their inner thoughts and 
motives. Obtaining a clearer vision of these thoughts and motives, in the context 
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of Murdoch’s philosophy, makes the ideal of ‘the Good’ clearer in the agent’s 
mind. At this point the agent becomes more conscious of people and things 
around them. They become able “… to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and 
join the world as it really is”.82 This is what Murdoch calls ‘love’, which is a 
truthful and sympathetic way of seeing and understanding other people, and is the 
goal of moral development.   
Section One  
Inner Life: Murdoch’s Thought Experiment 
In an era when universal concepts, such as reason and God, and universal 
institutions, such as religion, have lost their authority and legitimacy, Murdoch 
argues that the concept of the human being has become “thin as a needle”.83 We 
have been reduced to an empty will and the idea of a human personality has 
become too shallow and flimsy. In Murdoch’s view, moral philosophy should not 
only focus on external actions, but also on private voluntary actions (that is, what 
we do in relation to ourselves or to nature around us) and inner action (that is, 
what occurs in the privacy of our consciousness). She discusses this point through 
her famous example of the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law in her essay “The 
Idea of Perfection”.84 
In this example, there is a mother-in-law (M) who finds her daughter-in-
law (D) “unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement”, “… insufficiently 
ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, [and] always tiresomely 
juvenile”.85 Although M believes that “her son has married beneath him” she 
never lets her real opinion show.86 As time passes, M, being capable of self-
criticism, begins to pay close attention to D and to deliberately reflect upon her 
evaluation of her. M suspects that it might be the case that her own jealousy and 
                                                
82 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 91. 
83 Ibid., 52. 
84 Having claimed that metaphysics is a form of ‘picturing’, Murdoch herself puts forward 
‘pictures of humans’ in her moral philosophy, the best instance of which is this thought 
experiment. See Antonaccio, A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch, 83-84. 
85 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 16-17. 
86 Ibid., 17. 
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narrow-mindedness led her initially to see D the way she did. M makes a great 
effort to contemplate this image fairly, and this leads her to slowly change her 
opinion of D. It is a process of changing that occurs in M’s vision. Her vision is 
infinitely perfectible. Murdoch says:  
… the change is not in D’s behaviour but in M’s mind. D is 
discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified 
but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but 
delightfully youthful, and so on. As I say, ex hypothesi, M’s 
behaviour, beautiful from the start, in no way alters.87  
M has never treated D badly, so in this process her actions do not change. 
What transforms in M is her state of consciousness and the way she sees D. As 
Murdoch points out, this shift in M’s vision is not out of self-delusion, but out of 
love and justice.  
This example illustrates three key elements of Murdoch’s moral theory: 
First, moral change involves a continuous struggle and deliberation over oneself 
and others. The moral agent should constantly strive to recognize their prejudices 
and conventional attitudes in order to see others justly and compassionately. 
Second, proper moral change is a change of vision that occurs in consciousness 
and vision, or in what Murdoch calls inner life. And third, a virtuous person is one 
who has acquired the capacity to love, which enables them to see the reality of 
other individuals and to sympathize with them. I will discuss these points 
throughout this chapter.  
Deliberation over Self and Others 
The first important point implicit in Murdoch’s example is that in order 
truthfully to see and judge others around them, the moral agent must first be 
capable of acknowledging the weaknesses of their own character. The turning 
point in the way that M in the above example looks at D is the moment when she 
realizes that “‘I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and 




narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again.’”88 
If M does not look back at herself critically and identify her character flaws, the 
likelihood that she would see D differently without such introspection is very low. 
After looking back at herself, M realizes that the bias and jealousy she has 
towards D has clouded her judgment. This realization is what she needs to become 
motivated to change her vision and attitude.  
So the decisive factor in M’s change of attitude towards D is her capacity 
for self-criticism and self-knowledge. Murdoch denounces our egoistic tendencies 
throughout her work, as she believes such egoism is the main factor in preventing 
or retarding our moral progress.89 To Murdoch, we are naturally selfish, and to 
improve morally we have to try to become less selfish. So identifying one’s 
selfish tendencies can be an important step forward on the path of moral 
development. Murdoch does not expand on this point further. But there seems to 
be an inconsistency on this point in Murdoch’s work. While M’s ability to 
develop self-knowledge helps her improve her attitude, for Murdoch such a deep 
self-knowledge is usually not possible. Murdoch says: 
‘Self-knowledge’, in the sense of a minute understanding of one’s 
own machinery, seems to me, except at a fairly simple level, 
usually a delusion. A sense of such self-knowledge may of course 
be induced in analysis for therapeutic reasons, but ‘the cure’ does 
not prove the alleged knowledge genuine. Self is as hard to see 
justly as other things, and when clear vision has been achieved, self 
is a correspondingly smaller and less interesting object.90 
In this passage Murdoch claims that self-knowledge is only possible at the 
most superficial level. Just like everything else, ‘self’ is likely to be looked at and 
judged through our egocentric impulses. The self is a deceiver. It is not possible – 
at least for most people – to see one’s self justly, as one will likely be deceived by 
it. The self is more susceptible to prejudice, and focusing on it only feeds one’s 
                                                
88 Ibid. (My italics) 
89 Ibid., 51. 
90 Ibid., 66. 
26 
 
selfish motives. In our moral quests, we need to completely disregard or defeat 
our ego, as it is the enemy of the moral life.91  
If it is neither possible nor desirable to gain self-knowledge, then this 
raises the question of how we can recognize the egoistic tendencies of our ‘selves’, 
as M did, and then overcome them. It therefore seems that Murdoch must accept 
that we can attain a certain degree of self-knowledge, as she herself suggests in 
the example of the mother-in-law. Before trying to improve oneself, one needs the 
ability to look disinterestedly at one’s self and identify all of its negative aspects. 
The identification of the problem, namely one’s egocentrism, seems to be a good 
motive for resolving it. While it is true that ‘the self is hard to see justly’ and that 
‘self-knowledge is usually a delusion’, the moral agent still needs to make an 
effort to see beyond the selfish desires of their ego. So, instead of ignoring the self, 
as Murdoch suggests, one needs to find a way to assess it without bias. Similarly, 
Samantha Vice argues that it is hard to reconcile Murdoch’s insistence that we 
must turn away from the self, as it is selfish and deluded, with the view that a 
degree of self-knowledge or self-directed attention is required for moral progress. 
Self-concern is a necessary constituent of one’s moral journey. According to Vice, 
throughout her work, Murdoch emphasises the threat posed by the self, yet the 
self is not only the fantasy-ridden ego. The part of the self that can recognise its 
own pitfalls and can be attracted to perfection is open to self-improvement. So 
instead of ignoring this self as Murdoch suggests, we should educate it. Vice 
suggests that Murdoch needs a richer concept of the self to explain moral progress. 
For Vice, this complex self is part of the ethical reality that need to be attended 
to.92  
Let’s return to the example again and assume, for the sake of argument, 
that M is actually capable of self-knowledge and overcoming her ill judgments 
and feelings towards D. When M identifies her own unfairness, she makes an 
effort to see D more accurately. As Murdoch states: “What M is ex hypothesi 
                                                
91 Ibid., 91. 
92 Samantha Vice, "The Ethics of Self-Concern," in Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment, ed. Anne 
Rowe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 60-71. For another approach to this objection see 
Christopher Mole, "Attention, Self and the Sovereignty of Good," ibid., 72-84. 
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attempting to do is not just to see D accurately but to see her justly or lovingly”.93 
M’s approach to D improves in two ways: she sees D more accurately, the way 
she actually is; and she sees her more justly and sympathetically or lovingly. As 
Sabina Lovibond points out, there is a question to be asked here: “What if seeing 
D ‘lovingly’ is in fact at variance with seeing her justly?”94 M’s attention to D 
changes her view of D from negative to positive. According to Lovibond, 
Murdoch does not suggest that all negative moral attributes are empty, in that they 
do not have any instances in reality. So M’s new completely positive picture of D 
is thought to be more accurate either due to the fact that D is actually faultless, or 
because it is a kinder attitude towards D. Lovibond suggests that the second 
option is closer to the spirit of Murdoch’s thought, but that there are some 
practical difficulties with this conclusion. First, one cannot aim at improving 
oneself if one is incapable of seeing faults in others. Second, and which seems to 
be the more important difficulty, is that the prevention of wrongdoing and the 
enforcement of justice are dependent on recognising wrongdoings. It is the only 
way the innocent can be defended against the unjust.95 
Lovibond’s concern is valid. While I agree with her that Murdoch’s 
example of M and D can be misleading in demonstrating her view of morality as a 
realistic understanding of other people, I tend to disagree with Lovibond’s 
argument. It is true that M’s judgment of D transforms into a wholly positive 
account of D’s attributes and this in turn may seem quite counter-intuitive. 
Nonetheless, we do not have a third person in this scenario whose conception of D 
can be compared to M’s revised conception of her. That could help us to decide 
whether M’s new understanding or judgment of D is realistic or not. So we must 
rely on Murdoch’s own judgment as the third person when she clearly says: 
“When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is”.96 As David Robjant 
points out, Murdoch’s point is not that D is free from any defect, but rather “she 
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does not have any of the faults which M’s jealousy projects onto her”.97 This 
means that M’s new judgment of D is not tainted by her egoistic motives. 
Murdoch herself seems to be conscious of this potential objection when she says:  
I used above words such as ‘just’ and ‘intelligent’ which implied a 
favourable value judgment on M’s activity: and I want in fact to 
imagine a case where one would feel approval of M’s change of 
view. But of course in real life, and this is of interest, it might be 
very hard to decide whether what M was doing was proper or not, 
and opinions might differ…. Some people might say ‘she deludes 
herself’ while others would say she was moved by love or justice. I 
am picturing a case where I would find the latter description 
appropriate.98 
While it is possible that M is in fact deluding herself, Murdoch’s 
assumption is that M is actually an intelligent person and that her second thoughts 
about D are moved by justice, in that they are more in line with the reality of who 
D is. So while the example can be confusing, Murdoch clearly states that M’s 
second judgment is a better judgment (yet still not perfect) in the sense that it is 
not only more just and loving, but also more accurate (assuming M does not have 
any evidence of D’s really being rude and undignified, and so on). Murdoch’s 
message is clear here. Not every moral effort leads to the knowledge of one’s self 
and others, but this is the best one can hope for when aiming at moral 
improvement. A moral agent’s attempt to see other people more accurately may 
turn out to be unsuccessful, but they have no better choice than to keep trying. 
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Murdoch wishes to establish an emphasis on the ‘inner life’ of the moral 
agent, rather than their publicly observable actions, as an essential aspect of moral 
philosophy. When M decides to re-examine her judgement of D and starts to look 
at her more justly, her opinion and emotions towards D gradually alter. Her 
external behaviour towards D has been gracious since the beginning, and her 
change of vision does not alter the outer actions of either woman. Murdoch 
highlights this point by saying: “If we take D to be now absent or dead this can 
make it clear that the change is not in D’s behaviour but in M’s mind”.99 M’s 
inward feeling and thoughts remain hidden from other people throughout. 
Murdoch writes:  
At any rate the idea which we are trying to make sense of is that M 
has in the interim been active, she has been doing something, 
something which we approve of, something which is somehow 
worth doing in itself. M has been morally active in the interim: this 
is what we want to say and to be philosophically permitted to 
say.100 
On Murdoch’s view, ‘moral activity’ does not merely consist of outward 
behaviours and actions, but also inward reflections, which have a progressive 
character. Much of the individual’s moral character and moral growth are not 
manifested in public, and so if a moral theory does not consider the private aspect 
of moral activity, it misses an important dimension of morality. Murdoch argues 
that when we assess the moral behaviour of other people we should not simply 
consider their specifiable behaviour. We need to make the extra effort to look at 
them closely as well as more ‘justly and lovingly’, and try to find out “their total 
vision of life”, or “the configurations of their thought which show continually in 
their reactions and conversation”.101 However, while it seems true that in judging 
people morally we should care about their motives and thoughts, it seems almost 
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impossible to be certain about or even understand other people’s inner activities. 
Murdoch maintains that:  
We constantly reflect upon the inner life of others, we are driven to 
do this. The concept is forced upon us. Such coercion may be a 
source of enlightenment or of despair. To say that I can know what 
other people are thinking but not (in the same sense) what I am 
thinking, makes a philosophical point.102 
We often try to discover others’ inner reflections and intentions. But we 
actually have no direct access to anyone’s thoughts and emotions. At best, we can 
make an educated guess. Undoubtedly, our judgments of the inner life of others 
are to a large extent dependent on their observable behaviours. So the outer 
behaviour and action of the moral agent is the only evidence we have upon which 
to judge them. However, according to Murdoch, an action is not right because it 
brings about good consequences or corresponds to any specific moral rule; rather, 
the action is right in so far as it is rooted in just intentions and truthful 
contemplations. Yet, again, the question arises as to how we can know about other 
individuals’ inner states. After all, in cases such as the example mentioned above, 
M’s actions towards D do not change from the beginning, but her inner thoughts 
and feelings change through her moral effort. So if D was to judge M, she would 
say that M is a loving person who always treats her beautifully. The change in 
M’s thoughts would not affect D’s judgment of M. Therefore, the actions of other 
people can mislead us when morally judging them.  Murdoch can respond to this 
in two ways. First, she can say that her emphasis on the inner life is primarily an 
emphasis on the individual’s moral growth and moral development. She assigns 
great importance to the individual’s inner life to show that morality is not only 
about their observable actions, but also their inner thoughts and motives.103 What 
actually matters here is how we can become morally better people by working on 
the way we ‘see’ the people around us. To Murdoch, these are the important 
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questions that moral philosophy must be engaged with. 104  It is crucial for 
philosophers to be able to acknowledge and speak of the individual’s inner life 
and their moral progress as an important aspect of moral activity.  
The second way that Murdoch can respond is as follows. While through 
the example of M Murdoch tries to highlight that moral philosophy should take 
inner moral behaviour more seriously, she also implies that improved moral vision 
does in practice result in better (meaning more accurate as well as more just and 
loving) moral judgements. M examines her view of D over and over again. As her 
view of D becomes less and less influenced by her own selfish desires, and she 
begins to see D in the way she truly is, M becomes more kind and sympathetic 
towards her. M’s judgement of D becomes more accurate as well as more 
sympathetic as she starts to contemplate her own inner motives. The way M sees 
D influences how she judges her. Gaining a deeper moral vision may also enable 
the moral agent to refuse to judge others by attending to only a few of their 
actions, and postpone their judgment to a moment of some sort of certainty. To 
Murdoch, in moral life what each individual has primarily to worry about is trying 
to see others more clearly and lovingly, and thereby improve their moral vision. 
This will allow them to judge others more truly and more justly. Murdoch’s 
second response to our objection could be that we are not completely oblivious of 
other people’s thoughts and feelings after all. Murdoch states:  
We see, and suffer or benefit from, people’s actions; their states of 
mind are often secret and felt to be inaccessible. Yet what is 
inaccessible? We can seek for truth, we can imagine the past and 
test our imaginings, and we can do the same about other minds, and 
about our own.105 
By observing a person’s external behaviour and using their own 
imagination, the moral agent can, to some extent, get to know the motives and 
attitudes of that person. Murdoch’s concept of imagination finds an important role 
in the individual’s moral life. I will discuss this point in Chapter 4. 
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Murdoch’s emphasis on the sphere of inner life in ethics has led some of 
her critics to object to her theory of inner life. Martha Nussbaum objects to 
Murdoch’s ‘over-emphasis’ on the inner life, and says that “Murdoch is so 
preoccupied with the goings-on of the inner world that she seems almost to have 
forgotten about the difference that action can make; and the resulting obsession 
with one’s own states looks strangely like egoism”.106 Nussbaum criticises the 
resulting egoism of Murdoch’s theory, which is precisely what that theory 
commands us to avoid. However, the point that has been neglected in Nussbaum’s 
criticism is that even though Murdoch emphasises the inner life of the moral agent, 
she does not overlook the importance of their overt actions. Murdoch’s primary 
intention is to draw our attention to the importance of the inner life to offer an 
alternative picture of human consciousness in moral philosophy. To her it is 
simply obvious that publicly observable actions are important in themselves, 
because they are the exterior manifestation of inner happenings.107 They can 
confirm the background – namely, what happens inside the individual’s 
consciousness – from which they issue.108 Murdoch admits that other people’s 
actions can affect us positively or negatively. Her main concern is individual 
moral development, including the way we see our surroundings, as this has been 
neglected by modern moral philosophers. She doesn’t find it necessary to include 
an in-depth analysis of observable actions. There is nothing much we can say 
about observable actions as such, that is, without looking at them as 
manifestations of the inner life.109  
Besides, on Murdoch’s view there is a direct relationship between inner 
life (vision) and action. According to her, “… we can only move properly in a 
world that we can see, and what must be sought for is vision”.110 She takes this 
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further by claiming that “[t]ruthful vision prompts right action”.111 Right action is 
the immediate product of clear vision. While individuals approach specific 
situations in different ways, moral vision provides them with sufficient reason to 
perform a right action. Truthful vision with the Good as its background provides 
the individual with only one choice, which is equal to “a standpoint of choice 
from which all choosers agree on what should happen”.112 While individuals may 
differ in their moral approaches to each specific situation, there is a sense of 
direction toward the ideal Good which makes each individual recognise the right 
course of action. This can be different for each individual. The concept of the 
Good provides the individual with an objective outlook, and if the individual is 
determined to refine their vision, they can apprehend the right direction of the 
Good and the right deed. 
Nussbaum makes another objection to Murdoch’s concept of inner life. 
According to Nussbaum, Murdoch strongly emphasises the inner life and moral 
vision of individuals without considering the social and political factors 
determinative of their inner prejudices and decisions. For Nussbaum, it is one of 
the major gaps in Murdoch’s philosophical view that it lacks any interest in the 
political and social factors shaping an individual’s moral vision.113 In the same 
vein, Lawrence Blum criticises Murdoch’s focus on moral psychology and her 
lack of appreciation of the role played by socio-cultural factors in shaping or 
blocking an individual’s vision of the world. According to Blum, some social 
prejudices and stereotypes can be amenable to correction (an example of which is 
M’s stereotyping of D) but some are deeply rooted in the dominant culture of a 
society and it is very difficult to identify and modify them.114 As Nussbaum and 
Blum point out, there are many social, political, and educational factors that shape 
an individual’s vision of the world and leads them to act or react in certain ways, 
and it would be simplistic to overlook all these to psychological factors in 
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explaining human behaviour. Nonetheless, while Murdoch does not specifically 
refer to the variety of social and cultural factors determining one’s approach to a 
moral situation, she does not deny the importance of them. It is true that Murdoch 
highlights the ego as a powerful psychological factor that distorts one’s view of 
other people. However, she admits and even emphasizes “the invincible variety, 
contingency and scarcely communicable frightfulness of life”.115 On Murdoch’s 
view there is no single explanation for things that happen and decisions that are 
made in one’s life, as there are many factors at play in each and every particular 
situation. She says: “Any story which we tell about ourselves consoles us since it 
imposes pattern upon something which might otherwise seem intolerably chancy 
and incomplete. However, human life is chancy and incomplete”.116 Murdoch’s 
emphasis on the chanciness and the contingency of an individual’s life is her way 
of referring to innumerable external factors (social, political, and so on) that form 
one’s inner life and one’s attitude towards the world. It is a form of consolation to 
cut these innumerable factors down to a few key ones. It shows how little the 
individual has control over the various aspects of their life. But to Murdoch this 
does not mean that one should not make an effort to see the world more justly. It 
is this aspect of moral life she is trying to stress, namely how, against all odds one 
can become less focused on one’s self and more on the reality of other people. As 
Blum acknowledges, “Murdoch’s idea of… the egoistic system of energy that 
makes it so hard for us to see individual other persons is a vital contribution to the 
way that philosophy can appropriate a psychological idiom to begin to answer the 
question how we can morally improve”.117 
To sum up, in developing her own idea that moral philosophy must 
attempt to portray an accurate picture of humanity, Murdoch explains some key 
elements of her moral theory of inner life through the example of the mother-in-
law. Despite an apparent lack of consistency at some points, the important point 
for our purposes is that for Murdoch moral activity not only includes the agent’s 
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publicly observable behaviours, but also everything that happens in the privacy of 
their inner life. For her, there is no way to assess thoroughly the moral agent’s 
actions without taking their inner motives, feelings, and contemplations into 
consideration. Moral activity is not limited only to the moment of action. It is an 
ongoing process of contemplating one’s self (as hard as that is) and others. In the 
next section, I will argue that Murdoch stresses that the change of vision, or moral 
progress, takes place by giving just and careful attention to other people and 
developing a form of universal love. 
Section Two 
Attention, Love, and the Recognition of Reality 
As discussed in Chapter 1, according to Murdoch, our grasp of the Good 
as perfection gives us a sense of direction. It is a guidance or standard in relation 
to which we morally judge ourselves or our surroundings. Murdoch says: “A good 
quality of consciousness involves a continual discrimination between truth and 
falsehood”.118 The Good is “a transcendent magnetic centre” around which the 
individual’s moral life revolves.119 Morality involves making a continuous effort 
to get closer to this perfection to which the individual is drawn. In other words, 
for Murdoch, morality is primarily about self-improvement. As we saw in the 
example of the mother-in-law, moral improvement takes place as a result of 
changes in a person’s inner life.  
In what follows I will explain that what is changing in this process 
according to Murdoch is what she refers to as ‘moral vision’ – an aspect of inner 
life that is afforded a crucial role in her moral theory. The individual’s moral 
vision is infinitely perfectible. With a change of vision, the moral agent is, then, 
gradually and progressively changing to acquire a deeper and more truthful 
understanding of the world. I next explain how Murdoch brings the idea of 
‘attention’ back into philosophical discourse as a way of acquiring the right vision. 
Murdoch borrows this concept from Simone Weil, and acknowledges this debt to 
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her.120 I discuss the ways in which Murdoch’s explanation of an individual’s 
moral development promotes the practice of attention, which leads to a particular 
form of ‘love’ for other individuals. 
Murdochian Vision 
Discussing her example of the mother-in-law, Murdoch uses a metaphor to 
emphasise and shed light on the significance of the individual’s process of moral 
development.121 She says: “… M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about 
D, until gradually her vision of D alters”.122 The metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s 
account refers to the deepest attitudes of the individual towards the world. It is 
“the configurations of their thought” which are reconfigured gradually over time 
through effort and meditative reflection.123 People with the right vision see the 
world and the other people in it in a more insightful and truthful way. Vision is 
the individual’s understanding of reality, which is greatly influenced by reality.124 
It is the result of the constant interplay between the individual and the world. The 
individual’s moral vision not only influences the way they grasp the world, but it 
also changes through their meditation on the world. Vision influences one’s 
perception – the clearer the vision, the more realistic the individual’s 
apprehension of their surroundings and of other individuals. In Murdoch’s 
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example, “‘M’s vision of D has altered means that if M were to speak her mind 
about D now she would say different things from the things she would have said 
three years ago’”.125 M makes an effort to see the reality of D, and as a result the 
reality of D changes M’s vision. M does not see and describe D the way she did 
initially, and this is due to her change of vision. D has not changed, but M sees her 
differently. She sees different aspects of both D and her perceptions of D. These 
changed perceptions are more truthful and accurate than her previous ones. 
On Murdoch’s view, it is only through cultivating a realistic vision that 
one can get closer to the Good.126 In other words, as the individual’s vision 
becomes more refined through their continuous contemplation of the world, their 
evaluations become more accurate, which is what Murdoch means by proximity to 
the Good. Let’s return to the example I gave in Chapter 1 of Jill, the girl who was 
raised by parents who taught her that everything that is commonly deemed 
morally right is in fact wrong. As I explained in the example, being human, Jill 
also has an a priori understanding of the transcendental concept of the Good that 
leads her to constantly evaluate her surroundings. Although her ability to evaluate 
and discriminate is made possible by her conception of the Good, she is incapable 
of ‘seeing’ the reality of others and correctly distinguishing between right and 
wrong. In Murdoch’s view, what Jill needs is a change of vision, which comes 
with really looking and trying. After acknowledging that her judgments of other 
people can be unfair and faulty (for example, by comparing her own moral 
judgments to the judgments of people who are commonly known to be good or 
virtuous people, and by realizing that her moral judgments or decisions are often 
quite different from the judgements and decisions of those people), Jill needs to 
strive to see the reality of other people, how they really feel and think, and why 
they do what they do. If she consciously works on herself and the way she sees 
other people, over time she may be able to develop a vision that enables her to see 
others the way they truly are, and, as a result, to be more sensitive to their feelings 
and views. She may be able to put herself in their shoes before judging them, 
instead of simply applying the moral principles she learned from her parents. For 
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Murdoch, this kind of sensitivity and vision makes the Good clearer for Jill and 
leads her to approach other people more sympathetically and objectively.  
Murdochian Attention 
So by vision, Murdoch refers to a form of moral awareness that comes 
through the act of attending carefully to the world around us. In every situation, 
what Jill has to do is ‘to attend to’ or ‘to look’ more closely. Just as M in 
Murdoch’s example “looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses her attention”.127 
Terms such as ‘looking at’, ‘attending to’, or ‘focusing attention on’ are the terms 
Murdoch uses to develop her account of the concept of vision.128 Murdoch says: 
The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, 
not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of 
explicit moral choices. What happens in between such choices is 
indeed what is crucial. I would like on the whole to use the word 
‘attention’ as a good word and use some more general term like 
‘looking’ as the neutral word. Of course psychic energy flows, and 
more readily flows, into building up convincingly coherent but 
false pictures of the world…. Attention is the effort to counteract 
such states of illusion.129 
If we look closely into the concept of ‘attention’ (or ‘looking at’ fully) in 
the context of Murdoch’s work, we find that it is a counterpart of the metaphor of 
vision, both being aspects of Murdoch’s visual metaphor.130 In other words, the 
metaphor of ‘seeing’ on Murdoch’s view has two dimensions – external and 
internal. Attention, meaning a “just and loving gaze directed upon an individual 
reality”, is a form of visual perception associated with the external dimension of 
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this metaphor, as opposed to vision, which is the in-depth conceptual attitudes and 
views of the moral agent.131 In her example of the mother-in-law, Murdoch 
illustrates M’s moral effort to attend to D carefully, which leads to her change of 
vision. In this process “M is engaged in an internal struggle” to overcome her 
selfish ego.132  
Thus attention involves an internal struggle. This struggle is to look at the 
objects of attention and to see them objectively – the way they really are. The 
struggle is also to defeat one’s selfish desires and to try and see others selflessly. 
This step is important as for Murdoch, “[i]n the moral life the enemy is the fat 
relentless ego”.133 Attention is not only a careful and selfless gaze but also a just 
and loving gaze. It means that right attention also involves seeing the other 
individual more lovingly and sympathetically. That is why, as discussed earlier, in 
developing her example Murdoch’s states that M is not just seeing D “accurately 
but [also]… justly or lovingly”.134  It is through this quality of attention that the 
individual’s moral vision is likely to change. If the individual persists in attending 
to the world in this way, over time their attention becomes more refined and 
objective. In other words, the internal struggle against the ego which leads to a 
change of vision results in a more “unsentimental, detached, unselfish, objective 
attention”.135 In this sense, attention is both the means (an effort to attend the 
world) and the outcome (a more objective attention) of this moral process. Moral 
growth and progress occur through a genuine and sustained effort to attend to 
reality, and an unselfish and loving attention is the result of moral effort in 
overpowering the selfish ego.  
So the term ‘attention’ refers to a gaze directed inwards, to suppress the 
ego, and outwards, to see others more accurately and lovingly. As discussed in 
Section One of this chapter, Murdoch denies any sustainable knowledge of the 
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self and so the inward-directed attention is not to acknowledge the self but to deny 
it. That is why to her the “direction of attention” is ultimately “outward, away 
from self”, in order to lead to an alteration of vision.136 The moral agent must 
break away from the egoistic self, to become able to attend to other individuals 
more truly and truthfully. However, Murdoch contends that other individuals are 
not the ultimate objects of attention. By defeating the ego and attending to other 
people, one essentially aims at ‘the Good’ as the real object and the final 
destination of attention. Murdoch says: “Good is the focus of attention when an 
intent to be virtuous coexists (as perhaps it almost always does) with some 
unclarity of vision…. The Good itself is not visible”.137 To Murdoch, attention to 
the Good “is not just the planning of particular good actions but an attempt to look 
right away from self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of 
uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite undreamt-of virtue”.138 The 
Good is invisible and unachievable and it is only through attending to objects 
outside the self that the moral agent can approach the Good. Since the Good is 
perfection, then attention to the Good essentially means acquiring the desire to 
become a better person. The individual can never achieve perfection, but can 
continue to improve. So while attention to the Good is the main focus of attention, 
it is not fully achievable. All one can do is attend to other individuals in various 
situations sincerely and accurately in order to acquire an incomplete vision of the 
Good, and perhaps become a better person. 
Murdochian Love 
For Murdoch, attention has different levels of value: “There are good 
modes of attention and good objects of attention”.139 Attention to other people, 
attention to the beauty in nature and art, and attention to intellectual disciplines, 
are the most valuable sorts of attention. All these kinds of attention take one 
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further from the ego and closer to the Good.140 Murdoch maintains that ‘love’ is 
the ability to direct attention away from the self and towards others. 141  I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter that the practice of the right mode of attention 
might result in a more detached, unselfish, and objective attention. It seems that 
love, on Murdoch’s view, refers to this objective attention, which is the outcome 
of sustained attention. The concept of love becomes so important for Murdoch 
that she considers it to be the main subject of her philosophy.142 Murdoch writes: 
Art and morals are… one. Their essence is the same. The essence 
of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. Love 
is the extreme realisation that something other than oneself is real. 
Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality…. Love is 
the imaginative recognition of, that is respect for, this otherness.143 
As we can see, for Murdoch, love is acknowledging the reality of other 
people, and respecting this reality. Murdoch’s concept of love has two closely 
related meanings: First, love is cognition or knowledge of reality; it is the ability 
to see other individuals the way they really are.144 Second, love is compassion; it 
is the ability to respect other individuals and to see them with a kinder and a more 
sympathetic gaze.145 Murdoch says: “The love which brings the right answer is an 
exercise of justice and realism and really looking. The difficulty is to keep the 
attention fixed upon the real situation….”146 Love is the cognition of reality, 
which is the result of careful attention. In Murdoch’s cognitivist account of love, 
the cognition of the reality of others brings one closer to the idea of the Good as 
                                                
140 The Sovereignty of Good, 82-93. Murdoch’s discussion of the attention to beauty will be 
explored in Chapter 7. 
141 Ibid., 65. 
142 W. K. Rose, "Iris Murdoch, Informally," in From a Tiny Corner in the House of Fiction: 
Conversations with Iris Murdoch, ed. Gillian Dooley (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2003), 25. 
143 Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Good," 215-16. (My italics) 
144 The Sovereignty of Good, 37.  Murdoch maintains that love has a paradoxical nature. It is 
normally too possessive and mechanical to be a source of vision. This type of attachment is 
capable of being the source of our greatest errors. 
145 This echoes the point made in connection with M and D: it is M’s seeing D both more 
accurately and more kindly or sympathetically. 
146 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 89. 
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perfection, hence the sympathy one feels towards others. Murdoch says: “Good is 
the magnetic centre towards which love naturally moves”. 147  The idea of 
perfection moves and changes individuals because it inspires love in them.148 This 
is how Murdoch draws a close conceptual connection between the concepts 
“‘Good’: ‘Real’: ‘Love’”.149 To perceive the reality of individuals is to love them, 
and this is the purpose of ethical practice.  
Conclusion 
Having laid out the meaning and the function of the concept of the Good 
and its implications in Murdoch’s moral theory in Chapter 1, I moved on to offer 
an account of certain key aspects of Murdoch’s moral theory. I showed how 
Murdoch’s theory focuses on individual moral development and what it means for 
an individual to become a better person. I drew upon Murdoch’s account of the 
inner life and explained that in their dealings with other individuals, the moral 
agent must constantly deliberate over themselves and others. They must assess 
their intentions and ensure that their attitudes towards others are unbiased and 
objective. If the moral agent succeeds in this process, they develop the vision and 
sensitivity required for perceiving others more accurately and compassionately. A 
person with this kind of vision is more inclined to attend to the world justly and 
lovingly. On Murdoch cognitivist view, this loving attention is the ability to see 
the others the way they really are and to put oneself in their shoes. This form of 
love or selfless attention to other individuals does not mean to blindly sympathise 
with everyone, as the requirement of this form of love, or the very meaning of it, 
is the ability to perceive and acknowledge the reality of other individuals. 
Considering the central elements of Murdoch’s moral theory, in the next 
chapter I argue that Murdoch’s theory is a form of virtue ethics. Through this 
argument I intend to highlight the aspects of Murdoch’s theory that are 
particularly important for the purpose of moral education.   
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Murdochian Virtue Ethics 
Introduction 
In this chapter I argue that Murdoch’s moral theory is best described as a 
form of virtue ethics. Murdoch emphasizes the importance of vision rather than 
moral rules or principles in moral decision-making, and highlights the virtue of 
love at the centre of her moral theory. The Platonic aspect of Murdoch’s moral 
view and her emphasis on the concept of the Good, which is the ultimate value 
that motivates the moral agent, has led most of her critics to overlook the close 
affinity between the elements of her ethics and some common elements of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. Yet showing this affinity demonstrates that Murdoch 
does not only have some interesting moral insights to offer, but also a fully 
developed moral theory that can contribute to the current approaches to virtue 
ethics. My aim here is to accentuate the virtue ethical elements of Murdoch’s view 
that are especially significant for the purpose of moral education. However, as I 
will discuss, Murdoch’s theory has some distinctive elements that play an 
important part in her view of art as a means to moral education. 
I begin this chapter by arguing that Murdoch’s moral theory displays the 
three features that Nussbaum identifies as common to all forms of virtue ethics, 
namely, the centrality of the moral agent, the concern with their inner life and an 
emphasis on the role of motives and passions in their choices, and the focus on the 
whole course of their moral life.150 Following that I examine three concepts that 
are frequently discussed in Aristotelian virtue ethics, namely, virtue, eudaimonia, 
and practical wisdom.151 I will argue that although there are clear similarities 
                                                
150 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?," The Journal of Ethics 3, 
no. 3 (1999): 170. Elsewhere, Nussbaum offers this definition for virtue ethics: “an ethics 
concerned not just with action and rules of duty, but with the attempt to perfect one’s inner world, 
removing egoism and seeking clear vision of others”. "'Faint with Secret Knowledge’: Love and 
Vision in Murdoch’s the Black Prince," in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher: A Collection of Essays, ed. 
Justin Broackes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 137. 
151 I will especially focus on the works of Rosalind Hursthouse and Julia Annas as two 
significant proponents of this theory. As Hursthouse explains, “neo-Aristotelian” ethicists are 
those who are inspired by Aristotle’s moral theory, while not submitting to some aspects of his 
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between the views of Murdoch and the proponents of virtue ethics, Murdoch’s 
view differs in important ways. As I go on to explain in more detail in the 
following chapter, in Murdoch’s view clear vision requires moral imagination. 
Her emphasis on the role of imagination and defeating distorted egoistic images in 
the process of moral development and moral decision-making is an important 
contribution to the discourse on virtue and moral education. 
Section One 
Inner Life of Moral agent and the continuity of Moral Life 
Although Murdoch never calls herself a virtue ethicist, her volume, The 
Sovereignty of Good, is considered to be one of the most influential books in the 
reestablishment of virtue ethics in the last fifty years.152 Roger Crisp and Michael 
Slote include Murdoch’s “The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts” in their 
volume entitled Virtue Ethics.153 Pamela Hall is another philosopher who regards 
Murdoch as a virtue ethicist, and expresses her surprise that Stephen M. Gardiner 
has not included Murdoch in his list of the “most powerful recent philosophers of 
the virtues”, in the introduction of his edited volume.154  
Virtue ethics is typically presented as a normative theory that takes a 
stance against two other major theories, namely, utilitarianism (or more generally 
consequentialism), and Kantianism (or more generally deontology). All these 
                                                                                                                                 
theory such as elitism and sexism, and his defence of slavery. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8-9. 
152 Maria Antonaccio, "Reconsidering Iris Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy and Theology," in Iris 
Murdoch: A Reassessment, ed. Anne Rowe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15. See also 
Nussbaum, Nussbaum, "Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?," 175. Widdows, The Moral 
Vision of Iris Murdoch. 8. Bridget Clarke, "Iris Murdoch and the Prospects for Critical Moral 
Perception," in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher: A Collection of Essays, ed. Justin Broackes (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 227-28. Michael Schwartz, "Moral Vision: Iris Murdoch and 
Alasdair Macintyre," Journal of Business Ethics 90, no. 3 (2009): 315. It should be pointed out 
that whether or not Murdoch is a virtue ethicist has not been a matter of much debate. Only a few 
of her interpreters have shown some interest in this subject matter. 
153 Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote, Virtue Ethics, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 99-117. See Also ibid. 9-12. Also in his entry on “Virtue 
Ethics” Roger Crisp presents Murdoch as a virtue ethicist. Roger Crisp, "Virtue Ethics," in 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (New York: Routledge, 1998), 622-26. 
154 Pamela M. Hall, "Review of Virtue Ethics Old and New, by Stephen M. Gardiner," Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 2 (2008): 332. 
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normative theories have evolved significantly and taken many different forms. 
That is why philosophers often find it difficult to make a clear distinction between 
these views, or between different versions of them. This is the case for virtue 
ethics as well. It is not easy to identify common features that are inclusive of all 
forms of virtue ethics and exclusive of other moral theories. 
Nonetheless, Martha Nussbaum puts forward three common grounds 
among the defenders of virtue ethics: First of all, in virtue ethics the central focus 
is on the moral agent along with their choice and action.155 Second, virtue ethics is 
concerned with the agent’s inner moral life, and with settled patterns of motives 
and intentions, emotions, and desires. And third, virtue ethics concerns itself with 
the whole course of the agent’s moral life and not only their discrete actions and 
decisions.156 She suggests that Kantians and utilitarians have tended to neglect 
questions about the moral agent and their inner life, and virtue ethics emerged, in 
part, as an attempt to correct this.157 Nussbaum insightfully argues that the rise of 
virtue ethics in the Anglo-American world is a reaction to the neglect of human 
character and its inner complexities in mid-twentieth century philosophy. In 
reaction to this neglect, virtue ethicists brought these issues back to the centre of 
discussion and made them the fundamental concerns of their moral theories.  
Murdoch’s work is best situated as part of a more general critique of the 
utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill as well as the deontological ethics of Kant, 
with their emphasis on the neutrality and universality of moral reasons, the will, 
and observable actions. Her criticism of Kant’s belief in the moral agent’s 
absolute freedom and the autonomy of their will forms an important part of her 
criticism of modern voluntarist and behaviouristic ethics. I will now go on to 
briefly present Murdoch’s objection to the Kantian view of the moral agent, which 
serves to show that she shares the common concerns of virtue ethicists. 
                                                
155 Even if we object that virtue ethics is not committed to the centrality of character, there is 
no doubt that character is of a considerable importance to it. See Christine Swanton, "The 
Definition of Virtue Ethics," in The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Daniel C. Russell 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 315-38. 
156 Nussbaum contends that these three claims are in tune with the views of Kant and 




Throughout her philosophical work, Murdoch criticises the reductionist 
account of ethics that identifies the will as the main aspect of moral life and 
therefore overlooks the questions: “What is a good man like? How can we make 
ourselves morally better? Can we make ourselves morally better?”158 For her, 
these are the main questions a moral philosopher should endeavour to answer. She 
argues that the idea of freedom, or will, does not seem complex enough to display 
what we really are. In the Kantian picture of freedom, as an obvious instance of 
the ethics of will, people are autonomous and non-historical rational beings. 
Reason, which is the origin of the moral law, is a universal faculty, and is 
therefore the same for all people. In Kant’s view, morality must be in accordance 
with the principle of universalisability. Murdoch calls the structure of reason 
described by Kant an “empty consciousness”.159 This emptiness is noticeable in 
Kant’s emphasis on “rationality, universality, consistency”, and his dismissal of 
individuality and personality.160 By seeking out foundational principles on which 
all our moral judgments are based, Murdoch thinks Kant neglects the individual’s 
personal vision and attitudes in moral judgments: 
Kant does not tell us to respect whole particular tangled-up 
historical individuals, but to respect the universal reason in their 
breasts. … He would like, as it were, by morality to crystallise out 
of the historical process a simple society living strictly by 
                                                
158 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 51. Murdoch intends to reject “the relaxed empirical 
ethics of the British tradition (a cheerful amalgam of Hume, Kant and Mill), and … the more 
formal existentialist systems, and … wish[es] to replace these with something which would have 
to be called a metaphysical theory”. Ibid., 49. So Murdoch comes close to more prominent modern 
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an objective, comprehensive, and neutral moral theory, utilitarians, for example, adopt a 
reductionist approach and “theorise away” human particularity and the complexity of individuals’ 
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individual’s particular inner features and their attention to other individuals in their own right, 
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understanding of and caring for other individuals’ particular needs and desires, and the particular 
internal and external conditions of their behaviours. According to Murdoch, “philosophical 
doctrines which profess neutrality, whether they are professedly analytic … or scientific … cannot 
help … making moral judgments”. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 297. 
159 "The Existentialist Political Myth," 134. 
160 "A House of Theory," 177. 
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extremely general rules (‘Always tell the truth,’ etc.), with no place 
for the morally complicated or eccentric.161 
As we see in this statement, Murdoch criticises Kant for setting aside the 
complicated historical individual in their particularity, and as a substitute, holding 
up universal reason. For her, Kant is fearful of the particular and history.162 In 
Kant’s view, reasons and rules of right action are public, in the sense that 
everybody can share them and use them to judge other individuals. They represent 
a kind of ‘impersonal tyranny’ over actions. With respect to personal will, which 
relates to the moment of action, the individual is totally free, but in their moral 
choices they have to follow a practical rationality, which has sovereignty over 
personal emotions and desires. Murdoch says that in the Kantian theory, 
[m]orality resides at the point of action. What I am ‘objectively’ is 
not under my control; logic and observers decide that. What I am 
‘subjectively’ is a foot-loose, solitary, substanceless will. 
Personality dwindles to a point of pure will.163 
Kant’s desire to offer a scientific explanation of moral activity leaves out 
the sphere of the agent’s inner life, which cannot be publicly assessed. His 
emphasis on the rational recognition of duty and the exercise of freedom by the 
rational will does not do justice to the complexity of the agent’s inner emotions, 
thoughts, and motives, which is the background of their moral choice.164  
In reaction to this neglect, Murdoch shifts the locus of importance from 
the universal rational will to the individual person and their inner contemplations, 
motives, and emotions, which may manifest themselves in actions. This aspect of 
Murdoch’s view is in line with the first and second common concern of virtue 
ethicists as posed by Nussbaum. In Murdoch’s view, the background of the 
individual’s choice and action is “a just mode of vision and a good quality of 
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consciousness”. 165  She argues that with the absence of the inner in ethics, 
“something vital is missing”.166 What matters here is the individual person and 
their effort to change what happens in their vision or inner life, or as it were, in 
their whole attitude and personality. She says: “Here there is an activity but no 
observer”.167 This activity that happens only in the privacy of one’s inner life is 
actually the key form of moral activity. Inner activity is an essential part of moral 
life and the value of the outward (moral) activity is dependent on the inner life.  
The concept of love at the core of Murdoch’s ethics, along with its 
cognitive dimension, highlights the importance of our inner contemplations and 
the change of our moral vision.168 In Murdoch’s view, love involves destroying 
the false images created by one’s selfish ego and realizing the existence of others, 
and acknowledging the fact that they are different from one and respecting this 
difference.169 We are morally better (or virtuous) people if we manage to develop 
this sort of love and vision that enables us to see the reality of other people and 
evaluate their conditions before judging them or making any moral decisions. 
Regardless of the difficulty of the situation, a virtuous person keeps on trying and 
keeps on attending to others justly and compassionately. Due to their genuine love 
and respect for others in their otherness, the virtuous person’s observable 
activities tend to be morally right too. They are morally right because they stem 
from the right inner background that is love or the recognition of the particularity 
of other people. In Kant’s theory, however, “the presence of others is felt, if at all, 
simply as the presence of rational critics”.170 The Kantian moral agent as a free 
rational will is alone, because “[he] is not confronted with real dissimilar 
others”.171 Kant abandons any idea of “discrete units of experience”, and turns 
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morality to “the actualization of rational systems in the sphere of human action”, 
and moral agency to “the activity of the (rational and real) will”.172  
In Murdoch’s view, then, the moral agent is continually and patiently 
active, attending to their surroundings closely and lovingly. Morality is an on-
going effort. A person’s vision changes progressively throughout their life. It is a 
continuous struggle to attend to every situation carefully and compassionately and 
to form a clearer vision. Referring to the ethics of will as an inept approach to 
morality, Murdoch says:   
The [behaviouristic] analysis pictures [the individual] as defined 
‘from the outside in’: [Her] individuality lies in her will, 
understood as her ‘movements’. The analysis makes no sense of 
[the individual] as continually active, as making progress, or of her 
inner acts as belonging to her or forming part of a continuous fabric 
of being …173 
Murdoch uses the phrase ‘a continuous fabric of being’ to show that moral 
changes are changes that happen internally as well as continuously. Individuals 
are inevitably imperfect and strive to achieve love and knowledge, which is a 
perfectible task. Murdoch says: “A good quality of consciousness involves a 
continual discrimination between truth and falsehood”.174 This is in tune with the 
third criterion discussed by Nussbaum. To Murdoch, morality is not limited to the 
moments of choice, but is a continuous struggle to progressively change one’s 
way of seeing the world. Moral growth or acquiring virtue involves “the 
formation of habit, the background of virtuous action”. 175  This means that 
morality is a mode of being and a way of living. It involves all of one’s emotions, 
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173 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 21. 




desires, thoughts, and motives. It is about the whole course of one’s moral life, 
and “[m]oral tasks are characteristically endless”.176  
Drawing upon the criteria put forward by Nussbaum, thus far I have 
discussed the fact that some of the themes in Murdoch’s work, such as her 
criticism of dominant ethical theories and her emphasis on the individual’s 
character and their inner life, are present in the work of other virtue ethicists. In 
what follows, I will show that along with sharing the general concerns of virtue 
ethicists, Murdoch emphasises some of the same concepts highlighted by 




Although most normative theories include an account of virtue, it plays the 
central role in virtue ethics. According to virtue ethicists, virtue involves more 
than simply doing the right thing, or even the tendency or disposition to act in a 
certain way. Virtue is a character trait, “a lasting feature of a person” that is 
consistently demonstrated in different situations.177 The first aspect of virtue that 
most virtue ethicists agree upon is that it is observed in attitudes as well as 
emotions. A virtuous person has the right desires, emotions, and attitudes.178 Their 
emotions involve thoughts or perceptions of good and evil. As Julia Annas puts it, 
virtues are: 
… dispositions not only to act, but to feel emotions, as reactions as 
well as impulses to action … In the person with virtues, these 
emotions will be felt on the right occasions, towards the right 
people or objects, for the right reasons, where ‘right’ means 
‘correct’… 179 
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In order for an action to be considered truly virtuous, the agent must 
perform that action willingly and enthusiastically, rather than reluctantly or with a 
sense of pain and regret. This only happens when one’s emotions are supported by 
one’s reason. We intuitively find those people who take pleasure in doing the right 
action, and whose emotions lead them to act in the right manner, more virtuous 
than those who have to battle with their conflicting feelings when it comes to 
doing the right thing.  
The second aspect of virtue is that it does not only involve feeling in a 
certain way, but also reasoning in a certain way. A virtuous person acts for the 
right reason. They are also able to provide others with a rational explanation for 
their action. The virtuous person knows what they are doing, and accordingly, is 
able to explain the reasons for their actions. As Rosalind Hursthouse states, “[T]he 
virtuous, in choosing a V action [i.e. virtuous action] for an X reason, is choosing 
it qua virtuous and as an instance of doing well and for the sake of to kalon, 
because she is acting from virtue”.180 The moral agent is not acting virtuously per 
se, if their apparently right action is done unintentionally or by chance.181 
Someone who intends to lie but accidentally tells the truth – due to her ignorance, 
for example – is not acting virtuously.182   
The third claim that virtue ethicists make about virtue is that a change in 
one’s character usually happens slowly and profoundly.183 The formation of virtue, 
like a skill, comes only with practice and persistence, initially by copying and 
following a virtuous role model. This is the process of habituation, where an 
intention to act in a certain way becomes a routine.184 However, the process of 
acquiring virtue does not stop at this point. The individual will eventually come to 
understand what they have learned, and actively and consciously engage this 
practical mastery in all their activities, but always striving to improve.185 When a 
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morally desirable habit (such as honesty) becomes a characteristic or deep feature 
of a person, it attains the status of a virtue. As Hursthouse puts it, a “change in 
character has to be profound, to go all the way down, and part of what is meant by 
saying that it is profound is that it is not transitory”.186 
This brings me to the fourth feature of virtue, which is that it becomes part 
of one’s identity. It is “… a disposition central to the person, to whom he or she is, 
a way we standardly think of character”.187 The virtuous person’s reason for 
telling the truth, for example, will not be that they are following a certain moral 
rule, or that they are afraid of being revealed and ridiculed as a liar. Rather, their 
reason for telling the truth is that it is the right or honest thing to do.  The virtuous 
person finds it natural to be and to do what is honest, and they find it painful to act 
dishonestly. That is why no matter how difficult and challenging a situation may 
be, the virtuous person resists acting viciously. The persisting aspect of virtues 
makes them reliable dispositions. Individual virtues, as fixed features of a virtuous 
person’s character, allow others to predict that person’s behaviours and 
reactions.188 An honest person, that is, a person who tells the truth for the right 
reasons, at the right time, and with the right feelings and motivations, can be 
relied upon to act in an honest and trustworthy way in other situations as well. 
The final feature which is an important aspect of Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
is about what makes the cultivation of virtue worthwhile. To answer the question 
of why one ought to live a virtuous life, Aristotelian virtue ethicists like 
Hursthouse and Annas adopt the concept of eudaimonia (happiness, flourishing) 
from Aristotle’s ethics.189 The idea is that acquiring virtues contributes to the 
agent’s overall flourishing. On Annas’ view, the concept of eudaimonia should 
not be thought of as being independent of virtue. For her, “a life lived in 
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accordance with the virtues is the best specification of what flourishing is”.190 I 
will elaborate this last point further in the next section.  
Murdoch’s moral philosophy emphasises many of the same points that 
Aristotelians make. Yet what makes her theory of virtue unique is her account of 
virtue as a perceptual capacity, which targets the absolute Good, as well as her 
account of love as the highest virtue. Virtue, for Murdoch, involves a kind of 
perceptual capacity, which is basically concerned with “apprehending that other 
people exist”, attaining knowledge of the Good, and recognising the goodness in 
others.191 To Murdoch, “the central concept of morality is ‘the individual’ thought 
of as knowable by love”.192 Seeing others or attending to them truthfully helps the 
moral agent practice and acquire the virtue of love, which is the highest virtue.193 
Love is a character trait, which involves seeing and feeling more justly and 
compassionately. It is a matter of overcoming one’s selfish desires for the sake of 
something worthwhile or good. So love requires an understanding of what is good. 
A loving attention to reality helps individuals to acquire and to develop other 
moral virtues, and this provides them with the necessary perceptual background to 
ensure their judgments and actions are morally sound.  
The virtue of love, in the context of Murdoch’s philosophy, has both an 
emotional and an intellectual aspect, and is similar to the Aristotelian view of 
virtue in this regard. Through cultivating love one learns to overcome the 
naturally selfish force of ego, which is, for Murdoch, the main obstacle to seeing 
the reality of others. Love involves the ability to see others in their own right. The 
virtue of love involves not only understanding that other individuals are different 
from us, but also respecting them and feeling compassion towards them. These are 
the intellectual and the emotional aspects of the virtue of love. 
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Murdoch does not think that morality “can be satisfactorily characterized 
by an enumeration of varying ‘goods’ and virtues”.194 She suggests that by 
reflecting upon virtues, we find some sort of unity in the moral world. The human 
intellect, while identifying the hierarchical order of virtues, naturally seeks unity 
in them. When contemplating the nature of a particular virtue, such as courage, we 
are bound to resort to other virtues, such as steadfastness and temperance.195 
According to Murdoch, the concept that unites all the other virtues is the Good.196 
In explaining the relationship between the concept of the Good and love, Murdoch 
writes: 
Of course Good is sovereign over Love, as it is sovereign over 
other concepts, because Love can name something bad. … I think 
that Good and Love should not be identified, and not only because 
human love is usually self-assertive. The concepts, even when the 
idea of love is purified, still play different roles. … Good is the 
magnetic force towards which love naturally moves.197 
For love to be the highest virtue, or as Murdoch calls it, ‘a single supreme 
principle’ (by ‘principle’ here she means virtue) does not mean that it fills a 
higher position than the Good in the moral world. The transcendental concept of 
the Good and the virtue of love, along with the other virtues, play different parts 
in the sphere of morality. They are not only ontologically different, but also have 
different functions. All human beings, as human beings, have a conception of the 
Good. It is a necessary condition for developing and habituating the virtues, and 
above all, the virtue of love. Love involves attention to the Good.198 The Good is 
the highest moral value. It is what a virtuous person focuses their attention on, as 
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developing the virtues requires an understanding of the Good. It is the notion of 
the Good that relates all the virtues to each other by being their perfection.199 
As discussed earlier, in the Aristotelian view, the virtues are acquired 
through habituation and acting in certain ways. In Murdoch’s view, the essential 
condition for such habituation and action is the individual’s effort to attend to 
others carefully and persistently.200 Acquiring virtue is “a process of deepening or 
complicating, a process of learning, a progress….”201 Like Aristotelian virtue 
ethicists, Murdoch believes in the slow and profound process of change in one’s 
character, which goes ‘all the way down’ and gets imprinted in one’s disposition. 
Taking inspiration from Plato, Murdoch compares the habituation of virtue to the 
acquisition of an intellectual skill, such as learning a foreign language. They both 
require determination and practice. However, acquiring virtue is a more 
complicated process than mastering a language (because of the individual’s selfish 
attachment) and involves more effort and more practice.202 The task is difficult 
and the target is distant, but through the practice of careful attention to reality, 
one’s vision is gradually enlarged.203 One slowly learns to judge others more 
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impartially and more justly. One learns to put oneself in other people’s shoes and 
sympathise with them in all circumstances (provided that they deserve sympathy).   
To sum up, Murdoch’s conception of the virtue of love, which is a 
character trait involving seeing more others realistically and feeling more 
compassionately, indicates not only the intellectual aspect, but also the emotional 
aspect of virtue, both of which are central in virtue ethics (especially in the 
Aristotelian approach). In order to see other individuals truly, which is the 
precondition of being a virtuous person, the individual needs to cultivate love, and 
this leads them to be in direct contact with the real world. Murdoch shares with 
virtue ethicists the view that the virtues are acquired slowly and profoundly. It 
requires a lot of practice. This is what Aristotelians call the on-going process of 
learning and habituation. This slow but profound process leads to changes in 
one’s character and disposition. 
Another important concept in Aristotelian virtue ethics is the concept of 
eudaimonia, which will be the focus of the following section. Showing the 
presence of this element in the context of Murdoch’s philosophy will highlight 
another way in which Murdoch’s theory is similar to Aristotelian virtue ethics.  
Section Three 
Eudaimonia 
Aristotelian virtue ethicists believe that human life has a telos (purpose or 
goal), which is eudaimonia (flourishing or happiness), and that virtues are those 
traits that allow one to achieve eudaimonia. In this section, I briefly discuss the 
Aristotelian account of eudaimonia, and then contrast it to Murdoch’s view that 
life, in particular moral life, has no final goal. What distinguishes Murdoch’s view 
is her claim that virtue is pointless in the same way that beauty in art, and even 
life itself, are pointless. I intend to demonstrate that in spite of Murdoch’s 
emphasis on the idea that moral life has no meaningful purpose or telos, her 
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ethical approach is very similar to the teleological approach supported by 
contemporary eudaimonists, provided we understand ‘teleological’ in the same 
way that Aristotelians do. 
Aristotelian virtue ethicists do not try to identify the rules of right action. 
Instead, they consider the more general questions: ‘How should I live?’ or ‘What 
is a good life for a human being?’ In the Aristotelian view, all actions are directed 
at an end or goal. Hence, when we are asked why we pursue a certain goal, we 
make reference to some broader concern.  For example, we may ask ourselves 
why we want to work hard. To make money. Then why we want to make money? 
To buy a nice house. Why do we want a nice house? To be more comfortable and 
not to have to worry about paying rent. As we see, each of these goals is 
instrumental, in that each of them is for the sake of another. We might eventually 
come up with the question: ‘Does our life as a whole have a final end?’ The 
answer to this question, in the Aristotelian view, is positive – the intrinsic telos or 
final end of life is eudaimonia (happiness or flourishing).204 It is the ultimate aim 
of every human being, and what makes life worth living. Further, Aristotelian 
virtue ethicists argue that we can achieve eudaimonia by living virtuously. That is, 
virtue is the most reliable way to achieve it.  
There seems to be two concerns: 1. Even if we accept that eudaimonia is 
the final end that everyone seeks, it is a fairly indeterminate notion, and so it isn’t 
useful in guiding us in our daily lives. 2. It seems unlikely that everyone seeks or 
should seek the same final end, given that people commonly disagree about what 
happiness consists in. Virtue ethicists argue that the idea that there is only one 
final end and that end is eudaimonia does not mean that there is one single grand 
end around which all the other activities of life are organised. People live for all 
sorts of things and they contemplate their activities and pursue them on their own 
terms. One does not follow a career or raise children or travel around the world or 
even donate part of their income to charity for the sake of some single grand end. 
Yet, achieving those ends is part of being happy. Happiness is the sort of final end 
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that we seek only by coming to have those other ends.205 Virtue ethics does not try 
to offer any specification of flourishing or happiness. Happiness is not a matter of 
what individuals have, rather a matter of how they live their lives, more especially, 
whether they live virtuously. These theorists reject a conception of flourishing that 
makes no reference to virtue. Living virtuously is “the only reliable bet” in 
attaining happiness. 206 Nevertheless, the virtues do not guarantee happiness. 
Rather, they are necessary but not sufficient for happiness, or as Hursthouse puts 
it, they are the most reliable means to this end.207  
At first glance, Murdoch’s view of the telos of moral life appears to be 
very different from the Aristotelian view. She writes: 
… human life has no external point or τελος … I can see no 
evidence to suggest that human life is not something self-contained. 
There are properly many patterns and purposes within life, but 
there is no general and as it were externally guaranteed pattern or 
purpose of the kind for which philosophers and theologians used to 
search.208 
To illustrate her view that human life has no external point, Murdoch 
draws an analogy between beauty and the Good. She notes that we naturally and 
immediately enjoy looking at flowers and animals, as we love beauty instinctively. 
We not only enjoy beauty in nature, but also in art.209 Beauty in art invigorates us 
with a pure delight in something totally different from our selfish inclinations. In 
Murdoch’s view, “the enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue”.210 Art is 
the juxtaposition of pointlessness and value. We love beauty in art and enjoy a 
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work of art without having any material gain from it. In that sense the enjoyment 
of art is completely pointless. The pointlessness of art reflects the aimlessness of 
the universe and of human life itself. In fact, for Murdoch, beauty in art teaches us 
that “nothing in life is of any value except the attempt to be virtuous”.211 In 
Murdoch’s view, art – especially literature and painting – shows us how virtue is 
incorporated into human life, without any particular purpose. While being 
virtuous is important, it is pointless. It is because the concept of the Good as the 
perfection, which inspires and guides us in our endeavour to become virtuous, is 
absolutely for-nothing. Since all human life is subject to chance and necessity and 
lacks any finality, being good is being good ‘for nothing’.212 
In our moral development we seek an austere love of the Good and that is, 
for Murdoch, true morality.213 Morality requires us to see reality and its necessity 
and chanciness, to experience suffering and affliction and to make spiritual use of 
them – namely, by developing humility. She warns that ethics must not fall into 
the same trap that much art and religious myths have fallen into, that of ignoring 
the absolute contingency of life and the reality of death.214 If the contingency and 
pointlessness of life is fully perceived, “[s]uffering remains but accompanied by a 
kind of passion, a high Eros, or purified joy, which is the vision of good 
itself…”.215 Suffering is not an end in itself.216 Murdoch writes: “The human 
scene is one of moral failure combined with the remarkable continued return to an 
idea of Goodness as unique and absolute”. 217  Referring to Plato, Murdoch 
explains that our natural attraction to the Good is because it is real, but unlike 
other aspects of reality and life, it does not exist contingently.218 The Good is an 
idea that inspires love. The Good exerts a magnetism or attraction, the response to 
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which is love.219 The existence of the Good is the demonstration of the fact that 
human beings are spiritual creatures that are capable of cultivating love and 
understanding virtue through the acceptance of “real death and real chance and 
real transience”.220 Virtue is loved for its own sake.221 
Murdoch, then, advocates an acceptance of the fact that life is aimless and 
virtue pointless. She thinks it is a mistake to think of happiness as a reward for a 
moral life because suffering and affliction are inevitable parts of life. Human 
existence is too contingent and uncertain to have any end or telos. If we eliminate 
the consoling narratives offered by some religions and art, we find that death is 
the true end point to a life of suffering and pain.  
In comparing the Aristotelian and Murdochian view of the relation 
between virtue and eudaimonia, the first thing to be noticed is the issue of a telos 
or final end of life, which strikes one as an important point of dissimilarity 
between these two views. Whereas virtue ethicists believe that virtue plays a 
crucial role in one’s flourishing or happiness, which is to them the final end of life, 
Murdoch claims life is contingent and chancy and there is no meaningful end for 
it. The same thing is true of morality and our aspiration to develop the virtues. In 
Murdoch’s view, in spite of the fact that there is no rewarding end to one’s moral 
actions, some people still choose to follow the path of goodness and progressively 
strive to become virtuous. In Murdoch’s view it is because we have a natural 
attraction to the Good that is similar to the attraction we have to beauty. We are 
spiritual beings that are capable of seeking perfection through experiencing 
imperfect things. That perfection, or the Good which is the inspiration for the 
virtuous life, is appealing by itself without the assurance of another end. 
Following the Good and therefore developing the virtues can be quite agonising, 
as it demands a truthful grasp of reality. Nonetheless, obtaining truthful vision is 
something to be loved for its own sake. Seeing reality is the only reward for being 
virtuous. Human beings love the Good, and this manifests itself in their love of 
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truth. They do not love the Good because it leads to another end, such as 
flourishing, happiness, or the like. They do not look for a reward other than ‘being 
virtuous’ itself. As Murdoch states, “[t]ruth and progress (or some truth and some 
progress) are the reward of some exercise of virtue, courage, humility, 
patience”.222 In other words, being virtuous, which is essentially the ability to see 
the crude reality of life and being compassionate towards others, is the reward for 
being virtuous. 
However, if we look more closely at Aristotelian virtue ethics we will see 
that it is not all that different from Murdoch’s view. Three claims about the final 
end deserve mention here. Firstly, as Annas argues, the final end must be 
complete, in that everything we do is for its sake and it does not lead to any other 
ends. Secondly, the final end cannot consist of passive feelings such as pleasure. 
Rather we actively live our lives in a certain way.223 And thirdly (this is closely 
related to the second claim), happiness is not ‘a reward’ for virtuous behaviour, 
and the virtuous person is not motivated by the thought. If we consider Murdoch’s 
notion of love and the part it plays in one’s moral life, we can see that it has both 
of these features of the final end. The love of the Good, which is the love of the 
truth, is the only valuable end to one’s moral endeavour. The Good has its 
magnetic force. Nonetheless, cultivating love requires that we actively live our 
lives in a certain way. It demands an unceasing effort to see the world truthfully, 
and this is part of the meaning of love itself. When Murdoch states that life has no 
final end, she implies that one’s moral life has no final end other than the love of 
the Good for its own sake. She notes that “… nothing in life is of any value except 
the attempt to be virtuous”.224 So Murdoch’s moral theory is in fact teleological in 
the narrow sense in which some virtue ethicists, such as Annas and Daniel C. 
Russell, depict the concept of a human telos.  
This leads us to an important question: given that for Murdoch developing 
the virtues –especially the highest virtue, love – is the final end to one’s moral 
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efforts, how can this be compared to the Aristotelian final end, namely, 
eudaimonia? Opponents of eudaimonism have questioned the plausibility of 
making a connection between virtue and eudaimonia or happiness, for they claim 
that virtue is neither sufficient nor necessary for happiness.225 Virtue is not 
sufficient for happiness, because many virtuous people are unhappy through no 
fault of their own. It is not necessary for happiness either, for many vicious people 
appear to be happy. In response, some Aristotelians point out that this objection is 
grounded in a mistaken understanding of ‘happiness’. As Annas puts it, “[l]iving 
happily is not feeling good, getting what you want, or feeling satisfied with your 
life”.226 The virtues do not make us happy in the same manner as achieving a pre-
determined goal would. Rather, they form part of our character, and hence of our 
very identity. How we live our life is mostly due to our character, and the virtues 
are those traits that allow us to be happy in the sense of living well or living a 
good or worthwhile human life. Happiness, in this view, is not a passing feeling or 
state but rather a way of living our lives overall. More precisely, as explained 
earlier, happiness is the way we actively live our life, rather than a passive state of 
feeling good or satisfied.227 For eudaimonistic virtue ethicists, “a life lived in 
accordance with the virtues is the best specification of what flourishing is”.228 So, 
living virtuously is necessary for happiness, where ‘happiness’ is used in this 
narrow sense. 
Similarly, in our brief examination of Murdoch’s analogy between art and 
morality, we saw that in her view beauty in art has a natural attraction for humans 
and this is not due to some sort of benefit it might bring about for them. It is 
because beauty has a kind of intrinsic value. The Good has the same status in 
morality. The virtues require an appreciation and understanding of the Good as an 
end in itself, in the same way that appreciating and understanding beauty is an end 
in itself. We actively endeavour to become morally better and over time, the 
virtues, and in particular the virtue of love, become part of our ‘fabric of being’. 
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That is the perfection of the virtuous person’s life. To repeat Murdoch’s own 
words: “Suffering remains but accompanied by a kind of passion, … which is the 
vision of good itself”.229 So, although Murdoch does not promise any ‘final’ 
reward for following the path of goodness, she thinks that how we choose to live 
our life is its own reward. Our endeavour to develop the virtue of love is 
accompanied by a sort of joy, while the pain of knowing that there is no 
meaningful end still remains.  
To sum up, Murdoch emphatically denies that human life has any 
meaningful end. Accordingly, in her view the individual’s moral effort does not 
lead to a final end or reward. As she goes on to illustrate her view in greater detail, 
we see that her view is in fact very similar to the view of some Aristotelian 
eudaimonists on the question of whether there is some kind of reward to our moral 
life. Although the latter view adopts the term eudaimonia, meaning happiness or 
flourishing, they do not overlook the suffering that a life of virtue can bring about. 
This leads them to give a particular account of eudaimonia. Murdoch’s account of 
the Good and the love of virtue, which is desirable in and of itself regardless of 
the momentary feelings of pleasure or pain it might bring about, can be 
understood as an alternative way of depicting the same idea.  
In the next section I examine the concept of practical wisdom as another 
point of similarity between Murdoch’s view and Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
Section Four 
Practical Wisdom 
In the previous section I explained that according to eudaimonist virtue 
ethicists eudaimonia, a good life for human beings, is a virtuous life. Now the 
question arises as to how to achieve eudaimonia or, how to live a virtuous life. To 
answer this question, Aristotelian virtue ethicists embrace the concept of 
phronēsis, or practical wisdom, which is “the ability to reason correctly about 
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practical matters”.230 Roger Crisp introduces practical wisdom as an important 
aspect of virtue ethics and states that “for Aristotle, the virtuous man possesses 
phronēsis, ‘practical wisdom’, a sensitivity to the morally salient features of 
particular situations which goes beyond an ability to apply explicit rules.”231  
In this section, I will first briefly explain the concept of practical wisdom. 
I will not consider the account of practical wisdom, provided by John McDowell, 
which considers it to be identical with virtue. Instead, I will explore the more 
moderate account given by Rosalind Hursthouse and others who consider it to be 
a necessary and sufficient condition for virtue.232 Then I will draw an analogy 
between this concept and the notion of vision in the context of Murdoch’s 
philosophy in order to demonstrate that there is a close affinity between these two 
concepts. 
As noted earlier, Aristotelian virtue ethicists claim virtue is a disposition 
that requires emotional sensitivity. If one’s actions are not motivated by the 
appropriate concerns and accompanied by the appropriate emotions, then one is 
not acting virtuously. One can give the appearance of being a virtuous person, 
even act in ways that appear virtuous, but not have the appropriate emotions and 
attitudes, and thus, not be truly virtuous. According to these philosophers, the 
emotions of a moral agent are expressions of their character that can give rise to 
their actions. 233  However, being virtuous involves more than feeling in a 
particular way. The moral reasoning behind an action, or the intellectual aspect of 
a moral decision or judgment, is also greatly emphasised by Aristotelian virtue 
ethicists. In their view, virtues are dispositions to feel emotions, where these 
                                                
230 Hursthouse, 12. 
231 Crisp, "Virtue Ethics," 625. Crisp introduces Iris Murdoch and John McDowell as among 
the philosophers who have revived this view in modern virtue ethics. Elsewhere, again, Crisp 
points out that “[Murdoch’s] view of moral perception has its roots in Aristotle’s account of the 
practical wisdom (phronēsis) of the virtuous man, who sees matters as they are, and responds 
appropriately”, Crisp and Slote, 11. 
232  See John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," The Monist 62, no. 3 (1979). See also 
Hursthouse. 
233 As Van Hooft puts it, an emotion is a link between behaviour and action. Stan van Hooft, 




emotions are felt on the right occasions and in response to right reasons.234 A 
virtuous person’s emotions are not impulsive and irrational responses to certain 
situations, rather, they are stable and persisting attitudes rooted in that person’s 
virtuous disposition and they are responsive to the demands of reason. So, feeling 
the right emotions in any given situation requires the influence of reason. As 
Hursthouse puts it, “the claim that full virtue involves feeling emotions correctly 
makes it clear that this would not be possible (in general) without the influence of 
reason”.235 
Practical wisdom is a necessary condition for both the acquisition and the 
exercise of virtue. It is not an abstract or theoretical way of thinking, but rather a 
unifying way of thinking about life and how one should structure it.236 Practical 
wisdom is the intellectual virtue that makes it possible for the agent to act well, 
that is, for the right reasons and with the right emotions. This is a faculty of reason 
from which the virtuous action springs. As Annas puts it, the right action 
immediately follows practical reasoning.237 
Acquiring practical reason is a continuous and progressive process that 
starts in childhood. The child is first trained to follow some rules – prescriptions 
generated by virtues, or prohibitions generated by vices. These virtue rules, such 
as ‘do what is honest or just’, and vice rules, such as ‘don’t do what is cruel’, 
might initially seem quite difficult to learn and follow, because understanding 
such concepts as ‘honest’ or ‘just’ could be quite difficult for a child.238 That is 
why virtue ethicists do not oppose the idea of teaching children deontological 
rules such as ‘do not lie’, as these rules may be easier to follow for someone with 
an underdeveloped faculty of practical reasoning.239 However, virtue ethicists still 
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hold that learning the rule ‘do not lie’, for example, is not enough for a child to 
learn the virtue of honesty, as for that they actually need to learn to love the truth. 
Nonetheless, learning the rules can be quite useful for making the child ready for 
that purpose.240 In this process, one needs to rely on the wisdom of a virtuous 
person and strive to do what they would do in different circumstances, for 
“[p]hronesis – excellence in practical reasoning, moral knowledge – can be 
acquired only by habitually engaging in virtuous action, not, for example, just by 
learning a written code of conduct”.241  
What is important here is that the development of practical wisdom is a 
slow and gradual process. Practical wisdom develops progressively throughout the 
moral agent’s life, through them experiencing different challenges in different 
situations. In the process of moral development, the moral agent gradually learns 
to think for themselves and to choose the proper action in different situations. 
Another important point is that practical wisdom develops in a holistic way. It is 
unified over the person’s life, and likewise, it unifies various virtues. Some 
situations may require the exercise of a combination of different virtues, and it is 
the role of practical wisdom to discern which virtues to exercise in those 
situations.242  
Although she does not use the term ‘practical wisdom’, Murdoch’s 
account of the kind of intelligence involved in the moral life is similar to the 
Aristotelian view. In Murdoch’s view, our consciousness experiences the world as 
being morally structured, and “[m]oral good is certainly established as 
cognitive”.243 Through envisioning the concept of the Good as an inseparable idea 
of consciousness, we almost always experience a value-laden perception of the 
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world.244 In her account of consciousness, Murdoch presents a way out of a long 
assumed gap between fact and value. For her, our perceptions are almost never 
impartial or untainted with evaluation. We constantly evaluate the way we see the 
world and we see other individuals. We persistently seek new facts that modify 
our understanding of the surroundings. Since any new perception of facts attained 
through careful attention to reality is exposed to evaluation, moral activity is the 
attempt to see the world more truly and thereby to cultivate moral virtues 
progressively and continually. The unchanging transcendental notion of the Good 
in consciousness retains a dynamic quality for the moral life. In order to explicate 
this point, Murdoch resorts to the metaphor of vision, which as I will show, has a 
close affinity to the virtue ethicists’ concept of practical wisdom. 
The idea of vision goes hand in hand with the idea of truth, and by truth 
Murdoch does not mean “some sort of mechanical accuracy”, but rather “a larger 
idea, which can contain, turning toward the individual, the idea of ‘truthfulness’ 
and ‘wisdom’”.245 For Murdoch, moral activity, which consists of outward actions 
as well as inward deliberations, presupposes moral vision, the main function of 
which is offering a precise and truthful description of the reality of other 
individuals. The moral agent would be unable to make a true moral judgment or a 
good moral decision if they are not educated to cultivate the vision to see the 
world as it is. Just as in the Aristotelian view one’s action is not virtuous unless it 
is grounded in the right reasons, in Murdoch’s view, one’s action cannot be 
considered virtuous without this vision, however virtuous it may appear. 
Murdoch’s example of the ill-judging mother-in-law who initially forms a harsh 
opinion of her daughter-in-law, illustrates this point perfectly.246 What makes the 
mother-in-law become a better person is the change in her vision, rather than her 
action, as her outward actions and behaviour do not change.  
However, as explained in a previous chapter, Murdoch does appreciate the 
importance of action – “Overt actions are perfectly obviously important in 
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themselves, and important too because they are the indispensable pivot and spur 
of the inner scene. The inner, in this sense, cannot do without the outer”.247 One’s 
moral activity begins at the level of attending to the reality that surrounds one, 
acquiring moral vision, and cultivating the virtues; but moral action is where these 
virtues are manifested. In Murdoch’s view, as for Aristotle, when the right vision 
is obtained the right action inevitably follows – “truthful vision prompts right 
action”.248 
Murdoch’s moral agent cultivates moral vision through practice and effort 
– an effort to attend to the reality of other individuals and to see them in their own 
right. Only through this constant effort can the right moral vision be achieved. By 
the use of right moral vision then, the individual can develop the virtues and, 
above all others, the virtue of love. The process of forming moral vision as 
depicted by Murdoch also starts from an early age. She writes:  
Love may carry us on, natural generosity, instinctive compassion 
… But the concept of duty as moral rules of a certain degree of 
generality should stay in place. Do not lie, do not steal, be helpful, 
be kind. Fortunate children imbibe such ideas in a scene which 
promotes honesty and kindness and mutual love. Truth is taught in 
an atmosphere of truthfulness. Primary duties may seem to find 
their places in a general development of moral texture, while 
remaining on call as discrete individual commands.249 
Murdoch explains that early in life, moral education should be 
accompanied by teaching certain moral rules. In her view, we should not rely 
totally on the idea of duty and moral rules, but neither should we reject them 
entirely. In due course, through practicing moral duties and learning to truly 
attend to the world, one develops moral vision and moral virtue.250 In this process, 
                                                
247 Ibid., 42. 
248 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 295. 
249 Ibid., 302. 
250 Murdoch says: “‘The absolute’ may be thought of as a distant moral goal, like a temple at 
the end of a pilgrimage, a condition of perfection glimpsed but never reached”.  Ibid. 304. For 
more detailed account of this concept see Chapter 2, Section Two. 
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time and again the individual may be placed in situations where “moral instinct 
and habit fail”.251 In those situations moral rules can be helpful. Right vision, 
when achieved, helps the moral agent to obtain a better understanding and offer a 
better description of reality, and to base their moral decisions on that 
understanding. The more developed the vision, the more accurate and truthful the 
perception of reality and, as a result, the more reliable the judgment of the 
situation. Murdoch says: “A totally good being would not experience the call of 
duty, might be said to lack or not need the concept, since all acts and decisions 
emerge from virtuous insight and its orderly process”.252 
To sum up, I explored the Aristotelian claim that in order to cultivate 
practical wisdom, the individual needs to engage in virtuous activities by initially 
following some moral rules, as well as trying to do what a virtuous person would 
characteristically do in a similar situation. In due course, the individual develops 
practical wisdom, which is a necessary condition for the attainment of full virtue.  
I suggested that there are similarities between this account of practical wisdom 
and the Murdochian account of vision. Murdoch’s main emphasis in her ethical 
theory is on one’s effort to see the reality of other individuals prior to acting. In 
order to acquire this ability, the moral agent has to cultivate moral vision, which is 
attained through training and practice. Through this vision the individual develops 
other virtues and above all, the virtue of love. As for Murdoch sharing the views 
of virtue ethicists, although moral action is not the central focus of her theory, she 
does not deny its importance in the moral life. 
Conclusion 
I argued that Murdoch can rightfully be situated among virtue ethicists. I 
discussed three key concepts of Aristotelian virtue ethics, namely, virtue, 
eudaimonia, and practical wisdom. I argued that despite her genuinely distinctive 
position, Murdoch’s shares all these concepts with virtue ethicists and they form 
the central themes of her moral theory. In Murdoch’s view, the virtues are 
                                                




character traits that develop slowly but deeply. Acquiring virtues, and above all 
the virtue of love, requires a great deal of practice until the individual becomes 
able to react in an appropriate emotional and intellectual manner in every situation. 
In Murdoch’s view, following the Good and developing the virtue of love are 
desirable in themselves. In other words, living the life of virtue is its own telos. 
Her view is structurally similar to the virtue ethicist’s account of eudaimonia as 
the purpose of living a life of virtue. Finally, I discussed the concept of practical 
wisdom. I argued that just like Murdoch’s moral vision, practical wisdom is 
developed through different stages of practicing, following rules, and using 
virtuous people as exemplars. It is attained over time and with great effort.  
Aside from subtle differences between Murdoch’s view and that of the 
Aristotelian virtue ethicist, what makes Murdoch’s view an original one, and one 
that has something to offer the literature on virtue ethics, is her account of 
‘imagination’ and the role it plays in our moral development and moral life. For 
her, developing morally and making appropriate moral judgments requires us to 
be able to imagine different aspects of every situation and to be able to distinguish 
false images from true ones. To fully appreciate the role of imagination in moral 
judgment it is necessary to examine Murdoch’s account of imagination, and in 
particular the distinction she makes between imagination and fantasy. This will be 
my aim in the next chapter. A better understanding of the role of imagination will 
also allow us to see why engagement with art is important in Murdoch’s view of 





Imagination and Fantasy  
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, love for Murdoch is the highest 
virtue, and involves the pursuit of the knowledge of reality. The background 
condition for love is a truthful vision. The effort to acquire the right vision of 
reality is the individual’s main quest in their moral life. However, Murdoch also 
claims that “… clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort”.253 
Murdoch’s view that imagination and its creative function play a key role in 
morality distinguishes it from Aristotelian virtue ethics. My aim in this chapter is 
to examine why Murdoch thinks imagination and its counterpart, fantasy, play 
important parts, one positively and one negatively, in the moral life and 
development of the individual. This will ultimately reveal the link between 
morality and art in Murdoch’s view: both involve creativity and being in touch 
with reality. As I will argue later in the thesis, through the fortification of 
imagination in art, the individual obtains the moral sensitivity and vision required 
for developing love and compassion for other people. This becomes one important 
way in which art plays a key role in the individual’s moral development.  
In the first two sections I will argue Murdoch’s position with regards to 
imagination, together with the distinction she makes between imagination and 
fantasy, is an intricate synthesis of Plato’s and Kant’s views. Understanding this 
influence, which is not explicitly mentioned in Murdoch’s work, helps us to 
understand better Murdoch’s account of imagination and fantasy. Imagination, in 
Murdoch’s view, is an important medium through which we achieve a clear moral 
vision, whereas fantasy is destructive and misleading. In giving a central position 
to imagination as a creative faculty, Murdoch commits herself to the view that 
knowledge of reality is “a creative task”.254 To see the reality of other people, the 
individual needs to apply their imagination to picture different possibilities in any 
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given situation. They should try to put themselves in other people’s shoes and be 
sensitive to their thoughts, beliefs, and emotions. This sort of love created by 
means of the imagination forms the core of Murdoch’s moral philosophy. In the 
final section, I provide a critical analysis of the concepts of imagination and 
fantasy in Murdoch’s account of morality. I will argue that Murdoch succeeds in 
conforming her moral realism to the view that morality is a creative task taken up 
by the individual’s imagination.  
Section One 
Kant and Imagination 
In her discussion of the concept of imagination, Murdoch critically 
examines Kant’s account of this concept.255 She provides little detail of Kant’s 
view, but enough for her to provide grounds for putting forth forth her own view 
of this matter. Here, I do not intend to consider the accuracy of Murdoch’s reading 
of Kant. Instead, I analyse her account of Kant’s concept of imagination to 
demonstrate the Kantian aspects of her exegetical account of this concept. Even 
though she does not explicitly discuss its impact, I will show how, by critically 
reacting to Kant’s view, Murdoch’s account is influenced by it.256 I begin this 
section by briefly explaining Murdoch’s presentation of Kant’s notions of 
transcendental imagination, as a spontaneous mediator, and of aesthetic 
imagination, as a creative faculty. I then move on to discuss Murdoch’s criticism 
                                                
255 Murdoch’s most focused discussion of imagination is published as a chapter called 
“Imagination” in ibid., 308-48., which is one of her Gifford lectures initially published as "Ethics 
and the Imagination," Irish Theological Quarterly 52, no. 1-2 (1986): 81-95.  Murdoch’s 
discussion of imagination is scattered throughout her other works, such as "The Sublime and the 
Good," 205-20. "The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited," 261-86. "Against Dryness," 287-95.  
"Art Is the Imitation of Nature," 243-57.  
256 Marije Altorf takes a similar approach in her work Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imagining. 
However, Altorf offers a different reading of Murdoch’s Platonic and Kantian influences. As we 
will see in this chapter, my reading of Murdoch’s ‘Good’ as the very condition of the individual’s 
experience leads me to argue that Kant’s transcendental imagination plays the role of the mediator 
between the concept of the Good and the individual’s perception in Murdoch’s theory, whereas for 
Altorf, this aspect of Kant’s concept of imagination is what Murdoch calls fantasy. Moreover, 
Altorf’s discussion of the Platonic influence mostly revolves around her view of art. In my 
discussion, I focus on the concept of imagination and the deep impact of Plato’s view in forming 
Murdoch’s own view. I also wish to show the significance of the role of imagination in the context 
of Murdoch’s ethics. See Altorf, Iris Murdoch and the Art of Imagining, 67-87. 
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of Kant and how she combines these two forms of imagination found in Kant to 
develop her own view.   
Murdoch begins the chapter titled “Imagination” in Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals by briefly discussing Kant’s ‘transcendental imagination’ as a 
faculty the role of which is to make empirical knowledge possible. As Murdoch 
explains it, this imagination “is a spontaneous intuitive capacity to put together 
what is presented to us so as to form a coherent spatio-temporal experience which 
is intellectually ordered and sensuously based”. 257  Kant’s transcendental 
imagination, which is discussed in his Critique of Pure Reason, is the element 
which joins unchanging concepts or categories of mind with possible objects of 
experience. For Kant, transcendental imagination is necessary for conceptual 
understanding. It enables the mind to grasp empirical objects through joining the 
categories of mind with sense data. It is a ‘spontaneous’ process and the 
individual is not conscious of it.  
In contrast to transcendental imagination, Kant’s ‘aesthetic imagination’ is 
a creative faculty of mind that works freely outside the boundaries of the concepts 
of mind. Murdoch says: 
We look at clouds and stoves, we construct pictures in our minds. 
In our experience of beauty in art or nature imagination is free to 
discern conceptless forms, it plays or frolics with the understanding 
without being governed by empirical concepts. It is out at the edge 
of things. The experience of beauty is often ineffable, the creation 
of art inexplicable.258 
Aesthetic imagination, unlike transcendental imagination, does not have to 
work within the limits of a priori concepts or categories of mind.259 Rather, it is 
free to create and shape images in different ways. It is an irrational capacity of 
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258 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 310-11. 
259 See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1952), 75-89. 
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mind with “an exceptional and godlike power”.260 In Kant’s view, aesthetic 
imagination is a faculty of mind that is at work in creating beauty in art or 
appreciating beauty in nature. Due to the close connection Kant draws between 
these concepts, when discussing aesthetic imagination Murdoch explores the 
concepts of ‘the beautiful’, ‘the sublime’, and ‘the genius’, which I will briefly 
discuss here.  
Murdoch states that aesthetic imagination “… is a more independently 
speculative faculty, and may be so because what it does, in its discernment of the 
beautiful, in a sense does not matter”.261 The reason why aesthetic imagination, 
being a speculative faculty (unlike reason), deals with discerning and creating ‘the 
beautiful’ in nature and art, is that for Kant the beautiful, while being an 
experienced sensuous entity, is totally devoid of purpose.262 Murdoch notes that 
according to Kant,  
What is truly beautiful is independent of any interest, it is not 
tainted either by the good, or by any pleasure extraneous to the act 
of representing to ourselves the object itself. It has no concern with 
charm or with emotion. What is beautiful exhibits ‘purposiveness 
without a purpose’; it is composed as if with a purpose, and yet it 
has no purpose which we can name.263 
Murdoch explains that in Kant’s view, the beautiful is not concerned with 
emotions. What is related to emotions is ‘the sublime’, which is distinct from the 
beautiful. The feeling of sublimity is occasioned when imagination cannot 
encompass what it encounters, but nevertheless, at the same time it feels 
exhilarated by the way in which the object of experience goes beyond mere 
sensible imaginings.264 In Murdoch’s words, this feeling of sublimity is the 
realisation of “[w]hat is vast and formless in nature, or vast and powerful and 
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262 Ibid., 311-13. 
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264 Ibid., 208. 
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terrifying …”.265 The sublime has nothing to do with art.266 Art can only manifest 
the beautiful, not the sublime. Artworks have forms. They also have their own 
rules that are established by the imagination of ‘the genius’. Although art objects 
must follow rules, these rules are not universal and differ in every individual work 
of art. It is the genius that invents these rules and its own methods of 
verification.267 For the genius the imagination is free, but only within the scope of 
fine art. 
Murdoch allows the free creative faculty of imagination to break the 
restrictions Kant assumes for it, and while being inspired by Kant’s notion of 
imagination, she distances herself from him. In Murdoch’s view, imagination has 
two main specifications. First, it is a ‘spontaneous’ activity of mind (like Kant’s 
transcendental imagination). Second, it is a powerful faculty of creation (like 
Kant’s aesthetic imagination). This creative faculty, for Murdoch, does not only 
operate freely and creatively in the area of art, but in every aspect of life, and 
especially moral life. In what follows, I explain these points in greater detail. 
As explained earlier, for Kant the transcendental imagination operates as a 
connector between universal concepts of mind and intuition, and perceptions. This 
imagination works spontaneously, making empirical knowledge possible. All our 
empirical experiences are dependent upon this connection. Influenced by Kant, 
Murdoch ascribes to imagination the ‘spontaneity’ Kant ascribes to transcendental 
imagination in the individual’s empirical experiences. However, for Murdoch, 
imagination spontaneously makes a connection between the general concept of the 
Good (perfection or the highest value) and the individual’s experiences. 268 
Murdoch says: “The world which we confront is not just a world of ‘facts’ but a 
world upon which our imagination has, at any given moment, already worked”.269 
As explained in Chapter 1, to Murdoch the concept of the Good is the very 
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condition of the individual’s confrontation with the world, and so almost all 
perceptions are evaluations: “Our deepest imaginings which structure the world in 
which ‘moral judgments’ occur are already evaluations”.270 Whereas Kant says 
that “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind”,271 Murdoch’s theory about the relation between the a priori concept of the 
Good and particular moral events can be summarised as follows: the concept of 
the Good is empty and inaccessible unless through particular experiences, which 
are respectively blind and senseless if the individual’s mind does not have the 
distinctive function of infusing them with values. And it is the role of the 
individual’s imagination to make this connection possible. Imagination works as a 
facilitator that in every situation makes the evaluation possible. The soundness of 
the individual’s judgment depends on the strength of their imagination and the 
clarity of their vision.  
Murdoch’s concept of imagination not only acts spontaneously like Kant’s 
transcendental imagination, but also creatively like Kant’s aesthetic imagination. 
Murdoch attributes the freedom and creativity Kant ascribes only to the genius of 
the artist to all imagination. In Kant’s view, it is only in its aesthetic form that 
imagination works as a creative and free faculty. In Murdoch’s view, the creative 
faculty of mind is not just restricted to aesthetic activities and our dealings with 
‘the beautiful’. Imagination is always free and creative even when it mediates 
between value concepts of the mind and particular perceptions. The kind of 
freedom Kant allows for the imagination of the genius is the freedom that 
Murdoch thinks is at work in the imagination of every individual. She argues that 
not only the genius but everyone is constantly refashioning the world around them. 
Not only fine art, but also any perception of the world, is recreated by imagination. 
By using their imagination, individuals can picture different possibilities in every 
given situation and form a better understanding and better evaluation of the people 
and situations they encounter in life. This function of imagination can more 
clearly be seen in morally challenging situations. In these situations, by imagining 
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different possibilities individuals are better capable of putting themselves in other 
people’s shoes and understanding them before (morally) judging them.272 
Murdoch argues that Kant cannot affirm this account, as for him 
imagination “… is too double-sided a concept, too much like a kind of feeling, to 
be allowed … near to the essence of morality”.273 It is a “mixed matter” between 
mind and sense: “an intelligent sensibility”.274 Kant refrains from introducing 
imagination into morality, because in his view morality is strictly based on reason. 
Against this, Murdoch argues that 
… the world around us is constantly being modified or ‘presented’ 
(made or made up) by a spontaneous creative free faculty which is 
not that of ‘reason’ thought of as ‘beaming in’ upon purely 
empirical situations not otherwise evaluated. Imagination, if the 
concept is in question at all, can scarcely be thought of as morally 
neutral.275 
For Murdoch, we cannot help but to use our imagination in every situation. 
She says: “[Even when] we settle down to be ‘thoroughly rational’ about a 
situation, we have already, reflectively or unreflectively, imagined it in a certain 
way”. 276  However, Kant assigns moral goodness only to reason. Only the 
beautiful, which, for Kant, does not have any meaningful purpose, can be a 
product of imagination.277 As Murdoch puts it, to Kant “[t]he good is compulsory, 
the beautiful is not”.278 Whereas any concern with moral goodness is vital, the 
same is not true of the beautiful. That is why the creative and playful imagination 
is in charge of the beautiful but not goodness and morality. 
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Murdoch argues that the real reason Kant avoids relating imagination to 
morality is the fact that he does not wish to enter the realm of the particular and 
of history. For Kant, Murdoch maintains, “… the act of moral judgment [is] an 
instantiating of a timeless form of rational activity”.279 The concept of ‘respect’ as 
a central concept of Kant’s ethics is respect for universal reason, not the particular 
individual. For the individual to recognise their moral freedom, is for them to rise 
above history. Murdoch disagrees with Kant on this point and argues that the 
essence of art and morals is the same.280 Both morality and art deal with particular 
individuals and particular events. Morality is about individuals in particular 
situations, and rational judgment requires the ability to imagine different 
possibilities and situations. For example, in making a decision about returning a 
large sum of money we have found on the pavement, the imagination helps us 
picture the distress and anxiety the owner of the money might be going through 
and also to imagine how we would feel if we were to lose the money. So 
imagination plays a vital role in the individual’s particular decisions and 
evaluations. 
In summary, Murdoch’s concept of imagination is a fusion of Kant’s 
transcendental and aesthetic imagination. She criticises Kant’s notion of 
transcendental imagination as a mechanical force with some boundaries that limit 
its freedom. However, the necessary role Kant assigns to this imagination 
becomes an inspiration for Murdoch. Resembling Kant’s transcendental 
imagination that links the concepts of mind to the forms of intuition, imagination 
to Murdoch links the concept of the Good to some particular events and 
individuals within the scope of morality, which is why, for her, our experience of 
the world is not just factual, but also evaluative (at least most of the time). 
Furthermore, Murdoch takes an interest in Kant’s aesthetic imagination as a free 
creative faculty. Nevertheless, she takes issue with the confined sphere Kant 
allocates to the application of imagination, which is the sphere of fine arts. To 
Murdoch, the essence of arts and morals is the same, and in every moral judgment 
and moral encounter with the world, imagination is actively working. Picturing 
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different possibilities in different circumstances enables us to make better 
judgments in morally challenging situations. 
Murdoch’s conception of imagination is also greatly influenced by Plato’s 
depiction of this concept. I will continue this chapter by explaining Murdoch’s 
presentation of Plato’s view, which will enable me to offer Murdoch’s own view 
as a synthesis between Kant’s and Plato’s views.  
Section Two 
Plato and the Destruction of Images 
In the previous section, I discussed Kant’s influence on Murdoch’s 
account of imagination. Here, I turn to several points of convergence between 
Murdoch’s and Plato’s accounts of the concept, and argue that in her discussion of 
Plato, Murdoch introduces the notion of fantasy – our imaginings that are under 
the influence of our egoistic tendencies.281 There are three main points to be 
derived from Murdoch’s depiction of Plato’s conception of imagination and that 
form the basis of her own theory.282  
First, imagination plays a role in the creation of new images and 
metaphors. To Plato, the highest realities, such as the Idea of the Good, are 
imageless.283 That is why the imagination has to create images of those realities to 
enable the individual to better comprehend them. In Murdoch’s view, 
metaphysicians like Plato show us that in order to deal with fundamental truths, 
we cannot avoid picturing them through metaphors and myths.284  
In the context of Murdoch’s work, metaphors are words that stand for and 
refer to phenomena that are difficult, or occasionally impossible, to express by the 
                                                
281 Murdoch introduces her own view while she is discussing Plato’s. As a result, these two 
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them. In this section I present what I take to be Murdoch’s own view. 
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283 See Chapter 1, Section One. 
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use of literal language.285 Following Plato, Murdoch argues that given their 
complexity, some features of reality cannot be expressed in literal terms. That is 
why Murdoch herself uses various metaphors to illustrate central concepts in her 
moral theory. For example, when she describes the process of moral change, she 
uses the metaphor of the ‘fabric of being’ to emphasize that moral development 
involves a changes in a person’s whole way of thinking, judging, feeling, and 
being in the world. It is not only their decisions or actions in one particular 
circumstance that changes, but also their attitude and mind-set in general. 
Murdoch’s appeal to Plato’s Allegory of the Cave is another example of the 
application of metaphors or myths through which she presents her account of the 
Good. As explained in Chapter 1, Murdoch uses Plato’s image of the Sun in the 
Allegory to show the remoteness yet visibility of the Good. The Sun “… gives 
light and energy and enables us to know truth. In its light we see the things of the 
world in their true relationships. Looking at it itself is supremely difficult and is 
unlike looking at things in its light. It is a different kind of thing from what it 
illuminates”.286 Even ‘the Good’ itself becomes a metaphor in Murdoch’s theory, 
“… a very important metaphor and one which is not just a property of philosophy 
and not just a model”.287  
                                                
285 As Nora Hämäläinen points out, Murdoch uses the term ‘metaphor’ quite loosely, where it 
can refer to an allegory, a parable, an image, or a myth. Nora Hämäläinen, "What Is a 
Wittgensteinian Neo-Platonist?–Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics and Metaphor," Philosophical Papers 
43, no. 2 (2014): 219. 
286 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 90. 
287 Ibid., 91. Considering the Sun to be a metaphor for ‘the Good’, it may sound odd for the 
Good to be a metaphor as well. Murdoch’s critics, such as David Tracy, Nora Hämäläinen and 
Marije Altorf refer to Murdoch’s work and regard the Good as another metaphor in her theory. 
Altorf criticizes Murdoch and argues that it is not clear why the Good should be understood as a 
metaphor and image rather than as a concept. Sabina Lovibond criticizes Altorf’s reading of 
Murdoch and her referring to the Good as a metaphor. According to Lovibond, Plato uses the Sun 
as a symbol of the Good, but the Good itself is not a metaphor. I agree with Lovibond that Plato 
(and so Murdoch) use the Sun as a symbol of the Good, but I don’t think that it means the Good 
itself cannot be a metaphor, as Lovibond suggests. As I discussed above, in the context of 
Murdoch’s work metaphors refer to the phenomena which are difficult or impossible to be 
expressed through the literal application of words, due to their complex or changeable nature. If 
we agree with this, we have to agree that Murdoch’s Good is a metaphor in Murdoch’s broad sense 
of the word. The Good is a metaphor, the referent of which is an indefinable, unpresentable notion. 
Through experiencing particular good and bad things, the individual experiences they develop an 
understanding of the Good (which Murdoch often writes with capital ‘G’). That is why to 
Murdoch the Good is a metaphor, namely, a concept clearer than what it is referring to, in this case 
the absolute indefinable notion which is the form of the Good, to put it in Platonic terms. While we 
can never fully grasp the concept of the Good (the absolute value) and its perfection, we can 
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However, Murdoch distances herself from Plato by arguing that the image-
making function of imagination is not limited to the use of metaphors and to the 
understanding of higher realities. Rather, it functions in our ordinary day-to-day 
life. The importance she assigns to the particular and to the world of contingency 
makes her view at variance with that of Plato. While for Plato, knowledge of 
reality is limited to knowledge of universals, for Murdoch the particular and 
contingent are as important and as real, if not more important. In Murdoch’s view, 
the imagination of the individual continually creates images of their surroundings 
in the course of their everyday experience and activities. For example, a student 
might try to picture herself as seen by her favourite teacher and identify with that 
picture; or when choosing her field of study, she might try to picture herself 
working in different fields and compare those pictures in her imagination. In these 
cases, imagination deals with everyday experiences that are contingent and 
particular. Here, the role of imagination is to envision different aspects of a 
particular reality, whether in the present, past, or future. While some images 
created by our imagination are closer to reality, all images are imperfect. There is 
no ultimate image: all images can potentially become better and more accurate. 
Murdoch states: 
Image-making or image-apprehending is always an imperfect 
activity, some images are higher than others, that is nearer to 
reality. Images should not be resting places, but pointers toward 
higher truth. The implication is that the highest activities of the 
mind, as in mathematics and mysticism, are imageless…. [T]he 
mythical and metaphorical imagery of [Plato’s] central dialogues 
could be regarded, by those able to understand them, as ladders to 
be thrown away after use.288 
                                                                                                                                 
experience it in our moral life through experiencing contingent good things. See David Tracy, "Iris 
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While in everyday experiences, the individual often envisions images that 
help them make sense of their experiences, they must never consider an image as 
a final, but always be prepared to move on to a more accurate image of reality. 
For example, an employer who has formed a negative image of an employee who 
has previously made a big mistake must be prepared to change this image by 
confronting new facts. By regularly checking or attending to the activities of the 
employee, the employer ought to be amenable to revising his initial image in the 
light of new facts.  
This brings me to the second Platonic aspect of Murdoch’s theory of 
imagination, which is the idea that creating new images demands identifying and 
destroying false ones. Murdoch says:  
For Plato the lower level, which for Kant is necessary automatic 
synthesis, is seen in human terms as the production of base 
illusions, or perhaps simply of the ordinary unimaginative egoistic 
screen of our conceptualising. Plato, teaching by images and myths, 
also acknowledges high imagination as creative stirring spirit ....289 
Murdoch explains that on Plato’s account, there are two levels of 
imagination that display entirely opposite functions: ‘egoistic illusion or fantasy’ 
at the one end, and ‘creative imagination’ at the other.290 Plato uses the words 
eikasia or phantasia for what Murdoch calls illusion or fantasy, which is “… the 
most benighted human state, the lowest condition in the Cave”.291 For Murdoch, 
Plato is well aware of the egoistic tendencies that lead to fantasy, or an unrealistic 
                                                
289 Ibid., 320. 
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of senses. Different parts of the line possess different degrees of reality of truth. The entities in the 
realm of senses (shadows, images, physical objects, etc.) have less reality than those of the 
intelligible realm (mathematical figures, Forms, etc.). Plato uses this metaphor to explain the 
gradual ascent of the soul from the lowest stage (eikasia) to the highest stage (noesis) of 
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perception of the world.292 Murdoch explains that Plato’s lower imagination is 
engaged with the production of illusions that are rooted in an “unimaginative 
egoistic screen of our conceptualising”.293 In view of that, one of the most 
important tasks of ‘higher’ imagination (creative and truthful imagination) is to 
identify and destroy these images. For Plato, moral improvement or moral 
progress requires “a progressive destruction of false images” created by the 
individual’s fantasising ego and irrational passions.294  
False images exist alongside true ones, and arguments using such false 
propositions can be logically valid. That is why it is not always easy to distinguish 
between truth-seeking images and false ones, as they are “made into a single 
interwoven fabric”.295 Murdoch repeatedly warns us against creating false images, 
“… as in the layman ‘imagining’ physics, or in certain moral and religious 
situations”. 296  However, there is a continuous urge to move beyond false 
images.297 The destruction of those images is especially important to Murdoch 
because they affect one’s attitude and one’s approach to other people. The 
discontentment with an employee that results from an image created on the basis 
of a single mistake and in spite of all the good work they have done, the hatred 
towards an entire nation due to the biased images created by the media, the lack of 
compassion for a disabled neighbour on welfare, due to the false image that his 
unemployment is the result of him being reckless and idle; these are all examples 
of false images that inform the individual’s vision and beliefs. So the second role 
of imagination, which especially affects one’s moral progress, is destroying some 
of the images it creates.  
We can explain these aspects of imagination better by returning to the 
example of the mother-in-law discussed in Chapter 2, and recount it in light of 
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this Platonic view. When confronting D, M’s imagination spontaneously evaluates 
different aspect of D’s behaviour and personality, making use of the concept of 
the Good. What motivates M to see D as “unpolished and lacking in dignity and 
refinement”, is her own egocentric motives in the form of prejudice, narrow-
mindedness, snobbishness, and jealousy.298 However, M’s attitude towards D 
changes gradually by her effort to see D in the way she ‘truly’ is. While trying to 
attend to her and to see her more truthfully, M uses her imagination to see other 
possible ways D could be pictured and described. She also tries to imagine the 
possible reasons for the negative opinion she holds towards D, such as her 
prejudice about young people or the deep love she has for her son. As difficult as 
it may be, she makes an effort to imagine what it is like to be so young and 
inexperienced. Imagination enables her to put herself in D’s shoes and to see the 
world through her eyes, and as a result, to get over her prejudiced images of D. It 
influences the quality of her vision. However, while M’s conception of D has 
improved, she cannot say this is the only way the reality of D can be seen or 
described. She should not consider her image of D as the only possible image and 
should be prepared to imagine other aspects of the reality of D. 
Attentiveness to see the reality of other people more justly and lovingly is 
at the core of Murdoch’s account of morality, which brings me to the third 
influence of Plato’s theory of imagination on Murdoch’s view. Murdoch claims 
that morality is an “… imaginative cognitive activity”299 and that “[k]nowledge 
(language) is essentially related to morality by the idea of truth”.300 Creative 
imagination is at work in the individual’s cognitive effort to see reality. To 
approach reality the individual creates images, destroys them, and then goes 
beyond them.301 ‘To go beyond’ is a synthesis of the first two functions of 
imagination (creating images and destroying them) that Murdoch borrows from 
Plato. The individual gets closer to reality by acknowledging and eliminating 
images that are wrong and ‘fantastic’ and by creating more realistic ones, all the 
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while targeting a reality that still lies beyond. They must be mindful that there is 
no final true image. They can only try to obtain an improved vision and 
imagination that create more realistic, but still imperfect, images. It requires a 
disciplined effort to see the reality of every person and every situation and to be 
constantly “… moving beyond our images…”.302 According to Murdoch, for Plato, 
this constant destruction of false images is accompanied by “…a continuous 
breeding of imagery in the consciousness which is, for better or worse, a function 
of moral change”.303 
To recapitulate, after discussing the importance of metaphors and myths in 
Plato’s view and the divergence of Murdoch’s conception of imagination from 
Plato’s, I argued that Plato introduces a lower imagination, the role of which is to 
create false images. Murdoch follows Plato in claiming that in our quest to be 
moral, we must be alert to these false images and constantly attempt to destroy 
them. It is only through dismissing false images that one can come to a clearer 
understanding of reality. But this is not enough. Our imagination must always be 
prepared to create new images and abolish and modify false ones. That is why the 
moral life is a perfecting process, in which imagination creates images, destroys 
the false ones and creates new ones in their place (while not assuming any of 
these images to be final). The cognitive process of moral improvement is a 
continuous, never-ending process. 
Section Three 
Imagination and Fantasy 
In the first chapter I explained that for Murdoch “… morality, goodness, is 
a form of realism”.304 Her realist approach to morality manifests itself in her 
attempt to establish a moral absolute, which is the concept of the Good. Murdoch 
                                                
302 Ibid., 329. This leads to love, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, is the sympathetic 
recognition of the reality of other individuals, and improved and more compassionate vision of 
other individuals but not the ultimate one. 
303 Ibid. To Murdoch, Plato himself is a demythologiser who repeatedly moves beyond the 
metaphorical imagery of his older dialogues, and this movement is a necessary condition of an 
image-making process. Ibid., 318. 
304 The Sovereignty of Good, 57. 
86 
 
introduces the virtue of love and assigns a cognitive role to it, which is for her, the 
ability to see the reality of the other person. Murdoch uses the metaphor of vision 
to explain that seeing reality is an ever-improving ability that requires 
considerable effort. So by assigning absoluteness to the Good as a shared a priori 
concept of every individual’s mind, and by assigning a cognitive role to love, one 
of the most significant concerns of Murdoch’s moral philosophy becomes the 
individual’s recognition of the reality of others, and as a result, of the Good.305 
Yet, Murdoch says: 
The world is not given to us ‘on a plate’, it is given to us as a 
creative task. It is impossible to banish morality from this picture. 
We work, using or failing to use our honesty, our courage, our 
truthful imagination, at the interpretation of what is present to us, 
as we of necessity shape it and ‘make something of it’. We help it 
to be.306  
Given Murdoch’s realistic approach to the Good and her cognitivist 
account of ethics, an important question arises: is Murdoch’s realism consistent 
with her view that the individual’s confrontation with the world is a creative task? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine Murdoch’s distinction between 
imagination and fantasy, while drawing on my discussion of moral realism in 
Chapter 1. This will also prepare the ground for the discussion of the ways in 
which art can serve as a means of improving imagination, thereby allowing moral 
development. 
As explained earlier, Murdoch says: “The world which we confront is not 
just a world of ‘facts’ but a world upon which our imagination has, at any given 
moment, already worked”.307 To improve our moral vision, we are required to try 
to identify the reality of other people in different circumstances. However, 
Murdoch says that we do not have access to pure facts. In every experience, our 
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perceptions are manipulated by our imagination. If values are part of the fabric of 
the world and if Murdoch thinks it is possible for us to have the knowledge of 
these values, then how can morality also be a creative task?308 The answer to this 
question lies in the Kantian aspect of Murdoch’s imagination, namely, her view of 
imagination as a creative mediator. While the individual perceives their 
surroundings, the imagination acts as a mediator that facilitates the process of 
evaluation. In Murdoch’s view, there is no escape from this evaluation. It happens 
spontaneously in every experience. Although the mediation of imagination is 
inevitable, the individual can still deliberately shape and direct their imagination. 
Murdoch says: “…if we admit active imagination as an important faculty it is 
difficult not to see this as an exercise of will. Imagining is doing, it is a sort of 
personal exploring”.309 This shows the direct relation between imagination and the 
will. The individual chooses to imagine some other aspects of a situation and to 
see beyond appearances. It does not just happen by itself. Rather, it comes with 
moral effort. In the formulation of our beliefs about other people, our imagination 
and will (or wilful imagination) are both at work. This is the creative aspect of 
imagination. When we see a scene of a car crash on the side of the road, we can 
see the driver as careless and irresponsible or we can choose to imagine other 
possibilities, such as the existence of a pothole in the middle of the road or an 
unforeseen problem with the car. It is up to the individual to choose to rely on the 
spontaneous activity of imagination or to actively create images of their own. 
Nonetheless, Murdoch points out that the individual’s effort to imagine 
different aspects of reality is not always successful. In plenty of cases the 
individual regards a distorted image of a situation as representing reality. This is 
what Murdoch calls ‘fantasy’. Fantasy or ‘egoistic fantasy’ is the counterpart of 
constructive imagination. It corresponds to Plato’s lower imagination, which is the 
result of the egoistic forces in human beings.310 Murdoch repeatedly refers to 
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these forces and argues that human beings are naturally selfish. She says: “In the 
moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego”.311 Our ego or selfish energy 
powerfully strives to delude us. So fantasy refers to the creative faculty of mind 
that, instead of bringing one closer to reality, drives one further away. Murdoch 
writes: 
Each of us lives and chooses within a partly private, partly 
fabricated world, and although any particular belief might be 
shown to be ‘merely fantastic’ it is false to suggest that we could, 
even in principle, ‘purge’ the world we confront of these personal 
elements. Nor is there any reason why we should. To be a human 
being is to know more than one can prove, to conceive of a reality 
which goes ‘beyond the facts’ in these familiar and natural ways.312    
As we see in the above statement, in Murdoch’s view we cannot ‘purge’ 
our imaginings of personal preconceptions or prejudices. In reality, a great deal of 
our beliefs are purely egoistic fantasies. She claims that in most circumstances we 
are not imagining but ‘fantasising’, which is “[t]he chief enemy of excellence in 
morality…”.313 Murdoch views the egoistic fantasy as the prevailing force in the 
human psyche, which is the tragic aspect of fantasy. She asserts that “… fantasy is 
a stronger force than reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to 
human beings”.314 Fantasy is “…the proliferation of blinding self-centred aims 
and images, … [it] is itself a powerful system of energy, and most of what is often 
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called ‘will’ or ‘willing’ belongs to this system”.315 In fantasy, the direction of this 
system of energy shifts away from the outer reality towards the self, the ego. That 
is why it can prevent us from seeing the reality of other people. She writes: 
The human mind is naturally and largely given to fantasy. Vanity (a 
prime human motive) is composed of fantasy. Neurotic or vengeful 
fantasies, erotic fantasies, delusions of grandeur, dreams of power, 
can imprison the mind, impeding new understanding, new interests 
and affections, possibilities of fruitful and virtuous action. If we 
consider the narrow dreariness of this fantasy life to which we are 
so addicted the term ‘unimaginative’ seems appropriate.316 
For Murdoch, what prevents the fantasising or ‘unimaginative’ individual 
from attending to reality is the egoistic force to seek consolation and comfort in 
the face of torments. By resisting the vision of reality, we seek consolation in false 
images of reality created by fantasy.317 Fantasy is the psyche’s way of protecting 
itself from the pain of facing unpleasant realities.318 In a world full of suffering 
and misery, we use mediums, such as religious concepts, that are products of 
human fantasising, in order to survive emotionally.319 That is why Murdoch writes: 
“Fantasy operates either with shapeless day-dreams … or with small myths, toys, 
crystals. Each in his own way produces a sort of ‘dream necessity’. Neither 
grapples with reality”.320 One of the best examples of a character who is driven by 
fantasy is Charles, the male protagonist in Murdoch’s Novel The Sea, the Sea. 
Charles is a retired playwright whose selfish tendencies are manifested in the form 
of an obsessive pursuit of an old flame. His pride and ego lead him to create a 
completely fantasy-ridden picture of reality in which he is madly in love with his 
former girlfriend, Hartley, who is in turn still in love with him and fascinated by 
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his fame. Charles loved Hartley when they were very young. The experience was 
so intense and so innocent that he never got over the fact that Hartley left him. He 
needs to adhere to the consoling picture in which Harley loved him and he was the 
only person that could make her happy. In Charles’ fantasy, Hartley needs him to 
rescue her from her abusive husband. Due to his egoism, this picture becomes so 
large and so strong that he completely loses touch with reality. This leads Charles 
to kidnap Hartley, which leads to embarrassment and eventually the catastrophic 
death of Hartley’s son.321 The novel demonstrates how a false image that is the 
product of one’s distortion of reality through selfishness can lead to wrong 
judgements of a situation and wrong decisions. 
Charles’ mistake is choosing to regard an image as fixed and final and 
taking comfort in that. Following Plato, Murdoch warns us that while there is no 
escape from fantasizing, our task in the process of image-making is to avoid 
setting one image as final. No image can be final and it is selfish and egoistic to 
view it as such. Becoming moral is a progressive task. We should constantly try to 
get closer to reality by abolishing our old images, creating new ones, and moving 
to those that are closer to the reality of other people, and thus to the Good. This is 
the role of imagination.  
As opposed to fantasy, “[w]e use our imagination not to escape the world 
but to join it” and to see it the way it truly is. 322  In Murdoch’s view, 
“[i]magination reveals. It explains”.323 Imagination is the only means through 
which we can go beyond the consolations of fantasy. It is only through creating 
truthful images of reality and surpassing fantasy that we develop the “…capacity 
for compassion [and] for identifying with other people…”.324 This move to 
compassion and love, for Murdoch, is the essence of morality. Only through 
accurate and compassionate attention to other people is moral vision attained. So 
compassion and sympathy towards other people is the result of our imagination 
confronting the world along with the suppression of our ego, and achieving moral 
                                                
321 The Sea, the Sea (London: Chatto & Windus, 1978). 
322 The Sovereignty of Good, 88. 
323 "Literature and Philosophy: A Conversation with Bryan Magee," 18. 
324 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 53. 
91 
 
vision is dependent on developing such compassion and love, which is the 
ultimate goal in Murdoch’s cognitivist account of morality. That is how 
imagination plays a vital part in our moral progress. 
For Murdoch, “[w]e are fantasising imaginative animals”.325 These two 
functions of human consciousness, namely, imagining and fantasising, are 
constantly at work, and the images they create are often very similar. She says: 
“… creative imagination and obsessive fantasy may be very close almost 
indistinguishable forces in the mind of the writer”.326 This leads to an important 
difficulty for Murdoch, which is to explain how we can know whether our ideas 
are the result of constructive imagination or misleading and destructive fantasy. 
The similarity between imagination and fantasy rests upon the fact that in both of 
them, the mind entertains more than empirically verifiable reality, and the notion 
of ‘unreality’ becomes prominent. In other words, both imagination and fantasy 
have an unreal structure, and their common characteristic is the augmentation of 
empirical reality. Through imagination, for instance, we can envision the Good, 
which is real but cannot be grasped by means of our sense perception.327 In the 
case of imagination, the augmented reality created by consciousness is the only 
way to achieve a more truthful vision, but in the case of fantasy the augmented 
reality created by consciousness prevents us from discovering the truth. So there 
seems to be no objective and clear demarcation between these two notions. And if 
there are no certain criteria by which to recognise which state of consciousness we 
are in, we might infer that any attempt to distinguish between imagination and 
fantasy would be totally subjective.  
As Murdoch describes it, being a fantasising agent is equivalent to being 
blinded by “… the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and 
dreams…”.328 This means being trapped, even somehow subconsciously, in those 
consoling images we create for ourselves. It is implausible to think that someone 
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would consciously construct and hold on to false consoling images, such as God, 
all the while being aware that these images are with no instance in reality.329 After 
all, if this had been the case, these images would have lost their consoling power, 
as the consolation comes with the conviction that these images bear a trace of 
reality. For the faithful, for instance, God is not just created by the human psyche 
to protect itself, but is something real. To illustrate this point it is useful to 
consider Malcolm Muggeridge’s description of Simone Weil’s experience of God. 
We can see there is as much certainty in Weil’s belief in the reality of God as 
Murdoch’s conviction of the reality of the Good: 
In one of her letter to Fr Perrin she describes how, in the Easter 
week of 1938 … Christ came down and took possession of her. 
Thenceforth, He was the centre of her existence, the focus of her 
mind, the point of reference for all her questing and questioning. 
As T. S. Elliot has pointed out, this personal devotion to our Lord 
and love for Him saved her from pitfalls into which a certain 
pedantry and intellectual arrogance in her temperament might well 
have led her.330 
Weil describes her direct experience of Christ as a real experience that was 
a turning point in her intellectual life. As the above quote claims, Weil’s devotion 
to Christ saved her from pitfalls that her existing intellectual arrogance might have 
led her. Hence, Elliot appears to believe that Weil’s devotion to Christ acts as a 
corrective to her vice of intellectual arrogance (analogous to my spectacles acting 
as a corrective to my existing myopia). This example, along with the instances of 
other mystics and philosophers, such as Blaise Pascal and Meister Eckhart, who 
have personally undergone spiritual awakenings demonstrate how these personal 
experiences feel so real for those who experience them.331 As we can see, it is not 
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quite clear how it is possible for the individual to determine whether their images 
are in fact false images. 
Murdoch can answer the question posed above by saying that the problem 
does not lie in the image the mind creates, but in our attachment to that image. We 
should note that there is no final image. We keep creating images that bring us 
closer to reality, but we must constantly abandon them and move beyond them. 
As Murdoch says, “[i]mages should not be resting places, but pointers toward 
higher truth”.332 Fantasy is at work when we create an image and hold on to it. 
The problem arises when our fabricated images become our final images as they 
are a source of comfort to us, and it is this sense of comfort, which stops us from 
struggling and moving beyond them. We cling to an image like God and it gives 
us consolation and comfort as it makes us believe that we are eternal souls and our 
life has a meaningful purpose. Therefore, instead of abolishing that image and 
moving beyond it (maybe like Murdoch who moved to the image of the Good) we 
cling to it and it forms the pivotal part of our belief system.  
That said, it should be noted that Murdoch’s central point is that the moral 
consequences of imagination and fantasy are different. As Roger Crisp points out, 
“Murdoch’s ideal is one of selflessness”, which is equivalent to love and 
compassion.333 One way to distinguish between imagination and fantasy is to look 
at the role each plays in social relations. When facing a tragic dilemma, the moral 
agent (exercising their imagination) puts themselves in the other person’s shoes. 
They try to see the other person in their own right, not only in relation to 
themselves. Through imagination, they are not only carefully attending to, but 
also feeling for the other person.334 This, as explained earlier, is the compassion 
felt through imagination. As Murdoch describes it, “[l]ove is the perception of 
individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than 
oneself is real”.335 This kind of love, which is a form of knowledge, comes with 
                                                
332 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 318. 
333 Crisp, "Iris Murdoch on Nobility and Moral Value," 284. 
334 As discussed in Chapter 3, in Murdoch’s virtue ethics, morality is not only thinking a 
certain way, but also feeling a certain manner. 
335 Murdoch, "The Sublime and the Good," 215. 
94 
 
the exercising of compassion towards others. This is what fantasy lacks (given its 
egoistic tendencies). On Murdoch’s account, feeling compassion towards others is 
very rare, but not impossible. The degree to which one is able to sympathise with 
others, to feel their happiness and distress is the degree to which one’s 
imagination is developed. So Murdoch could say that we are on the level of 
imagination when we are, in every situation, able to see other individuals in their 
own right, and sympathise with them. Thus, our sensitivity to the pain and 
suffering of other people is a sign of a developed imagination, which is a 
necessary condition for becoming a better person. 
To recapitulate, Murdoch assumes that moral agent has a cognitive task – 
the task of constantly making an effort to see and come to know the reality of the 
world and other individuals. On the other hand, she emphasises the role of 
imagination as a creative faculty that is the necessary condition for obtaining a 
realistic grasp of our surroundings. She argues that the reality an individual 
experiences is not completely given, but ‘partly fabricated’ by their imagination. 
These mind pictures and images are the only means of truly seeing the world. 
However, individuals must be aware that they cannot retain any of these images as 
a final image and must endeavour to make new images and obtain a more truthful 
vision. They should constantly try to put themselves in other people’s shoes and 
sympathize with them. Imagination can enable the individual to develop the 
sensitivity necessary to sympathise with other people in different situations. 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, I discussed the concept of the Good from 
Murdoch’s point of view and her central idea that morality is an act of knowing 
the reality of our surroundings. I showed that Murdoch is a kind of virtue ethicist, 
in the modern Aristotelian sense. However, as I discussed in this chapter, 
Murdoch’s discussions of imagination and fantasy has something to offer to virtue 
ethics – that is an account of morality as a creative task of imagination. In this 
chapter, I showed that, for Murdoch, the cultivation of imagination is necessary 
for an individual’s moral progress. Since imagination is associated with creation 
and innovation, the question arose as to how Murdoch’s Platonic moral realism, 
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which implies that morality involves knowledge, coheres with the view that 
morality is a creative task. Through examining Murdoch’s understanding of the 
concept of imagination, and its counterpart, fantasy, I argued that while for 
Murdoch morality is about the knowledge of the reality of other people, it is a 
creative process of picturing different aspects of every situation and 
contemplating them; it is about trying to put oneself in other people’s shoes. A 
stronger imagination helps the individual to develop a better moral understanding 
and assessment of every situation. As we will see in the next few chapters, this 
understanding of morality leads Murdoch to draw a close connection between 
morality and art, with both being products of the creative function of the human 
mind. 
In order to show how morality is a creative task carried out by the 
individual’s imagination, I first examined Murdoch’s understanding of these two 
concepts, drawing upon her Platonic and Kantian influences. The first Kantian 
aspect of Murdoch’s account of imagination is the link she makes between the 
universal concept of the Good and particular events. This aspect is equivalent to 
Kant’s transcendental imagination. However, this is where Murdoch’s account 
differs from Plato’s, for Plato does not give weight to the perception of particulars. 
The second Kantian aspect of Murdoch’s account of imagination is her definition 
of imagination as a spontaneous creative faculty. Nevertheless, as she 
acknowledges, Kant’s creative imagination is only at work in the sphere of fine 
arts (aesthetic imagination), whereas Murdoch extends it to the sphere of morality 
as to her, the essence of art and morality is the same.  
Murdoch admires Plato for identifying that the imagination can become 
corrupted, turning into what Murdoch calls fantasy. Murdoch is not influenced as 
much by Plato’s theory as by his own example of using images and metaphors to 
explain, or show, the highest realities. Following Plato, Murdoch argues that in 
the process of moral improvement, we must constantly create images, destroy 
them, and move beyond them. This is a never-ending task. This is how, for 
Murdoch, morality is a creative task. There is never a final image with which we 
can be satisfied. Since every image includes some aspect of reality, but never all 
of it, we should make a continuous effort to move on to new images.  
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In this process, we might get deluded into regarding some of these images 
as the ultimate ones. This is where, by forcing in illusions generated by fantasy, 
the negative force of the ego stops us from seeing reality, which for Murdoch is 
essential for morality. I argued that Murdoch’s realist and cognitivist approach 
nevertheless prevents her from considering reality as ‘partly fabricated’ by the 
individual’s imagination. This raises the question as to how we can decide 
whether it is a legitimate ‘fabrication’, the work of imagination, or an illegitimate 
one, the work of fantasy. I argued that what might help us distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate fabrications is to consider the role each plays in social 
relations and the feelings moral agents have towards each other. Using our 
imagination allows us to put ourselves in other people’s shoes, to feel what they 
feel, and to empathize with them: a loving approach to others that is not 
achievable by our egoistic fantasies. Ultimately, Murdoch’s main point is that 
humility requires us to resist egoism and arrogance. That is why she emphasises 
that we should never settle on any image and consider them as final. We should 
always be ready to move on to new, and hopefully improved, images of reality. 
In the next Chapter, I will discuss Murdoch’s theory of art, which will 
show a close affinity between her views of art, reality, and morality. Then 
considering the concept of imagination together with concepts central to 






The Paradox of Art 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I argued that virtue, specifically the virtue of love, 
plays a central role in Murdoch’s moral theory. She sees morality as a creative 
project, and emphasizes the importance of imagination in cultivating virtue. As I 
will explain in the following chapters, Murdoch thinks that art, but only great art, 
has the potential to educate and to contribute to the development of the character 
of the individual. Before considering this view, it is necessary to examine 
Murdoch’s theory of art, in particular her view of what makes a work of art good 
or great.  
I will draw on my discussion of the concepts of imagination and fantasy in 
Chapter 4 to highlight a tension between the concepts of unity and disunity in 
Murdoch’s theory of art. She claims that artists should present disunity in their 
artwork, which involves portraying the messiness, unintelligibility, and 
contingency of reality. However, she also claims that unity (form) is a necessary 
and unavoidable component of an artwork. In light of my discussion of the 
distinction between imagination and fantasy I will argue that in Murdoch’s view, 
the kind of unity manifested in an artwork should not just be a consoling unity, 
which is the product of fantasy, but the necessary unity of an artistic form, which 
is the product of imagination. What makes an artwork great, then, is its ‘realism’, 
that is, its ability to portray the chancy and transient reality within the boundaries 
of an artwork. In this view, it is only an artwork created by imagination that can 
be great and hence, that can be morally educational. 
Murdoch does not explicitly discuss this tension between unity and 
disunity in her work and neither do her commentators. However, focusing on this 
tension is useful in allowing us to construct a Murdochian theory of art from the 
discussions on the topic scattered throughout her work. More importantly, it 
prepares the ground for the discussion, in the following chapters, of the ways in 
which art can contribute to moral education. 
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Unity versus Disunity  
Murdoch’s main concern in her discussion of art is that art should avoid 
losing touch with reality. For Murdoch, in the enjoyment of great art, “… an 
essential ingredient is a sense of the revelation of reality, of the really real, the 
ὄντως ὄν: the world as we were never able so clearly to see it before”.336 
Murdoch’s concern about art’s relation to reality manifests itself particularly in 
her discussions of unity and disunity in art. She maintains that great art is 
disunified because reality is disunified. Reality consists of the discontinuities of 
the individual’s experiences and does not have a comprehensible unity and order. 
As opposed to good works of art, Murdoch says: “Ordinary works of art may be 
seen as illusory unities, the reassuring image of the satisfied ego, pleasing through 
a felt unification of the sensibility, an intuited harmony”.337 She continues: 
A prime difficulty in human life: we must have stories (art forms), 
but stories (art forms) are almost always a bit or very false…. The 
true story may not even look like a story because it will inhibit the 
automatic movement of egoism, with its imposition of a pleasing 
innocuous form. We want to control the tale ourselves and give it 
our ending ….338 
Imposing unity on art is the product of the egoism of the artist, rather than 
the product of their attention directed away from the self towards reality, and this 
is the ‘prime difficulty’ of an artist in creating an artwork. Artists should avoid 
imposing unity upon their work. However, in other places, Murdoch states: “Good 
art reveals what we are usually too selfish and too timid to recognize, the minute 
and absolutely random detail of the world, and reveals it together with a sense of 
unity and form”.339 In an interview with Christopher Bigsby, Murdoch emphasises 
that “[a] work of art has got to have a form, it has got to have notation, it has got 
                                                
336 "The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists," 454. 
337 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 104. 
338 Ibid., 105. 
339 The Sovereignty of Good, 84. (My italics). 
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to have something which is fixed and authoritative …”.340 So on the one hand, 
Murdoch objects to unity in art as it is a product of the artist’s ego which conceals 
reality. On the other hand, she emphasises that unity is a necessary component of 
an artwork and is therefore unavoidable. In the rest of this chapter I will explain 
how these two contradictory ideas are reconcilable and even essential in 
Murdoch’s theory of art. 
‘Unity’ is a concept repeatedly employed in different contexts throughout 
Murdoch’s work.341 Murdoch writes: “It is the traditional inspiration of the 
philosopher, but also his traditional vice, to believe that all is one”.342 The 
aspiration for unity and unification is a strong drive in philosophy, art, and other 
intellectual activities.343 So, Murdoch brings the concept of ‘unity’ to the context 
of art as well and repeatedly questions whether the unity portrayed in art is a false 
or distorted depiction of the imperfection and randomness of reality. In Murdoch’s 
view, “…it is realism which makes great art great…” and reality is chancy and 
transient.344 Life is contingent and pointless. Even an attempt to be virtuous is 
pointless.345 There is no real unity and purpose in human life. Reality is not a 
limited whole, and therefore unachievable. The human consciousness is not 
unified either. It contains various emotions and thoughts that are both vigorous 
and unstable, and in constant interplay with a reality that is dynamic and 
contingent. There is no unity in human life and everything is subject to change. In 
                                                
340 Christopher Bigsby, "Interview with Iris Murdoch," in From a Tiny Corner in the House of 
Fiction: Conversations with Iris Murdoch, ed. Gillian Dooley (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2003), 101. 
341 Consider, for example, the ‘unity of the virtues’ in Murdoch’s moral theory as discussed in 
Chapter 3, Section Two. Briefly, in the discussion of Murdoch’s virtue ethical approach, I argued 
that while Murdoch does not believe that morality can be reduced to a unity like a single principle, 
she also does not think that morality “can be satisfactorily characterized by an enumeration of 
varying ‘goods’ and virtues” either. Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 492. Murdoch 
argues that the human intellect, while identifying the hierarchical order of virtues, seeks unity in 
them. She suggests that “reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world and that increasing moral 
sophistication reveals increasing unity”. The Sovereignty of Good, 56. Through contemplating the 
variety of virtues, we find some sort of unity in the world of virtues. The virtue that unifies all the 
virtues is the virtue of love. 
342 The Sovereignty of Good, 49. 
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345 See Chapter 3, Section Three. 
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Murdoch’s view, art must reveal to us the chanciness and the pointlessness of life. 
The unity imposed in an artwork is not compatible with reality and is a product of 
personal fantasy.346  
Nevertheless, Murdoch argues that in a work of art we naturally seek “… 
the comforting sense of a unified self, with organised emotions and fearless 
world-dominating intelligence, a complete experience in a limited whole”.347 
However, this is a shameless display of “…the self-magnifying illusion-making 
lying ego…”.348 The idea of a unified self is the demand of one’s ego to identify 
itself with any easily comprehensible quality of consciousness or the preference of 
some qualities over others. This is a false picture, which is the product of one’s 
fantasy. The kind of art that displays this sort of unity is what Murdoch calls ‘bad 
art’ – it presents a false unity that pacifies one’s ego.  
The unity in bad art results from the triumph of ego or egoistic fantasy 
over crude reality. It is the function of fantasy to create a consoling picture of the 
victory of a putative unified self over randomness and contingency, which leads to 
a false feeling of happiness and consolation. Fantasy protects the ego against the 
messiness and formlessness of reality by deluding it into believing that it can form 
a unified picture of this formlessness. Fantasy conceals reality by consoling the 
ego. In a bad literary work, for example, fantasy manifests unity as “… the 
sentimental untruthful tale of how the brave attractive ego (of course he has his 
faults) triumphs over accident and causality and is never really mocked or brought 
to nought”.349 However reality is not all glorious or predictable. Reality consists 
of unintelligible and accidental details that human consciousness cannot fully 
comprehend. Fantasy denies this and creates a world with form and purpose. The 
kind of art that displays the self-aggrandizing images of fantasy is pleasing and 
consoling to the ego. For Murdoch, most art objects are nothing but “…a false 
unity, the product of a mortal man who cannot entirely dominate his subject 
matter and remove or transform contingent rubble and unclarified personal 
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emotions and attitudes”. 350  The consolation of the false unity is not the 
consolation of reality, but the consolation of fantasy or what is fake. Murdoch 
goes as far as saying: “Almost anything that consoles us is a fake”.351 
Nevertheless, in Murdoch’s view the sense of joy and pleasure in art 
comes primarily from a sense of unity. For her, taking pleasure in art is certainly 
an essential function of it. In an interview, in response to the question of what 
effect she would like her novels to have, she states that “I’d like people to enjoy 
reading them… literature is to be enjoyed, to be grasped by enjoyment”.352 And 
for art to be enjoyable it must possess unity and form. Murdoch writes:  
Art, and by ‘art’… I mean good art, not fantasy art, affords us a 
pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both 
in its genesis and its enjoyment it is a thing totally opposed to 
selfish obsession .… It is able to do this partly by virtue of 
something which it shares with nature: a perfection of form which 
invites unpossessive contemplation and resists absorption into the 
selfish dream life of the consciousness.353  
The ‘perfection of form’ in art elicits a sense of joy and delight in the 
perceiver. It is because the individual naturally fears plurality and chaos, and 
tends to intuit a unity in instances of plurality, that they experience such joy and 
delight. Murdoch argues that the individual finds the lack of any form distressing, 
and the perception of what are discrete parts as a unified whole reassuring.354 That 
is why art cannot avoid form. One of the most important functions of art is to 
create joy and delight in the perceiver of art, which comes largely by the 
individual’s perception of form in art. So it seems that art can never truthfully 
represent the formlessness and randomness of reality, because to create joy it 
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needs unity and form, and reality is not unified. Yet as I will argue in the context 
of Murdoch’s theory of art, this paradox is both necessary and meaningful. To 
demonstrate this, it is useful to consider Murdoch’s own example of good art and 
how it incorporates both unity and disunity. 
Murdoch frequently uses literary works as an example of good works of 
art, and ‘tragedy’, particularly Shakespearean and Greek tragedy, as the greatest 
art of all.355 Tragedy, in her view, is a form of art in which the writer overcomes 
their fear of plurality, and portrays evil without trying to console the reader.356 In 
tragedy “… in the interests of truth, the artist must inhibit his magic”.357 The kind 
of magic that tragedy denies to its reader is the consolation of an egoistic and 
illusory unity by instead presenting contingency, misery, and death. The idea of 
contingency and death destroys the ego and its dream of eternal happiness and 
power.358 Tragedy can inflict distress or fear in the audience by looking directly at 
human evil. Murdoch refers to this as the paradoxical nature of tragedy. Tragedy 
destroys itself as art, for art is beautiful and charming whereas miseries are ugly 
and unattractive.359 At the same time tragedy maintains itself as art, for it exhibits 
the truth within the boundaries of an artwork. However, Murdoch claims that 
tragedy, as the highest of all artistic forms, fails to present real life, even though it 
exhibits what is incomplete and contingent. Tragedy depicts the truth, but in a 
                                                
355 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. 92-99. Murdoch says: “There are extremely 
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way that is bearable. She writes: “Real life is not tragic. In saying this one means 
that the extreme horrors of real life cannot be expressed in art”.360  
Murdoch explains that real-life cases, such as the example of Goebbels 
and his wife poisoning their children during their last days in Hitler’s bunker, can 
cause overwhelming distress and sadness, yet are not tragedies. In the case of 
Goebbel’s children, it is far more awful than tragedy, not because it is real, but 
because it has no form or boundaries. 361  Murdoch says: “Art offers some 
consolation, some sense, some form whereas the most dreadful ills of human life 
allow of none. Auschwitz is not a tragedy”.362 ‘Form’ is the unity found in art that 
while displaying some aspects of reality, transforms other aspects of it. While 
form is necessary in creating an artwork and representing reality, it also creates 
boundaries for it.363 In Murdoch’s words: “[Art] magically charms reality, nature, 
into a formal semblance”.364 That is why in a more moderate statement Murdoch 
says: “Since it [tragedy] is art it must have borders, it must be some kind of magic, 
but must also inhibit magic in its more familiar and consoling uses”.365 Tragedy, 
being a form of art, must be attractive and enjoyable, but not attractive in a 
familiar and easily accessible way. The charm of tragedy is not readily perceived 
and felt because it does not transform reality but reveals “… the true nature of sin, 
the futility of fantasy and the reality of death”.366 
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So the individual can take some pleasure in tragedy – “… unconsoling 
coldness … can be accompanied by a gloomy relish”.367 Murdoch does not 
expand on this point any further. Yet the question arises: ‘How is it possible to 
take pleasure in the misery and pain portrayed in tragedy?’ If we look closely at 
what Murdoch means by enjoyment in art, we find that this enjoyment must be a 
deeper emotion than some mere sensual pleasure, such as eating one’s favourite 
food, or some other trivial pleasures, such as the pleasure one takes in watching 
soap operas. This deeper emotion is the result of the artist’s use of technique to 
convey a deeper understanding of some facets of human life and consciousness, 
within the limitations of an artwork. In other words, it is the result of the mastery 
of the artist over the art form they practice and their effort to present reality within 
the boundaries of form in a way that engages its perceiver. To explain this aspect 
of Murdoch’s theory of art, it is useful to recall my discussion, in Chapter 3, of the 
kind of emotion that accompanies virtuous activity. The pleasure one takes in 
deeply engaging with the disastrous events of a tragedy resembles the kind of 
emotion a virtuous person takes in acting virtuously, despite all the difficulties 
they might go through. A generous and compassionate person enjoys giving to 
charity and helping other people, despite losing some of their money or despite 
the sadness and pain they might experience by encountering people who are 
suffering from poverty and injustice. Irrespective of how painful a situation can be, 
a virtuous person obtains a degree of satisfaction from acting virtuously.368 To 
Murdoch the same is true of art. The work of art that can engage the individual 
intellectually and on a deeper level is enjoyable to them. Murdoch writes: “In 
intellectual disciplines and in the enjoyment of art and nature we discover value in 
our ability to forget self, to be realistic, to perceive justly”.369  The enjoyment in 
art is the result of the artist’s ability to engage the audience with the artwork – an 
artwork which is the product of the artist’s skill in displaying diverse and random 
aspects of reality within the unity of an art form. This kind of engagement enables 
the audience to shift their attention from their selfish fantasies and to obtain a 
clearer vision of reality. To Murdoch, the enjoyment of art “… is a thing totally 
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opposed to selfish obsession. It invigorates our best faculties and, to use Platonic 
language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul”.370 Engaging with art gives 
rise to a form of pleasure, and ultimately love, which, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, involves a more accurate vision of reality.371 
In Murdoch’s novel The Unicorn, which includes elements of tragedy, 
Hannah’s unbearable sense of guilt due to her unsuccessful attempt to kill her 
husband leads her to self-purification and self-punishment. But since this self-
punishment is the result of her acute self-centeredness, which influences the other 
characters of the story as well, it leads to more violence and devastation at the end 
of the novel. This story does not provoke enjoyment in the reader in the 
conventional sense, but rather creates a sense of suspense and shock at the unusual 
succession of events and the melancholic setting of the story. In this novel, “… 
the satisfying calming completeness of art is internally contradicted by absolute 
contingency and humiliating death”.372 Ordinarily, there is no pleasure to be taken 
from a pointless death. Yet, there is a sense of “supreme pleasure” which comes 
from reaching “…heights of clarified intensity and dread…” 373  – the 
unpredictability of the narrative line and unfamiliarity of the characters, which 
resemble the messy and aimless nature of reality. Through reading this novel, the 
reader experiences events and people, however unpleasant, that they would not 
otherwise experience, and this gives them a sense of ‘a gloomy relish’.   
As we see in the example above, through reading a great novel one 
experiences a rarefied enjoyment which is rooted in the novelist’s artistic aptitude 
and ability to engage the reader’s imagination with the line of the story and the 
characters’ feelings of pain and remorse. This provokes one into reflecting on the 
different ways one can see life, which is only possible in a good work of art. By 
imposing form upon the chaotic and contingent reality, art makes it more visible 
and accessible. Form is the unity necessary for a good artwork. It is the product of 
the artist’s mastery of the techniques associated with their artistic medium, and is 
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accompanied by their attempt to display disunity and incompleteness. Murdoch 
states: 
Much modern music (post-Schoenberg) defeats our old-fashioned 
wish for the melody to ‘come home’. A lack of ‘finish’ may result 
from artistic failure or from a deliberate internalised disunity which 
only the perceptive client will understand …. ‘Loose ends’ may be 
a, frequently used, way of indicating patterns or realities which 
attend the work ‘from the outside’.374  
The disunity in good art, which is inspired by the disunity in reality, 
manifests itself differently in different art forms. In what Murdoch refers to as 
modern music, the disunity is the lack of typical melodic patterns and in literature, 
it could be ‘a lack of finish’. The lack of finish or completeness gently pushes the 
reader outside of their comfort zone and obliges them to look more attentively and 
see things differently. The manifestation of disunity in art is outside the 
individual’s comfort zone because they “… are not used to looking at the real 
world at all”.375  ‘Loose ends’ makes their imagination grow by challenging them 
to picture different possibilities through which the narrative could take shape. A 
lack of melody in some contemporary music makes it more of an opportunity for 
contemplation than an opportunity for relaxation. Loose ends and incompleteness 
also represent the banal and absurd realities of life – that the miseries of life are 
pointless and life does not end in a grand event, but rather in death. Art should be 
able to show this absurdity while inevitably softening or modifying it. Murdoch 
writes:  
… [In art] the awful things are contained in open surroundings, 
aware of contingency and absurdity, absolute ultimate loss of 
dignity, and the impossibility of an aesthetically complete 
presentation. The highest art here trails away into life. The context 
modifies the ‘tragic moment’ even when its point is a senseless 
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death like that of Petya Rostov in War and Peace.376 
Art presents reality in its disunity, contingency, and absurdity. However, it 
can only do so by “modifying the ‘tragic moment’” and thereby inducing a sense 
of enjoyment, which is due to its inevitable unity together with the skilfulness of 
the artist. While being moved by an artwork, such as tragedy, the audience also 
mistrusts it. Given its formal structure, the audience sees it as just a story. In my 
view, this is what Murdoch means when she describes good art “… as 
purposiveness without purpose, finality without end”.377 A work of art represents 
the chanciness and contingency of reality, but it does so in a purposive way, 
which involves imposing upon it a degree of form or structure necessary for 
engaging the audience. It is the paradox and the magic of good art, which leads 
the audience to take pleasure in it.378  
So great art, produced by a free and uncorrupted imagination, conveys a 
duality. Through imagination one joins the world rather than escapes it. Great art 
both educates and reveals, by portraying contingency and accident, and at the 
same time inspires intuitions of unreality through limitations of form and unity. 
Murdoch says: “This double revelation of both random detail and intuited unity is 
what we receive in every sphere of life… [and] quite clearly in art and intellectual 
work….  [An] increased understanding of an art reveals its unity through its 
excellence”.379 So while for Murdoch the tendency towards unity is a consoling 
escape from reality, she allows for a degree of it in art. Artists create unity in art 
by means of form. The main problem for the artist then becomes ‘how much form’ 
to impose before the artwork loses touch with reality.380  
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As explained in this chapter, Murdoch sees false unity in inferior art as the 
work of the ego and fantasy, whereas the unity that is necessary for great art is its 
form – a strong form in which free beings are “strolling around in real life as it 
were”.381 Form in good art resists the imposed patterns of fantasy, which is the 
main enemy of any art. It provides the audience with a sense of unity, but at the 
same time reminds them of the complete chanciness of life. There is a constant 
conflict in art between “the form-maker and the truthful, formless figure” of 
reality.382 This conflict, for Murdoch, happens in life as well. The subconscious 
mind of the artist creates art and imposes form on it. Without any input from the 
subconscious, there is no work of art. However, it is the job of the intellect to 
prevent the subconscious from being too coercive in determining the emotion and 
the structure of the artwork.383 Although form is the absolute essence of art, it 
should not be imposed in such a way that it stops the artist from representing the 
contradictions and paradoxes of the subject matter.  
To illustrate Murdoch’s point here, it is useful to consider Vincent van 
Gogh’s painting of “A Pair of Shoes”. The painting portrays a pair of dull brown 
work shoes that are rather worn out. The unusual visual angle of the shoes, while 
taking the audience out of their comfort zone, does not compromise the sense of 
unity of the artwork as a perfect painting. However, such a unity, which is the 
product of the artist’s technique and the strong strokes of the brush on the canvas, 
emphasises the mundaneness of the subject matter, and the details of the subject 
delineated there suggest the importance of this prosaicness and the possible story 
behind it. 
Murdoch argues that although form should be present, the artist should not 
readily give in to it.384 Good art is full of surprises. It does not take up a 
predetermined form, but rather maintains its contingent openness. A good novel, 
for instance, cannot be a series of predictable events preaching a particular motto. 
                                                
381 Bigsby, 101. 
382 Michael O. Bellamy, "An Interview with Iris Murdoch," ibid., 50. 
383 Christopher Bigsby, "Interview with Iris Murdoch," ibid., 115. 
384 Frank Kermode, "Interview from "the House of Fiction: Interviews with Seven English 
Novelists"," ibid., 10-11. 
109 
 
It must give way to unpredictability as reality is so. The kind of unity that comes 
with the form found in great art does not conflict with reality. Murdoch says: 
“Truth is always a proper touchstone in art, and a training in art is a training in 
how to use the touchstone”.385 If we look at Pablo Picasso’s cubist paintings, for 
example, we find that even in his most abstract works, he pictures reality in its 
messiness and accidentality.386 In his paintings we see men and women with 
objects such as violins and bottles, illustrated from very different and unusual 
angles, and sometimes a single object portrayed from several angles at the same 
time. The objects depicted in Picasso’s paintings are the objects he was involved 
with in life in some way, however they are expressed in a very unusual way. 
Through its novel way of expression, this artwork surprises the audience, 
engaging with them by motivating them to discover and decipher its elements, 
while showing them different ways of looking at reality, even insignificant ones.  
These characteristics of surprise, discovery, and engagement are what Murdoch 
considers to be characteristics of good art. 
Conclusion 
In her discussion of art scattered throughout her writings, Murdoch 
constantly switches between the concepts of unity and disunity, which may create 
the impression that she is not consistent in her view of art. However, as I 
constructed a Murdochian theory of art from the various references she makes to 
it in her writings, I argued that if we elaborate on these two concepts in the 
context of her moral theory, we are able to present an account of her theory that 
reconciles these two seemingly paradoxical concepts. A good work of art, being 
the product of the artist’s imagination, rather than their self-aggrandizing fantasy, 
should be a truthful representation of reality. Reality is disunified, chancy, and 
contingent. Rather than being an unrealistically optimistic presentation of life, 
which resonates to the artist’s selfish inclinations, a good artwork is faithful to the 
disunity and chanciness of reality. Yet in Murdoch’s view, it is also important for 
an artwork to be enjoyable. The audience for art must take pleasure in receiving 
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the artwork. Although we can appreciate that the contingency and messiness of 
life are not particularly enjoyable, and can even be quite distressing, in a good 
artwork, the experience of disunity becomes enjoyable, as the reality represented 
in the work must be contained within the boundaries of the art form. However, in 
a good artwork the experience of the disunity of an artwork becomes enjoyable, as 
the reality presented in the artwork has to be presented within the boundaries of an 
art form. While Murdoch warns us of the danger of too much unity imposed upon 
an artwork, she argues that the artwork should maintain its enjoyability, which is 
mainly experienced by it being limited to a comprehensible, limited whole. 
In the next chapter, I will expand on Murdoch’s view of what makes a 
work of art good. This will lead to a discussion in the final chapter of Murdoch’s 




Good Art: Murdoch’s Moral Evaluation of Art  
Introduction 
Before I consider, in the next chapter, the ways in which art can be 
morally educational, it is necessary to discuss the kind of art that in Murdoch’s 
view has the potential to contribute to one’s moral development. My aim in this 
chapter is to provide a critique of Murdoch’s view of ‘good art’ as art that 
displays good moral character, and to suggest a more moderate account of good 
art that is consistent with Murdoch’s moral theory. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the concepts of unity and disunity in 
Murdoch’s theory of art. I argued that a good work of art is a combination of the 
unity of art form and the disunity of content, with the strict condition that the 
artwork should not lose touch with reality. Within the inevitable unity imposed by 
an art form, the artist should justly and faithfully present the disunity and chaos of 
reality. Building upon my discussions of Murdoch’s theory of art as well as her 
moral theory, my aim in this chapter is to examine Murdoch’s view of ‘good art’ 
in more detail. 
For Murdoch, art is inseparable from morality. She claims that “… art is 
an excellent analogy of morals, or indeed that it is … a case of morals”.387 I will 
argue that Murdoch’s theoretical treatment of art and morality suggests that a 
good artist must be virtuous (at least as far as their artwork is concerned), because 
good art is morally educational and only a virtuous person can produce art 
containing the vision that morally educational art requires. I will discuss the 
drawbacks of this view and argue that a non-virtuous artist is also capable of 
producing morally educational art. I will also argue that a moral flaw of an 
artwork does not necessarily count as an aesthetic or artistic flaw and, and even 
when it does, an aesthetic flaw does not necessarily prevent an artwork from being 
morally educational. 
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Art, Morality, and an Objection to Murdoch’s Theory of Good 
Art 
In an interview, Murdoch was asked whether a novelist should also be a 
moralist and a teacher. She answered that the novelist should avoid being a 
teacher in a didactic manner, but that values are expressed within an artwork and 
that the artist is “a compulsory moralist”.388 In spite of the consensus among 
commentators about the philosophical character of her novels, 389  Murdoch 
repeatedly rejects the idea that art in general, and literature in particular, must aim 
at presenting the artist’s philosophical viewpoint. She denies that she has inserted 
her philosophical views into her novels.390 Murdoch states that “[literature’s] 
function is art, forget about morality, its function is to be good art”.391 And again, 
“[my] novels are not moral tracts. They are works of art. But obviously there is a 
moral orientation, which is the same as in my moral philosophy”.392 For Murdoch, 
presenting the artist’s moral views or being morally educational is not the main 
goal of an artwork, rather its primary goal is “… to be grasped by enjoyment”.393 
However, in other places in her writing, she goes so far as to say: “Art is far and 
away the most educational thing we have, far more so than its rivals, philosophy 
and theology and science”.394  
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Hence, Murdoch’s view appears to be the following: an artist is not 
supposed to express their philosophical view in their art. An artist is not a moral 
teacher, nor is an artwork a ‘moral tract’. Yet the artist cannot help being a 
“moralist” and an artwork inevitably contributes to one’s moral development. To 
put it differently, the artist should not try to insert their moral views into their 
work, but the artwork necessarily has some moral orientation and thus is morally 
educational. And not only that, “… it is the most educational of all human 
activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen”.395 The question 
arises: ‘What does Murdoch mean by considering an artist to be a moralist inside 
their work and an artwork to be morally educational?’ To answer this question, I 
begin by explaining why, in Murdoch’s view, morality is inseparable from art.  
In Murdoch’s view, almost any account of reality is value-laden. As 
explained in my discussion of her moral philosophy, Murdoch criticises the fact-
value division, resorting to the transcendental concept of the Good embedded in 
one’s consciousness. A realistic understanding of the world, which is the core of 
morality to Murdoch, involves seeing it evaluatively.396 There is no escape from 
doing so, as “[p]erception itself is a mode of evaluation”.397 In Murdoch’s view, 
art is inevitably tied to morality because the ability to perceive the world and to 
portray it the way it truly is, which is a crucial task of an artist, introduces value 
into the world. She states “… art is not either photographs of facts or outbursts of 
private feeling. In understanding how great art utterly transcends this (version of 
the fact-value distinction) we exercise our general ability to distinguish what is 
illusory from what is real”.398 This can be more easily seen in the case of literary 
works than in other forms of art, as to Murdoch, “… language itself is a moral 
medium, almost all uses of language convey value .… literature is soaked in the 
moral”.399 Literary forms of language can more easily capture the features of 
reality and human behaviour. Literary works contain accounts of human 
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characters and their activities and struggles. The author cannot refrain from 
making moral judgments, especially when the subject matter is human 
behaviour.400 In Murdoch’s view, “[t]he author’s moral judgments is the air which 
the reader breathes”.401 In these artworks, the author is able to describe the details 
of reality. Murdoch states: “… I would venture to say that ultimately we judge the 
great novelists by the quality of their awareness of others, and that for the novelist 
this is at the highest level the most crucial test”.402  
In Zorba the Greek, for example, Nikos Kazantzakis uses literary devices 
to condemn the villagers who stone and then kill a lonely widow for having a love 
affair with an outsider. The author’s way of portraying the dramatic scene 
displays his disgust of the ignorance, greed, and brutality of the mob that killed 
her.403 His description of the scene is certainly not morally neutral. So since the 
artist’s perception of facts about the world and their evaluative judgements are 
intertwined, their representation of the world is essentially a moral activity. The 
artist’s value-laden perception of reality manifests itself in their artwork. That is 
why Murdoch states that “… great art is analogous to moral knowledge, an 
absolute convergence of fact and value.… an enlightened (just, ‘obedient’) vision 
of necessity…”.404 Art is not just a neutral presentation of facts.  
So, for Murdoch, art is inevitably fused with morality. However, this alone 
is not what Murdoch means by the claim that an artist is a moralist inside their 
artwork. In her view, for a work of art to present the artist’s moral orientation or 
to possess some moral character is not sufficient for it to be regarded as morally 
educational. A good work of art is one that has good moral character. As 
explained in the previous chapter, disunity, as an essential aspect of art, is a matter 
of being faithful to the discontinuity, contingency, and chanciness of reality. In 
Murdoch’s view, a good work of art should be able to embrace the reality of 
human life and present it in a just and truthful manner. Being able to present 
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reality the way it is requires the artist to be able to ‘see’ reality the way it is. This, 
to Murdoch, is the artist’s moral task, because morality involves a just and loving 
way of seeing and perceiving the world. It is the realisation that other people also 
matter. They have needs, interests, and views that are worthy of our attention.  We 
need to make an effort to see them in their own right and to develop a truth-
seeking vision. In Murdoch’s view, the recognition of particular realities as 
existing outside of us establishes the essence of good art.405 As “… a great source 
of revelation”, good art displays, more clearly and from different perspectives, 
aspects of human nature as well as the world in which we live.406 As a mode of 
cognition or a way of perceiving the contingency and frightfulness of reality, good 
art represents the truth.407 Murdoch says: “The question of truth, which we are 
indeed forced to attend to in all our doings, appears here as an aspect of the 
unavoidable nature of morality”.408 So a truth-seeking and a revealing vision is at 
the core of both art and morality.  
Accordingly, for Murdoch, art is not only “an excellent analogy of morals”, 
but indeed “a case of morals”.409 Since a good work of art is one with good moral 
character, a good artist must have the same kind of virtue as a good man to be able 
to create a good artwork. In her view, “… the artist’s discipline includes the 
exercise of virtue: patience, courage, truthfulness, justice”.410 A good artist has 
virtue and the capacity to see the world the way it truly is. Murdoch says: “The 
good artist, in relation to his art, is brave, truthful, patient, humble”.411 They know 
that the contingent realities of the world deserve their “respectful and loving 
attention”, the kind of moral vision possessed by virtuous individuals.412 The 
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question arises here: ‘Does a good artist really have to be a virtuous person in 
order to be able to create good art?’ Murdoch writes: 
The good artist is a sort of image of the good man, the great artist is 
a sort of image of the saint. He is only a sort of image, since in his 
whole person he may be a dreadful egoist. Artists have their own 
specialised temptations to egoism and illusions of omnipotence. Art 
is power. We are all specialists in morality ... and it is difficult 
(impossible) for the whole man to be virtuous. But inside his work, 
‘and in so far as he is an artist’, … he can be humble and truthful 
and brave and inspired by a love of perfection.413 
In Murdoch’s view, artists can be quite egoistic, because the power they 
have as artists can tempt them into thinking they are better than others. However, 
according to her, it is possible for an artist to be an egoist and yet to display virtue 
in his art. When it comes to their artwork, the good artist is a virtuous person. The 
egoism of a good artist is not manifested in the artwork. So a good artist, 
regardless of whether they are a genuinely virtuous person or ‘a dreadful egoist’, 
is someone who manifests virtue – humility, honesty, courage, and so on – in their 
art. 
It is clear that a great artist can be a dreadful egoist. To this extent 
Murdoch is right. There are many examples of good artists who were not 
particularly good people in their life. Pablo Picasso is an example of a great artist 
with a questionable moral character. His granddaughter described him as someone 
who was indifferent and unsympathetic to everything outside his art. He was very 
destructive to the women who were significant in his life, to his children, and even 
to his grandchildren.414 Arthur Koestler is another example of a great artist with a 
poor moral character. It is rather well known that Koestler – a celebrated author – 
had been accused of sexually assaulting a number of women, including Jill 
Craigie, the wife of his friend Michael Foot. Nonetheless, as John Sutherland puts 
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it, “this monstrously unstable, incorrigibly selfish man wrote a novel which, 
arguably, if it did not change history, changed the way the west saw its recent 
history”.415 Considering these examples, we can conclude that a great artist can be 
a bad person in the Murdochian sense of the word – unsympathetic, extremely 
selfish, and inattentive to other people.  
These examples raise the question: ‘How can an egoist be a great artist?’ 
Murdoch’s answer seems to be: ‘He can be virtuous “inside his work”’. In what 
follows, I examine Murdoch’s claim that an artist can be a ‘dreadful egoist’ in 
their life and yet be an image of the good man or even the saint in their artwork. I 
will argue that this claim is inconsistent with central aspects of her moral theory, 
in particular her emphasis on moral vision. 
Murdoch portrays morality as a process (or, as she calls it, ‘a pilgrimage’), 
which begins with the individual’s effort to break through their egoistic 
tendencies. ‘Egoism’ is a powerful energy that blinds the individual to the true 
nature of reality, and gives rise to unrealistic illusions or fantasies. What makes 
the moral quest a difficult journey – which is almost impossible for most people to 
complete successfully – is the power of egoism. In Murdoch’s view, the main 
requirement for being a good person is being realistic or true to life. And to be 
able to see reality the way it is, the individual needs to develop the right vision. As 
explained in Chapter 3, moral vision is a requirement for virtue, for it allows the 
individual to make good moral judgments. A virtuous person’s beliefs, attitudes, 
and emotions are in harmony. Moral vision also serves to unify the virtues. In 
Murdoch’s view, love is the supreme virtue, which unites all the others, for it 
requires knowledge of reality and the possession of a truthful vision, as well as the 
ability to be just and compassionate.416 
The key point in Murdoch’s ethics is that in order for the individual to 
come closer to seeing reality the way it is, and to be just and loving, they need to 
go beyond their egoistic tendencies, and “[i]t is in the capacity to love, that is to 
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see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists. The freedom which is a 
proper goal is the freedom from fantasy, that is the realism of compassion”.417 
This applies to the artist as well. Murdoch states: “Art is about the pilgrimage 
from appearance to reality (the subject of every good play and novel) …”.418 In 
order for an artist to be able to have the required moral vision to see reality and to 
be compassionate, which are to Murdoch essential qualities for a good man, and 
thus a good artist, they should not be ‘a dreadful egoist’. It follows that if an artist 
is extremely self-absorbed, they do not satisfy the necessary condition for 
perceiving and portraying reality, and their artistic creation is a medium for them 
to gratify their egoistic tendency and their consoling fantasy.419 If the virtues are 
unified, one cannot lack the virtue of love and selflessness and yet possess all the 
other virtues, except superficially. Therefore, it seems impossible for an artist who 
is devoid of moral vision and compassion, and is egoistic in their everyday life, to 
be virtuous, that is to use right moral vision in the process of creating their 
artwork. Artists cannot pretend to have or portray in their artwork what they lack 
in real life. So Murdoch’s claim that an artist who is ‘a dreadful egoist’ should be 
the “image of the saint” in their work is inconsistent with her ethics of vision and 
the idea of the unity of the virtues.  
One might argue that the artist, regardless of their personal character, must 
adhere to moral rules and principles in their work. In this case the artist does not 
have to be a good man, but they are still capable of creating an artwork with good 
moral character, so long as they are aware of and follow the moral rules. If 
morality is a matter of following rules, then it is easy to see how an artist with a 
morally questionable character can be a good person inside their art. Having 
rejected rule-based morality, this solution is not available to Murdoch. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Murdoch does not advocate an ethics of rules, rather a 
version of virtue ethics that emphasises the individual’s vision and the unity of the 
virtues. And if morality is a matter of acquiring the virtues –character traits that 
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are deeply embedded in one’s personality – a morally bad person cannot become a 
moralist at once in their artwork. In other words, if acquiring the virtues is a long 
and arduous process, and results in profound changes in one’s character, then it is 
impossible for an artist to be virtuous in their artwork but vicious outside of their 
work. It is nonsensical to claim that someone can be virtuous occasionally. 
If we accept that a selfish person can be a great artist, and that an artist 
cannot be egoist and yet be virtuous inside his work, then we have reason to 
question whether Murdoch is correct in suggesting that the moral value of an 
artwork necessarily has a bearing on its aesthetic value.420 According to her, when 
the moral view contained in an artwork is flawed, we should conclude that the 
work of art is aesthetically defective. In this case, this moral defect would count as 
an aesthetic blemish even if it goes unnoticed, because this blemish has the 
potential to be picked up by the morally sensitive audience, and as a result, to 
spoil their response to the work. Not only that; such a bad artwork cannot be 
morally educational either. Although to Murdoch, moral education is not the 
primary purpose of an artwork, when a narrative (for instance) succeeds in 
deepening the moral understanding and emotions of the audience and makes them 
feel pleasure and joy, she considers the narrative to be a better work of art than the 
ones that fail to do so.  
Murdoch’s assumption here seems to be that if an artwork engages one’s 
moral understanding and emotions, it will be more captivating, and thus can be 
morally educational. Many of the emotional responses of the audiences are 
dependent on moral assessments. If a work of art provokes the wrong moral 
responses from the audience, such as approving of or adopting a morally defective 
view, it will fail to secure the appropriate emotional responses and, as a result, it 
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will fail to be a good work of art.421 For example, an artwork promoting immoral 
or degrading values, such as vanity or lust, may elicit blame rather than 
admiration in the morally sensitive audience. In Murdoch’s view, this artwork is 
not only morally flawed, as it promotes immoral perspectives, but also 
aesthetically flawed, as it fails to elicit admiration and joy in the audience.422 
Therefore, to Murdoch, in such cases a moral defect can be considered an 
aesthetic defect. 
Murdoch is right in saying that in some cases a moral defect can 
compromise the aesthetic value of an artwork. As an example, we can consider 
Leni Riefenstahl’s propaganda film, Triumph of the Will, which due to its high 
technical quality and its revolutionary approach to cinematography is considered 
to be one of the best propaganda films in history. Since this film uses spectacular 
techniques to promote the Nazis’ profoundly unethical, anti-Semitic system, and 
invites the audience to approve and adopt its moral approach, it can be said that 
the aesthetic value of this work is diminished by its obvious moral defect. So, 
there is no doubt that in some cases there is a direct connection between moral 
and aesthetic value in a work of art. However, it is not always the case. In some 
artworks moral defects do not necessarily detract from the aesthetic value of an 
artwork.  
As an example, consider Murdoch’s novel The Time of the Angels.  The 
main character of the story, Carel Fisher, is the priest of a London church, and 
does not believe in the existence of God. Carel has sexual relationships with his 
housekeeper – a relationship that has led to the death of his wife – and with his 
sick niece. As the narrative goes on, we find out that the sick niece, who is 
willingly confined in a room in Carel’s house, is actually his biological daughter. 
A conversation Carel has with his brother, Marcus, provides us with Carel’s views, 
which is the key to understanding his gloomy and isolated personality and his 
illicit activities. Through the character of Carel, Murdoch shows a Godless 
universe to be extremely cold and sinful – one in which any evil act is permitted. 
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In his afterword to the novel, Richard Holloway makes the following insightful 
observation: 
The planet Murdoch is a stranger, colder place, because God's 
death has emptied it of light and meaning. But does a godless 
universe have to be as cold and dark as this? If God is dead there 
are several ways to understand the event and they don’t all have to 
freeze our hearts.423 
As Holloway points out, Murdoch offers a one-sided, unsympathetic 
presentation of a godless world, within which there is nothing but darkness and 
evil that consumes both the good and the bad. This presentation does not seem to 
be ‘just’ or ‘loving’ in any way. It rather seems quite biased and unfair. In this 
narrative, almost all the characters, especially the character of Carel, seem 
unrealistic and exaggerated. It is hard, if not impossible, to sympathize with them 
or to put oneself in their shoes. Applying Murdoch’s own moral standards, this 
narrative can be said to be morally defective, because the presentation of the 
situation is far from being realistic, fair, or loving. Nevertheless, the novel is still 
considered a good artwork. Its moral defect does not detract from its artistic value. 
It seems to be due to the fact that despite the exaggerated gloomy atmosphere of 
the narrative, it is not unintelligible. On the contrary, it seems that the moral 
defect of the narrative offers the audience an insight into situations or characters 
that they could not otherwise experience, and this is one of the aspects of the 
narrative that makes it artistically valuable and morally educational. The 
exaggerated and unrealistic plot of the story, and the evil character of the 
protagonist, fully engages one’s imagination, and offers one a gloomy sense of 
enjoyment – the kind of enjoyment that Murdoch considers to be one of the main 
missions of art. So, as we can see in the example above, the moral defect of the 
novel does not count as an aesthetic defect. The novel is considered to be a great 
novel because of Murdoch’s skill in offering a perfectly intelligible and enjoyable 
work of art, even if (or especially because) it requires some effort on the side of 
the reader. The defect of the moral character of an artwork can only be considered 
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an aesthetic defect if it affects its intelligibility and its enjoyability for a sensitive 
audience.  
Another good example that can help us clarify this point further is 
Matthew Kieran’s comparison between the Rottgen Pietà and Michelangelo’s first 
Pietà (which was sculpted after Rottgen Pietà), both of which portray a grief-
ridden Mary holding Christ’s dead body.424 Kieran explains that Mary’s outsized 
face and her facial expression in the former work, which is a wooden sculpture, is 
the demonstration of horror and a desperate sadness. Christ’s figure is disturbingly 
distorted and his wounds are exaggerated in scale. Some might find such a 
grotesque conception of human nature difficult to comprehend, due to the artist’s 
exaggeration of the level of grief. Michelangelo’s first Pietà, on the other hand, 
marks a radical shift in representing Christ and his sacrifice. Mary’s beautiful 
youthful face suggests the acceptance of her sacrifice and the direction of her face 
towards Christ’s body encourages the viewer to see Christ as cradled by his 
mother and fully supported in her lap.  
As Kieran suggests, the attitudes conveyed in the two works and the 
responses they evoke in the observer are dramatically different. In the latter work, 
Jesus is to be mourned as a son and his sacrifice makes available forgiveness to all 
humans, while what the former work seeks seems to be the awakening of the 
feelings of guilt and responsibility for the rupture from God and the death of Jesus. 
Kieran argues that the moral characters of these two works are radically distinct. 
The nature of the violent sacrifice (portrayed in Rottgen Pietà) might seem very 
aggressive and vengeful, as the artist intends us to internalise guilt and self-
mortification. This seems to be morally problematic.425 The latter conception, 
oriented around the virtue of love, forgiveness, and mercy, is deemed more 
intelligible in a secular world. The conclusion Kieran draws is that the moral 
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character of a work can affect its intelligibility, and as a result, the appreciation 
and evaluation of the viewer. In so far as the moral character of an artwork 
compromises its intelligibility, an artwork’s moral character is relevant to its 
aesthetic value.426  So as Kieran correctly argues, any work of art (especially 
narratives) can have a cognitive dimension that is moral. This dimension affects 
one’s emotional response to the work, the quality of the experience the work 
affords, and the insight it conveys. Many works enhance our understanding of the 
world and give us some insight by engaging us with their morally problematic 
content. Kieran’s claim is based on “the assumption that, for creatures such as 
ourselves, experience is a primary means of understanding .… This applies not 
only to being subject to morally bad experiences but to being implicated in them 
in morally problematic ways.”427  
So good artworks not only engage us, but demand our emotional and 
perceptual responses. The work fails at being good art if it does not motivate the 
response it aims at. Good art stimulates the individual’s imagination. This directly 
affects the quality of their contemplation and understanding of the world. The 
individual’s moral perceptions and emotional responses are highly dependent on 
their imaginative understanding of people and the world. As Kieran writes, “[even 
artworks] which commend, or fail to condemn, characters and states of affairs that 
we would judge to be morally bad can, through getting us to take up a perspective 
we would not otherwise entertain, enhance the value of the imaginative 
experience afforded”.428 It is partly through experiencing bad things that we 
understand and appreciate good things. A lack of experience deprives us of a full 
understanding of the world. 429  So, experiencing bad things in an artwork 
                                                
426 Matthew Kieran, Revealing Art (London: Routledge, 2005), 169-75. 
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429 As James Harold explains, a work of art may embrace a morally defective perspective, but 
that does not mean that the work itself is morally flawed. It is only wrong when we are asked not 
only to imagine that perspective, but also to approve of it, or to enjoy imagining it. So, according 
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morally defective perspective, or inviting them to enjoy the experience of such a perspective, that 
some works of art can be considered to be morally flawed. See James Harold, "Immoralism and 
the Valence Constraint," The British Journal of Aesthetics 48, no. 1 (2008): 51-52. 
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(provided this does not affect its intelligibility) can also make possible an 
understanding we could not otherwise attain.  
To further clarify the flaws of Murdoch’s view, I return to her view of 
good art and bad art, and briefly explore her criticism of popular literature and 
film as examples of bad art. Murdoch states: “Popular literature and film argue the 
dullness of the good, the charm of the bad. The violent man is the hero of our 
time”.430 Murdoch suggests that popular literature and film cannot be considered 
good art because they are often morally flawed. She categorically rejects the idea 
that popular art – which is any art form intended to be received by the masses – 
can be morally educational, regardless of its moral character, in so far as it is 
aesthetically valuable. Murdoch’s dismissal of popular art further demonstrates 
the shortcomings of her view of good art. We cannot deny that some popular film 
and literature lack creativity and the ability to expand one’s vision. Surely some 
forms of art are more in-depth, detailed, challenging, and creative. However, I do 
not agree with Murdoch’s claim that popular literature and film are ethically, and 
as a result aesthetically worthless because they do not accurately display reality. 
They may be aesthetically worthless if they fail to be sufficiently intelligible or 
creative or to inspire one’s imagination. In other words, instead of encouraging us 
to see the world in a different way, they just distract us from reality. However, I 
would agree that some popular art is artistically valuable, even considering 
Murdoch’s own criterion of good art. Several reasons can be given in support of 
this view. 
To begin with, according to Murdoch’s moral theory, to be moral is to be 
realistic and truthful. If this is the case, then we can argue that what is portrayed in 
some popular literature and film is indeed the ‘reality’ of our age. ‘Moderation’ 
and ‘contentment’, for instance, are traditionally considered to be moral virtues. 
But in today’s society, an out-of-touch and self-indulgent celebrity can become 
the object of admiration for sections of that society. So what Murdoch considers 
to be bad art due to its moral flaw, such as popular film, can be in fact good art 
based on her own definition of good art as faithfully portraying reality. Moreover, 
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reality can be dull and morally undesirable, and what is evil can be charming, as 
Murdoch herself maintains. Through experiencing the bad and unjust in popular 
film and literature the individual is given a chance to experience something that 
they might not otherwise experience. If the person only experiences the good and 
never the deceptive charm of the bad, they might miss out on the experience of a 
significant part of reality, which is composed of evil, and the harm and 
degradation of vice. 
Even Murdoch herself acknowledges that on television or in the cinema, 
we may sometimes experience that “… art which lies can also instruct …. [that 
such] blunted art did convey some conception of the facts to a large audience”.431 
She cannot deny the fact that what she calls ‘bad art’ “… displays the base aspects 
of human nature more clearly than anything else …. One might even say that the 
exemplification of human frailty in bad art is a clearer warning to us than its 
representation in good art”.432 Furthermore, it is sometimes through comparison 
to its opposite that the individual gets a better realisation of what is good. 
Experiencing the bad and its deceptive charm can deepen their understanding of 
the good through the comparison their mind draws between these two concepts. 
Therefore, while some popular literature and film cannot be regarded as good 
artworks, as they fail to represent reality in its purest form (in order to entertain 
the audience), other examples portray the everyday insignificant realities of life, 
while still being enjoyable, which is what Murdoch believes an artwork should do.  
Breaking Bad  (by Vince Gilligan) is an American television series which 
has received critical acclaim for portraying the complexities of the human psyche 
through its great cinematography, its bold visual style, and its engaging theme.   It 
is the story of Walter White, a chemistry teacher, who finds out that he has a 
terminal cancer. When he faces his mortality, he turns to a life of crime (cooking 
methamphetamine) to pay for his cancer treatment, and also to provide financial 
stability for his loving family – his pregnant wife and their disabled son. Through 
its good use of cinematic technique and its interesting, unpredictable storyline, 
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this television series succeeds in fully engaging the audience and inviting them to 
experience and reflect upon extreme situations, where evil is presented as a 
complex synthesis of the good and the bad. At times, one may find it difficult to 
distinguish the good characters from the bad ones. Even the most sinister 
characters could be sympathised with at some point. Facing the moral dilemmas 
and engaging with them emotionally and intellectually can be an unusually 
challenging experience for the audience of this popular television series. 
Murdoch’s narrow conception of good art and bad art, and her criticism of 
popular art (and much of modern art) has led some of her commentators to do 
away with this aspect of her theory. Simon Blackburn, for example, criticises 
Murdoch’s dismissal of television as a series of trivial, momentary, and 
incomprehensible images or her sarcastic attitude to some silly sentimental novels. 
He also addresses Murdoch’s uncompromising attitude to truth. He calls this “the 
relentless downgrading of the everyday”, which seems to conflict with her own 
view.433 As Blackburn says, “[t]he everyday and contingent include smiling at a 
neighbor, saving the child, alleviating the pain, earning a living, or teaching the 
truth”.434 He rejects Murdoch’s understanding of reality as only what is elegant 
and morally agreeable. So on Blackburn’s account, Murdoch’s conception of good 
art is too narrow and excludes a great deal of artwork commonly thought to be 
good artworks. 
My last argument against Murdoch’s view of the moral evaluation of art is 
that there is not always a direct connection between the moral value and the 
aesthetic value of an artwork. There are many artworks that do not have any 
detectable or measurable moral character, and therefore, are not susceptible to 
moral evaluation. Although Murdoch takes her theory “… to apply to all the arts 
and not just the literary arts”, there are some arts, such as some musical 
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compositions (concertos, symphonies, and so on) and non-representational arts, to 
which Murdoch’s criterion of good art does not apply.435 Much of what is purely 
orchestral music, for example, is normally assessed by criteria other than moral 
criteria. Undoubtedly, there are some musical compositions that are known for 
their meaningful themes, such as operas of Richard Wagner, and most 
significantly, his grand composition The Ring of the Nibelung. Many artists and 
philosophers of art have endeavoured to interpret this work of Wagner, which is 
said to have four levels: mythic, dramatic, political, and spiritual.436 Wagner’s 
work has been assessed from different perspectives, including the moral 
perspective. But there are some other musical compositions that cannot be 
evaluated morally, such as Arnold Schoenberg’s Verklärte Nacht. It is not the 
moral character of Schoenberg’s work that is determinative of its artistic value, 
rather it is its novel way of transcending tonality and its intricate techniques. 
However, this music is considered to be a great work of art. It can also contribute 
to one’s moral development, without having a good (or even bad) moral 
character.437 Moreover, even the types of art that can have moral character, such 
as literature and some styles of painting, can be so complex in terms of subject 
matter, genre, constraints, attitudes, and the like, that critics usually find it quite 
hard, if not impossible, to make an ultimate moral judgment about them. Yet, 
critics would not hesitate to consider some of them great artworks, due to their 
other merits. Focusing too much on the moral character of an artwork may only 
cloud one’s artistic sensitivity and lead one to quickly mark a morally flawed 
artwork down as a bad artwork.  
Conclusion 
I criticised Murdoch’s claim that good art is art with a good moral 
character and that an artist must be a virtuous person “inside his work” in order to 
create good art. A good artist could indeed be a non-virtuous person. Acquiring 
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the virtues is not a necessary condition for an artist to become a good artist. If we 
agree that an artist with good artistic vision and skill has the potential to produce a 
good artwork, irrespective of their moral views, then we need to allow that an 
artwork can be artistically valuable, regardless of its moral character. In other 
words, the artistic or aesthetic value of a work of art is not necessarily dependant 
on its moral character, as Murdoch suggests it is.  
This view is consistent with the spirit of Murdoch’s theory of art and 
morality, but avoids its flaws. It also allows us to regard a wider range of artworks 
as good artworks that can contribute to the individual’s moral development. So, I 
abandon Murdoch’s definition of good art and instead support the view that an 
artwork with a bad moral character can nevertheless be regarded as a good work 
of art if its bad moral character does not compromise its intelligibility and 
appropriateness. With this conclusion in mind, in the next chapter I will discuss 






Murdoch and the Morally Educational Role of Art 
Introduction 
Having examined the central aspects of Murdoch’s moral and aesthetic 
views, we are now in a position to consider the role of art in the individual’s 
moral development. Although Murdoch occasionally alludes to the morally 
educational role of art, she does not discuss it systematically. Her views are either 
implicit in her other discussions on the topic of ethics or scattered throughout her 
work. So it is my goal here to show how they form a coherent and plausible 
position.  
In this chapter, I will develop a Murdochian view of the morally 
educational role of art, drawing on what I consider to be central aspects of her 
moral and aesthetic views, as well as some of the few comments or suggestions on 
the topic of moral education scattered throughout her work. I will identify the 
various ways in which art can contribute to the individual’s moral education – all, 
I believe, come down to the quality of the individual’s ‘attention’ to an artwork.438 
As discussed previously, the character and the moral development of the 
individual, rather than any of their particular actions and choices, are the principal 
concerns of Murdoch’s virtue ethics.439 If the individual is successful in their 
moral development, namely, if they acquire the character traits commonly held to 
be virtues, it is very likely that what they choose to do would be what it is morally 
right to do. Murdoch’s emphasis on moral growth leads her to adopt Simone 
Weil’s notion of ‘attention’ and place it at the centre of her moral theory. She 
argues that virtues are acquired through one’s progressive ability to silence their 
ego and to ‘attend to’ other people – that is, to appreciate other people as unique 
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individuals who deserve one’s effort to truly understand them, and possibly 
empathise with them.  
In what follows, I draw on my reading of Murdoch’s moral and aesthetic 
views to elaborate three ways in which the individual’s attention to art and their 
aesthetic experience can lead to moral improvement: 1) Attention to art is an 
exercise of selflessness and love. 2) Through one’s attention to beauty in art, one 
learns about ‘the Good’. 3) Attention to art is an exercise of imagination, which 
plays an important role in one’s moral development. It must be noted that these 
three routes to moral improvement are not easily separable, as they are deeply 
intertwined in Murdoch’s work, but I will attempt to delineate them as far as 
possible in order to explain them more clearly.  
Section One 
Attention to Art without Seizing or Using it 
Murdoch maintains that a work of art triggers the attention of the 
individual. In her view, attention to an artwork is a pure form of moral activity 
and a great opportunity for moral development because: 1) It is attention directed 
away from the self towards the appreciation of beauty (the exercise of selflessness) 
and 2) It is attention to something without seizing or using it (an exercise of love 
and truthfulness). I will explain each of these points in turn. 
In Chapter 2, I explained that the concept of attention plays an important 
role in Murdoch’s moral theory. In her view, the primary object of one’s attention 
is one’s ego or self and its misleading consoling fantasies. We are naturally 
egoistic, and this is the main impediment to our moral growth. One’s fantasizing 
ego, Murdoch says, is “[t]he chief enemy of excellence in morality (and also in 
art) …”.440 Attention directed to one’s ego prevents one from seeing other people 
free of one’s misconceptions and prejudices. Since, on Murdoch’s account, the 
essential component of moral reasoning is acquiring knowledge (i.e. the right 
perception) of the world, being able to see the world untainted by one’s personal 
fantasies is a necessary condition for one’s moral growth. Therefore, for Murdoch, 
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moral improvement requires “… a long deep process of unselfing” – freeing 
oneself from selfish desires and fantasies.441 This means that we need to make a 
conscious effort to divert our attention towards that which is not the self. 
Attention without regard for the self diminishes the self in favour of the object 
being attended to. It acknowledges the distance and otherness of things, and 
respects them in their otherness. It is only through re-orientation away from the 
self that one begins to see reality for what it really is.  
In Murdoch’s view, in creating or contemplating a work of art the 
individual exercises the same sort of attention, the primary object of which is not 
the self, but rather something separate from it. Murdoch writes:  
… great art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved 
without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the 
greedy organism of the self. This exercise of detachment is difficult 
and valuable whether the thing contemplated is a human being or 
the root of a tree or the vibration of a colour or a sound…. Beauty 
is that which attracts this particular sort of unselfish attention. It is 
obvious here what is the role, for the artist or spectator, of 
exactness and good vision: unsentimental, detached, unselfish, 
objective attention.442 
Attending to a work of art is an effective way of exercising detachment 
from the self and its desires, as art is capable of redirecting the individual’s 
attention towards it. One of the main qualities of such attention is that it is the 
exercise of coming upon an object and not using or seizing it. Artworks are not to 
be treated as things of utility, namely, as having instrumental value. The 
individual is not supposed to use an artwork the same way as they use an object 
like a bookshelf or a cup. Rather, they should contemplate, cherish, and enjoy the 
artwork. Careful attention to a piece of music (say Beethoven’s “Sonata 
Pathétique”) can emotionally, and even intellectually, affect the individual and 
strip them of their day-to-day concerns and preoccupations without being used or 
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possessed in the ordinary sense. We actually enjoy, value, and cherish such a 
piece of music because it cannot be used. It is distant and unattainable, yet 
capable of fully engaging the audience. Good artworks are revered for being 
distant and separate. It is this distance between the self and the artwork that 
provides one with the space required for contemplation. Stepping back and 
attending carefully to an artwork as something that is not ‘for me’ lays the 
foundation for making a habit of looking beyond the self, towards what is other, 
disinterestedly and unselfishly. 
So one of the crucial moral aspects of attention to art on Murdoch’s 
account is the exercise of being fully present to what is not the self and what does 
not have any instrumental value to the self. In her view, this is how a virtuous 
person perceives other individuals. She says: “The more the separateness and 
differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has 
needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a 
person as a thing”.443 For Murdoch, it is vital that we do not treat other people as 
things whose value to us is only instrumental. When one allows other people to be 
‘other’, separate and different, one creates the opportunity and the space required 
for the self to attend to the other person and to see them in their own right, where 
this attention is not influenced by the self’s prejudices and misconceptions. By not 
treating other people as merely having instrumental value, and respecting them 
despite their ‘otherness’, one learns to see them in their own right. One’s quality 
of consciousness when attending to other individuals should be the same as one’s 
quality of consciousness when attending to an artwork. As Murdoch says, “… if 
the quality of consciousness matters, then anything which alters consciousness in 
the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected with 
virtue”.444 Exercising detachment through selfless attention is indeed “… one of 
the most difficult and central of all virtues”.445 That is why Murdoch says: “Virtue 
is au fond the same in the artist as in the good man in that it is a selfless attention 
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to nature: something which is easy to name but very hard to achieve”.446 Thus, the 
exercise of selfless attention, or attention without seizing and using, in attending 
to art is an exercise in acting virtuously.  
For Murdoch, the disposition to be able to disregard one’s self in order to 
be able to see the other is indeed the highest virtue – the virtue she calls love.447 
Loving attention is another way of attending to something without using it. 
Murdoch states: “The essence of both [art and morals] is love. Love is the 
perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that 
something other than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery 
of reality …”.448 And again, [l]ove is the imaginative recognition of, that is 
respect for, this otherness.449 Love, as the highest form of attention, is seeing and 
acknowledging the distance between the self and the other (an artwork or another 
person) and respecting it. It is surrendering to “… something pre-eminently 
outside us and resistant to our consciousness”.450 Love is not only knowing that 
the other person does not merely exist for my use, and is different and separate 
from me, but is also appreciating and welcoming this difference. The kind of love 
learned through attention to art is different from ordinary human love, which is, 
for Murdoch, “… normally too profoundly possessive and also too ‘mechanical’ 
to be a place of vision”.451 However, love learned through art is the highest form 
of love, because it is impersonal. In this sense art has a unique position. 
Murdoch’s conception of impersonal love learned through art is an elevated 
perception of reality, which automatically leads to one’s humility by surrendering 
to this reality. For Murdoch, it is a quest for the real. 
Truthfulness and a commitment to reality are obligations for both the artist 
and the audience of the art. Murdoch says: “Art shows us the only sense in which 
the permanent and incorruptible is compatible with the transient; and whether 
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representational or not, it reveals to us aspects of our world which our ordinary 
dull dream-consciousness is unable to see”.452 Love is the submission to reality – 
“… the detail of the world”.453 Through attending to art, the individual better 
captures the contingent and transient reality of life. As Murdoch says, attention to 
art “… enhances our ability to see the detail of our surroundings”.454 Through 
attending to art, one recognises the chanciness and pointlessness of life and 
becomes at peace with this reality. The perceiver of art enjoys experiencing the 
detail of random realities of life boldly portrayed in an artwork. For example, Paul 
Gauguin’s painting Still-Life with Three Puppies depicts the mundane event of 
three puppies drinking or eating from a pan. In the foreground, there are three 
goblets and some fruit. The domestic elements of this painting, objects that tend to 
be overlooked in day-to-day life, become the centre of one’s attention when 
portrayed thus by the artist. Through attending to the mundane realities that are 
portrayed in this painting through Gauguin’s artistic vision, one takes pleasure in 
experiencing the state of being fully present and attentive to some contingent 
realities of the world. So learning to fully attend to art teaches the individual the 
virtue of love, which is the state of appreciating the reality of others in their 
otherness – and not as a ‘thing’ - and accepting and respecting this reality. By 
being fully present in the face of an artwork, one learns to attend to and enjoy the 
beauty of the artwork, which according to Murdoch, is an analogy of the Good. In 
what follows I will show how attending to beauty can become a morally 
educational experience. 
Section Two 
Attention to Beauty as an Analogy of the Good 
In Murdoch’s view, attending to art and appreciating the beauty therein is 
another way art can contribute to one’s moral education. She draws our attention 
to the close relation between beauty and the Good and claims that the appreciation 
of beauty is a pointer to the appreciation of the Good. Murdoch writes:  
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Beauty is a clue to good. Love is desire for good, virtue is being in 
love with good. As we refine our conception of beauty we discover 
good …. Our desire for beauty leads to and becomes our desire for 
perfection .… Beauty can be an image of good, and thus a way to 
good; or a substitute for it.455 
In the context of Murdoch’s work, appreciation of beauty (in art and 
nature) is conducive to appreciation of the Good.456 Learning to attend to beauty, 
especially in art, is an exercise of obedience to reality or the Good.  As I will 
explain, ‘obedience’ is a moral concept referring to the state of loving attention, or 
the state of being fully present to the object of attention. 
As discussed previously, Murdoch argues that in an era where the concept 
of God and the institution of religion have lost much of their authority, the 
individual identifies with their own inexhaustible power of will.457 With the 
individual’s will as determinative of their moral values, morality becomes relative 
and dependent on the individual’s conditioning. Murdoch attempts to salvage 
morality from subjectivity by giving the Good the power that once belonged to 
God. God, as Murdoch understands it, “… contains the certainty of its own reality. 
God is an object of love which uniquely excludes doubt and relativism”.458 For 
Murdoch, however, traditional religions and the role ‘God’ plays in them 
contribute primarily to separating the individual from reality and consoling them 
by erroneously attributing meaning and purpose to life. While Murdoch does not 
believe in the God of traditional religions, she claims: 
There is … something in the serious attempt to look 
compassionately at human things which automatically suggests that 
‘there is more than this’. The ‘there is more than this’, if it is not to 
be corrupted by some sort of quasi-theological finality, must 
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remain a very tiny spark of insight, something with, as it were, a 
metaphysical position but no metaphysical form. But it seems to 
me that the spark is real, and that great art is evidence of its 
reality.459 
In Murdoch’s view, when we look more closely at human virtues and the 
compassion individuals exercise towards each other, we feel that there is more to 
life than this. For her, such a conviction is not only intelligible, but also necessary, 
because submitting to the authority of something beyond human will humbles the 
individual and provides them with values that are real and exist independently of 
their personal and psychological conditioning. Murdoch advocates a version of 
moral realism, according to which the transcendental concept of the Good is the 
objective condition for all moral experiences and moral judgments. In her view, 
the Good is “part of the world”, and not just “a movable label affixed to the 
world”.460 She compares the Good with the image of the Sun in Plato’s allegory of 
the Cave, as the ultimate source of light, which leads the individual in the 
direction of moral perfection. The Good does not exist in the same way that other 
ordinary things do, yet it is present in almost all the individual’s encounters with 
the world. Yet, while the transcendental Good exists in every experience of the 
world, it is too abstract and elusive to be apprehended fully.461 The Good in its 
abstract and perfect form is not fully comprehensible to the human mind. This is 
what makes the attempt to gain an understanding of the Good distinctive. That is 
why Murdoch resorts to ‘beauty’ as an analogy of the Good that can provide 
guidance to the understanding of the Good.  
Murdoch argues that just like the Good, beauty in its perfection is abstract 
and incomprehensible, yet attractive and powerful. These qualities make it a 
perfect pointer to the Good. However, despite the resemblance between the two, 
beauty is generally more visible. For most people, it is usually easier to identify, 
attend to, and to appreciate beauty than the Good. Murdoch writes: 
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It is as if we can see beauty itself in a way in which we cannot see 
goodness itself …. I can experience the transcendence of the 
beautiful, but (I think) not the transcendence of the good. Beautiful 
things contain beauty in a way in which good acts do not exactly 
contain good, because beauty is partly a matter of the senses. So if 
we speak of good as transcendence we are speaking of something 
rather more complicated and which cannot be experienced.462 
In its absolute form beauty shares the indestructible and incorruptible 
nature of the Good.463 However, beauty and its uplifting role in human life is 
physically more accessible than the Good. Murdoch says: “We see and love 
beauty more readily than we love good, it is the spiritual thing to which we are 
most immediately and instinctively attracted”.464 Individuals appreciate the beauty 
of a tulip garden more easily than a person’s good intentions, because the beauty 
of the flowers is more a matter of appearance that can be perceived by senses. 
Similarly, the aesthetic features of an artwork can quite easily be perceived due to 
their sensory qualities.  
We may object that while it seems true that most people do not have 
difficulty appreciating the beauty of a red tulip or sunset over the ocean, this is not 
always the case when it comes to art. Recognising beauty, especially in some 
modern and contemporary works of art that push the boundaries of the traditional 
understanding of beauty, such as Luciano Brio’s electro-acoustic compositions or 
Mark Rothko’s non-figurative paintings, is not as easy as Murdoch seems to 
suggest. Many people do not appreciate the beauty of such artworks in a way that 
a trained artist or an art critic would. Moreover, for Murdoch, art cannot help but 
to beautify and charm. Even “the misery of the world is beautiful”, when depicted 
in the form of art.465 In art, “[h]ell itself it turns to favour and to prettiness”.466 
Here, one cannot help but wonder how the misery of the world is supposed to be 
                                                
462 Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, 58. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 14. 
465 Ibid., 119. 
466 Ibid., 122. 
138 
 
seen as ‘beautiful’ when depicted in art, and how this beauty is accessible to the 
audience of art. As discussed in Chapter 5, for Murdoch tragedy is the best 
example of great art that is loyal to the meaningless, but beautiful, miseries of life. 
In her view, “Goya’s ‘horrors of war’ [for example] are terrifying but beautiful. 
Great art is beautiful…”.467 
Murdoch’s point can be explained by separating the task of the artist in 
creating, and the audience in receiving, an artwork. When discussing the 
appreciation of beauty in art, she primarily emphasises the quality of ‘attention’, 
which is paid by an audience to an artwork. Murdoch uses Simone Weil’s concept 
of ‘obedience’ to demonstrate the significant task of the audience in receiving art. 
Murdoch says: “The contingent can become spiritually significant, even beautiful, 
as in art, as in Simone’s Weil’s idea of the beauty of the world as an image of 
obedience”.468 Obedience, as Murdoch puts it, is “realism exposed to good”.469 It 
involves acquiring the discipline to fully receive the object of attention. It is a 
patient and loving attention towards what is unintelligible and pointless. The 
individual does not need to know the purpose of life and its miseries to be able to 
attend to it carefully and lovingly. In the state of obedience, the individual resists 
their preconceptions and prejudices. They just submit and accept reality the way it 
is. Obedience is submitting to necessity. It “… ideally teaches a position where 
there is no choice”.470 Even though “… the evils and the miseries of human life 
are not beautiful or attractive …”, the virtue of fully submitting to the contingent 
reality makes the reality presented in art look beautiful.471 Murdoch writes:  
Tragedy then would be a (unique) moralising or redeeming of the 
beautiful. Only within a high morality can the spectacle of terrible 
human suffering become a thing of beauty. If only saints can watch 
awful pain without some subtle degradation or evasion, then 
tragedy might be a temporary, perhaps edifying, simulation of 
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sanctity …. Fear of the contingent, fear of chance, of the dreadful 
machinery of human fate, certainly seems to be in place here.472  
On Murdoch’s view, in experiencing beautiful things, especially works of 
art, “… the sense of separateness from the temporal process is connected perhaps 
with concepts of perfection of form and ‘authority’ which are not easy to transfer 
into the field of morals”.473 When a person attends to a painting or a piece of 
music, the quality of their attention is usually different from that of attending to a 
‘useful’ object. As discussed earlier, most individuals attend to an artwork 
impartially and without an expectation of any gain in the ordinary sense. They 
experience a sense of complete presence, due to the authority of beauty, which 
may not be fully conceived. They are fully obedient to the object of their attention. 
They are impartial and unbiased. So to be able to appreciate the beauty of an 
artwork, one needs to submit fully to it.  
As well as obedience, which is a moral concept referring to the quality of 
attention, the audience is also required to develop an artistic vision and sensitivity 
to the aesthetic features of an artwork. Murdoch does not emphasise this point in 
her work. Yet it seems that reading a tragedy can become a redeeming experience 
only when the reader has developed the capacity to recognise its excellence and is 
ready to submit to its beauty. It is not the case that every person has the artistic 
vision to see the beauty in an artwork. An insensitive and untrained audience may 
not be able to fully grasp the beauty of an artwork, as they lack training in art 
appreciation or aesthetics. Many people do not have the capacity to appreciate an 
outstanding work of art. For example, by looking at an abstract painting, such as 
Kandinsky’s On White II, a person who lacks the required artistic sensitivity and 
training might only see some thick black lines, both curved and straight, vertical 
yellow and red rectangles, a few circles, and a multitude of coloured lines and 
shapes scattered over the canvas, but no beauty. In some abstract paintings the 
artist draws the attention of the audience to aspects of reality that may be taken for 
granted, such as light and colour. By bringing some aspects of reality out of their 
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context or portraying them from unusual angles, the artist provides the audience 
with a completely different perspective. This makes the experience of the abstract 
art in question a novel and educational experience for the audience. Yet again, to 
appreciate beauty, especially in these forms of art, a person needs to train 
themselves in the arts. They need to develop the vision necessary for appreciating 
reality and its beauty in art. For example, a person might find the huge sculpture 
of Maman by Louise Bourgeois venomous and terrifying. They might only 
experience the negative emotions of agony, disgust, and repugnance. It is also 
helpful here to consider an example discussed by Matthew Kieran, namely, 
Francis Bacon’s Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion, which 
consists of three large canvases. While acknowledging the artistic value of the 
triptych, Kieran describes Bacon’s work as follows: 
The figure on the left [canvas] is crouching on a table, huddling 
itself in a bird-like manner, its vaguely human face a quarter on and 
turned away. The central figure is side on, the elongated neck 
stretching from the bulbous, ostrich-like body, bringing its face in 
full confrontation with the viewer. The threatening, repulsive, 
mouth of lips and teeth is somewhat agape, and where there should 
be eyes the face is bandaged. The mouth emerges directly from the 
neck rather than belonging to a distinct face. The third canvas 
represents a sharpened, cow-like body, its elongated neck bringing 
a viciously howling mouth into three quarter view.474 
And thus it goes on. The sensations one feels when viewing this work are 
of horror, disgust, and pain. It is not easy to see any ‘beauty’ in such a work of art. 
However, an artist or a person who is trained in aesthetic appreciation and has the 
required artistic sensitivity and vision is expected to be able to appreciate the 
beauty of such a unique work of art. Here, it may help to explain what we mean 
by the ‘beauty’ that is perceived by a sensitive audience in such work as Bacon’s. 
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As Derek Matravers notes, there is a difference between an artwork that is 
merely ‘pretty’ and one that is ‘beautiful’.475 A pretty artwork is one that merely 
presents a pleasing appearance and nothing more. A beautiful artwork, on the 
other hand, does not simply display a pleasing appearance but contains some sort 
of value or aesthetic merit. Artists and art critics have differing opinions as to 
where this value lies. For example, some artists and critics hold that a beautiful 
artwork is one that is intellectually intriguing, whereas others hold the value lies 
in its originality and creativeness. We can build on Murdoch’s discussions of art 
in order to see what this ‘valuable thing’ – namely what makes an artwork 
beautiful – is. As discussed in the previous chapter, for Murdoch the main reason 
an artwork is worthwhile (i.e. a great work of art) is that it has a good moral 
character. However, I argued that with some modification of her view, we can say 
that the beauty of an artwork lies in its truthfulness and loyalty to reality. 
Murdoch writes: 
Art is informative and entertaining, it condenses and clarifies the 
world, directing attention upon particular things. This intense 
showing, this bearing witness, of which it is capable is detested by 
tyrants who always persecute or demoralise their artists. Art 
illuminates accident and contingency and the general muddle of 
life, the limitations of time and the discursive intellect, so as to 
enable us to survey complex or horrible things which would 
otherwise appal us.476  
Loyalty to reality, or as Murdoch calls it, ‘realism’, is the main aspect of 
beauty in art. In other words, beauty is an aspect of realism presented in an 
artwork.477 If the artwork is true to life, and the perceiver possesses the vision 
necessary for appreciating the aspect of reality presented in the work, then they 
can appreciate the beauty of it. That is why Murdoch says: “We enjoy art, even 
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simple art, because it disturbs us in deep often incomprehensible ways”.478 So, 
being obedient as well as obtaining artistic vision is the task of the perceiver of art, 
while portraying reality is the task of the artist. As Murdoch puts it, the audience 
must “… be disciplined enough to see as much reality in the work as the artist has 
succeeded in putting into it”.479  
Now I return to Murdoch’s initial claim that beauty is more accessible than 
the Good, which is why learning to attend to beauty shows one how to attend to 
the Good. We saw that when in a state of obedience, individuals are impartial and 
unbiased. However, in Murdoch’s view, when it comes to other people rather than 
works of art, it is not easy for an individual to be as impartial. When the object of 
attention is a human relationship, “… clarity of thought and purity of attention 
becomes harder and more ambiguous…”. 480  In human relationships, the 
individual’s ego stands more strongly in the way of a loving and just attention to 
other people. In these cases, individuals seem to be more affected by their social 
and psychological background and environment. For example, a woman may tend 
to be less empathetic to women than men and to judge them quite harshly, as the 
result of her past experience of being constantly bullied by some of the girls when 
at school. Yet when the same person attends to Edgar Degas’ “The Dance Class”, 
she may sincerely enjoy the beauty of the way the girls in the picture are depicted, 
and imagine the relationships between them in a less prejudiced way (for example, 
she would not be imagining the dancers as bitter rivals, but would imagine that 
they shared a camaraderie). It is the accessible authority of the beauty of the 
artwork, and its apparent purposelessness, that makes it easier for the individual to 
fully submit to it. In Murdoch’s view, these characteristics make beauty a good 
‘starting-point’ to the individual’s appreciation of the Good in human 
relationships, and therefore, to their moral development.481  
So that is what Murdoch means by the accessibility of beauty compared to 
the accessibility of the Good. It seems to be easier for the individual to attend to 
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an artwork, wholeheartedly and open-mindedly, than to attend to other individuals. 
For example, in the abovementioned Degas’ painting “The Dance Class”, the 
beauty of the colours and forms immediately attract the attention of the observer. 
One does not need to know much about the context of the painting – the location 
of the rehearsal room, the relationships of the girls depicted in the painting, the 
poster on the wall and so on – to be able to be fully present and attentive to the 
artwork. Attending to such an artwork can immediately enhance the individual’s 
mood and give them a positive feeling. It can instantly clear the mind of the 
individual of their exasperating preoccupations and engagements. Regardless of 
whether the observer understands or knows much about this artwork, they still can 
take pleasure in it, if they obediently attend to it. 
So practising such unpossessive, loving attention to art (obedience) is one 
of the most effective ways for the individual to make moral progress. Obedience 
to art and its beauty is a moral practice, the exercise of which helps one to learn to 
attend to the reality of other individuals beyond one’s selfish desires and 
judgments. In Murdoch’s view, attention to beauty in art and the enjoyment of 
that beauty is a form of love – a pure and impartial form of attention.482 The love 
of beauty is a clue to the love of the Good, “… since such love is naturally, or 
readily, pure and unpossessive”.483 Murdoch suggests that “… a love of beauty [is] 
something spiritual, as itself a love of truth and of virtue and a capacity … for 
virtuous and truthful love”.484 Murdoch refers to the love of beauty as something 
spiritual, due to its quality of being an unpossessive love of something impersonal. 
It is a detached, selfless attention to something that cannot be possessed.  
Nonetheless, as discussed previously, since a work of art is created by 
individuals, it is very likely to be distorted by their egoism.485 “To silence and 
expel self” is, for Murdoch, a crucial task of the producer of art, which “demands 
a moral discipline”.486 For her, most artworks, are products of human fantasy, a 
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system of energy aiming at the proliferation of the ego.487 The development of 
imagination is the remedy to the natural egoistic fantasies of the artist and the 
audience, and it is this development of imagination, which is the main 
requirement to attaining a real vision of the Good. This is the third way in which 
art for Murdoch is morally educational, and the last point I am going to discuss in 
this chapter. 
Section Three 
Attention to Art to Develop a Stronger Imagination 
I explained in Chapter 4 that Murdoch’s Platonic and Kantian influences 
lead her to claim that morality is the creative task of imagination. Murdoch refers 
to the activity of imagination as something we all do in our dealings with different 
people and different events, and it is this activity “… which builds detail, adds 
colour, conjures up possibilities in ways which go beyond what could be said to 
be strictly factual”.488 In this sense, “we are all artists”.489 For Murdoch, in the 
process of moral development, people use their imagination to picture different 
possibilities in each situation and to destroy their biased and unfair images of 
reality. If the individual possesses a strong imagination, it is more likely that they 
can picture the effects of their actions on other people more clearly. They might 
also be able to picture what other people are going through and why they do what 
they do, and so be able to empathise with them. Being able to imagine all these 
different possibilities prevents the individual from judging others too quickly and 
unjustly. So cultivating a strong imagination helps us in our moral improvement.  
As I have already, when one’s act of imagining is in danger of being 
influenced by one’s egoistic inclinations, it is called ‘fantasy’.490 Although we are 
all to some extent able to imagine different aspects of different situations, our 
imagination is more or less polluted by our selfish desires, because, according to 
Murdoch, the human mind is strongly inclined to fantasy, or egocentric 
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imagination. While the creative imagination paves the path to experiencing reality, 
fantasy distorts reality and clouds our judgment. So there is a close relation 
between the activity of imagination and one’s vision of reality. Murdoch famously 
says: “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ 
which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral 
effort”.491 The more attentive the individual is to reality and the clearer their 
vision of reality, the better they can imagine different possibilities – the 
possibilities that are more likely to be actually the case. Also, the better one is 
able to imagine different possibilities, the more likely it is that one can imagine 
the reality of the situation.  
Considering the important role imagination plays in the individual’s moral 
understanding and moral judgments, I will show how on Murdoch’s account, art 
can play a significant role in the individual’s moral growth through strengthening 
their imagination. As Murdoch puts it, “[art] can stretch the imagination, enlarge 
the vision and strengthen the judgment”.492 By imaginatively presenting different 
aspects of reality, an artwork is capable of capturing the attention of the audience 
and inviting them to experience different aspects of reality in their imagination. 
This is the first way that art can contribute to the individual’s moral education: by 
enlarging their imagination. Another way art can do this is through showing the 
individual how to use the images and metaphors created by their imagination to 
achieve a better grasp of reality. This is rooted in Murdoch’s conviction that 
“[i]magery, metaphor, ... [as] an important part of human learning is an ability 
both to generate and to judge and understand the imagery which helps us to 
interpret the world”.493 In what follows, I will discuss these two points, and 
explain that both of them ultimately lead the individual to become more sensitive 
and more empathic to other people.   
As has been claimed in the previous chapter, Murdoch’s view is that a 
good work of art is one with a good moral character.494 A work of art with a bad 
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moral character may lead its perceiver (especially in case of literature) to develop 
an immoral view. However, I argued that appreciating a work of art with a bad 
moral character is not necessarily tantamount to endorsing and adopting the 
immoral position presented in the work. Any work of art, regardless of its moral 
character, can have great aesthetic value and can contribute to the individual’s 
moral growth. It can do so by enlarging their imagination. As Kieran argues, a 
work of art with a bad moral character allows us to experience bad things in our 
imagination. Instead of having to experience such bad things in reality or never 
experience them, one gets the opportunity to experience these things in one’s 
imagination and learn about those aspects of reality. This can help the individual 
expand their imagination, as it enables them to experience things they would not 
otherwise experience. However, as Kieran continues, experiencing the bad 
character of artwork can only be morally educational if the individual is capable 
of suspending their actual moral judgment, or if they are able to entertain the 
incorrect moral judgment of the artwork in their imagination without endorsing 
it.495  
So most great works of art are capable of capturing the individual’s 
imagination, and providing them with experiences (good or bad) they would not 
otherwise experience. However, a specific experience might not be what the 
individual would morally endorse. In this case, they should try to suspend their 
judgment. They should not allow their moral judgment to affect their aesthetic 
evaluation, if it does not affect the intelligibility of their experience. They can use 
this opportunity to experience something different in their imagination, which is 
an aspect of reality that they would normally avoid. This can give them a better 
understanding of what they do not approve of, without having to actually 
experience it in real life, as they would be experiencing it in their imagination. 
This helps their imagination grow. Gregory Currie puts this point nicely when he 
says, 
… it is often hard for us to sustain an imaginative exploration of a 
complex situation. That is where fictions come in. Fictions can act 
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as aids to imagination – holding our attention, making a situation 
vivid for us…. They can help us enter empathically into characters, 
make their choices, pursue their goals….496  
In narrative art the reader experiences in their imagination, the personal 
journeys of the characters, and pictures the different situations from the 
perspective of those characters. The individual gets to experience vicariously the 
rewards or punishments, which are the consequences of the actions of the 
characters. For example, in Murdoch’s novel Bruno’s Dream, the reader can 
imagine the dreadful side of life through the vision of a dying old man. They can 
experience vicariously the emotions of a housekeeper in an unhappy love triangle; 
the fantasies of a happily married woman who yet desires another man; and the 
illusions of a simple drunken man who pursues love in places he should not. This 
gives the individual an insight into the lives of other people. They can experience 
what the world is like from the perspective of all these different characters. 
It is not only narrative art, but also other forms of art, such as painting, that 
can allow the individual to experience life from different perspectives in their 
imagination. With regards to his work The Potato Eaters, which is a depiction of 
the hard lives of peasants, Van Gogh writes: 
It would be wrong, I think, to give a peasant picture a certain 
conventional smoothness. If a peasant picture smells of bacon, 
smoke, potato steam – all right, that’s not unhealthy; if a stable 
smells of dung – alright, that belongs to a stable; if the field has an 
odour of ripe corn or potatoes or of guano or manure – that’s 
healthy, especially for city people. Such pictures may teach them 
something. But to be perfumed is not what a peasant picture 
needs.497  
As Van Gogh’s description of his depiction of village life suggests, it is 
through the revealing of the rough, possibly unpleasant or unfamiliar reality of 
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peasants’ lives that the viewer gains some insight into their lives and gets to 
experience things in their imagination that they would not otherwise experience. 
In Murdoch’s view, experiencing different examples of people and events and 
experiencing their vulnerabilities and the contingency of their positions in one’s 
imagination shows that one’s moral position can have a very unclear and shifting 
quality. By her lights, if one’s imagination is trained through engagement with 
different artworks, it is more prepared to picture different possibilities in real life 
situations. Then the individual avoids the mistake of taking their first assumption 
as an ultimate judgment.  
Artists use images and metaphors created by their imaginations to express 
the most serious realities of life. In Murdoch’s view, the imagination is where the 
aesthetic and the moral are fused, as they are both concerned with the realities of 
life and other individuals. Murdoch says: “Moral imagination is partly aesthetic, it 
is a place where the aesthetic is moralised”.498 The individual’s thinking is a 
mixture of figurative and non-figurative thoughts, or as Murdoch puts it,  “[a]t 
deep levels metaphor and perception merge”.499 Seeing the reality of other people 
is one’s moral task and one cannot help but use metaphors and pictures in one’s 
imagination in order to access reality. Through the experience of art the individual 
learns the state of seeing as, namely the metaphorical (figurative, by the use of 
image or imagery) confrontation with the world. Murdoch says: 
The art object points beyond itself, the world is seen beyond it, 
somewhat as the artist saw it when he attempted his statement, 
although of course he is not just copying the world. The art object 
is porous or cracked, another reality flows through it, it is in tension 
between a clarified statement and a confused pointing, and is in 
danger if it goes too far either way. Much modern art instinctively 
tends to abandon complete clear statement and complete separate 
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object in favour of a merging of art into the continuity of the world 
….500  
Art shows the individual how to understand the world through metaphors. 
For Murdoch, metaphors are “fundamental modes of understanding”.501 They are 
present in many different aspects of the individual’s thinking. Carefully attending 
to an artwork teaches the individual an in-depth figurative grasp of the world. Art 
shows the individual the confused layered aspects of everyday reality and invites 
them to see and picture the complexity of life. It asks the individual not to settle 
on one picture in their imagination, but to try to move on to what may be a better 
grasp of the reality presented in them. It is only through metaphorical 
understanding that the individual can have a deeper grasp of reality. Moreover, in 
Murdoch’s view, “[o]ur understanding of a higher morality than that which comes 
easily to us tends to be intuitive and pictorial, we live all the time in semi-pictorial 
modes of awareness”.502 To put it differently, “… our moral experience shares in 
the peculiar density of art, and in its imaginative cognitive activity”.503 In a sense, 
for Murdoch, being realistic is to go beyond what is simply seen and to attend to 
and to get imaginatively engaged with a deeper reality. A strong imagination 
allows the individual to have a better realisation of ‘the Good’, as the Good in its 
absolute form is beyond explanation or definition. Normally, when the individual 
speaks about something being good, they have a faint understanding of what ‘the 
Good’ is. If they have a stronger imagination, however, they can better picture the 
Good as something beyond, something perfect, something desirable. Through the 
power of imagination they can imagine the Good as perfection and experience its 
attraction. It motivates them and gives them a better sense of direction in their 
moral life. This is how imagination structures the world. Murdoch states: 
“Imagination suggests the searching, joining, light-seeking, semi-figurative nature 
of the mind’s work, which prepares and forms the consciousness for action”.504 
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Art does not teach one how to behave, but how to imagine different possibilities 
of how the world could be and then decide how to behave. In fact, the choice 
comes naturally. 
So attending to art helps the individual expand their imagination by 
experiencing diverse aspects of reality. It also trains their imagination to enable a 
more accurate and in-depth grasp of reality by better picturing those aspects of it 
that are not understandable except by the use of images and metaphors. The 
artist’s honest depiction of circumstances and people that are not normally within 
the experiences of the audience contributes to the depth of their imaginings. 
Through attempting to imagine different possibilities, the individual learns to 
examine critically their initial judgments, and even suspend their judgment in 
some cases. Furthermore, a strong imagination allows the individual to put 
themselves in another person’s place and consider different possible explanations 
for why people are behaving the way they are. The individual becomes more 
sensitive towards other people’s needs. That is why Murdoch considers 
imagination as “a moral discipline of the mind” and says: 
...  imagination appears as a restoration of freedom, cognition, the 
effortful ability to see what lies before one more clearly, more 
justly, to consider new possibilities, and to respond to good 
attachments and desires which have been in eclipse. This effort 
may be compared with that of ‘composing’ and ‘holding’ a difficult 
work of art in one’s attention, an effort which is similar in the good 
artist and in the good client. (Teaching art is teaching morals.) ‘Be 
more sympathetic, imagine her situation, see it from her point of 
view.’ Fairly everyday advice. Imagination is here a moral 
discipline of the mind …505  
Most art has the power to capture the individual’s imagination. Art 
pictures imaginative possibilities that are based on reality. Oftentimes, carefully 
attending to other people and imagining their needs and intentions are difficult 
tasks. Having a stronger imagination and the ability to imagine different 
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possibilities fosters sensitivity and compassion in people, because they can better 
imagine and feel what the other individual is experiencing. Lack of a strong 
imagination and sensitivity is one of the reasons an individual inflicts pain on 
others. Consider the following scenario: Tim’s grandmother – who is quite unwell 
and vulnerable – asks him to visit her tomorrow. He promises her that he will go 
to her place first thing in the morning. The next morning, Tim’s friend comes over 
unannounced for a chat. Tim thinks to himself that he can visit his grandmother 
another day. He does not like disappointing people, so he does not tell his friend 
about his initial intention to visit his grandmother, as he does not want to 
disappoint him by refusing his visit. He does not even inform his grandmother that 
he will not visit her that day, again, because he does not like to disappoint people. 
Murdoch can say that the reason why Tim can so easily break his promise to his 
grandmother is that he does not have a strong enough imagination to be able to 
imagine the possible consequences of his decision – the grandmother feeling very 
lonely and sad by Tim’s apparent abandonment of her; her becoming extremely 
worried about Tim for not showing up, and so on. Tim does not intend to inflict so 
much pain on his grandmother, but his lack of ability to imagine her condition 
makes his decision morally wrong. If Tim had developed a stronger imagination 
through attending to art, for example, it would not be too hard for him to associate 
the disappointment he would feel if he was stood up with that of his grandmother. 
Art, then, can deepen and widen the individual’s imaginative 
understanding of other people across different times and cultures. An exercise of 
imagination enables the individual to become more sensitive to other people and 
their emotions and needs, by helping them to picture what other people may be 
going through. Individuals can imagine the situation from the perspective of the 
other person. They can think beyond the present moment and relate the past to the 
present, and the future, and thus imagine the possible effects of their decisions and 
actions on other people. They are better able to imagine the unarticulated aspects 
of personality and motives of the other individual. The receiver of art learns to 
pause for a moment and shift their attention away from themselves and to see 
other people from a completely different viewpoint, to be more empathic toward 
them, and to judge them more fairly. This, for Murdoch, is virtue – “… really 
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apprehending that other people exist”.506 Attending to an artwork helps the 
individual to develop a stronger imagination that can picture the conditions of 
other individuals more realistically and more lovingly. This is a moral ability that 
is very difficult to acquire solely through life experience. For example, a person 
might never experience village life, yet they can experience a particular 
imaginative depiction of it through the artist’s techniques presented in a painting 
such as The Potato Eaters, the bold and skilful strokes of brush on the canvas, the 
application of dark and neutral colours, and the artistic vision manifested in the 
way of setting the scene and depicting the peasants’ lives. This not only helps 
them experience what they would not otherwise experience, but also allows them 
to be more careful in judging the lives of peasants, in particular, and in general, 
the lives of other people that live differently to them. 
Let’s now recall Murdoch’s example of the mother-in-law and daughter-
in-law discussed in Chapter 2. Let’s imagine a different scenario in which 
attending to art influences M’s attitude towards D and helps her to be more loving 
and sympathetic towards D. Imagine M spends her spare time reading classic 
novels. She also regularly goes to art galleries and spends a great deal of time 
attending to the artworks in there. She possesses the required cognitive and 
intellectual capacities to be fully present and to understand the artworks she 
attends to, and she experiences a great pleasure in doing so. The appreciation of 
beauty in an artwork engenders serenity and happiness in her and creates an 
appreciation for what is good. By being fully present to an artwork, she 
intellectually and emotionally engages with the imagination of the artist and 
resonates to it. She makes an effort to imagine what the artist has intended to 
depict in his artwork. By giving her full attention to an artwork, she gains a strong 
grounding in the here and now. The practice of being fully present and attentive to 
art leads her to pay closer attention to the details of her surroundings and 
experience them more intensely. This practice helps her to develop a better vision 
of reality. She learns to devote more attention to the pertinent details in different 
situations and gains a heightened sense of reality and an increased openness to the 
objects of her attention. When D is around, M is capable of being fully present 
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and to observe D, not only as her daughter-in-law, but also as a human being who 
is worthy of her love and respect, regardless of their relationship. M can tell when 
she is under the influence of her own prejudices, as through her experience of 
appreciating art, she can distinguish a disinterested approach from a biased one. 
When she feels agitated by D’s playfulness and carelessness she withholds 
judgment, as she knows that she needs to attend to D more closely as there are 
many aspects to each situation that are not easily seen and require more effort to 
discern, just as she has experienced in various artworks and novels. Through her 
experiencing different art, she knows there is always more to reality than first 
meets the eye. She knows that she needs to use her imagination and to try to 
picture other aspects of reality. So she does not give in to the first negative 
impression she forms. The practice of being attentive to details helps her to 
develop a better vision of reality and its complexity and chanciness, to imagine 
various possibilities before making judgements. 
Having developed a stronger imagination through her engagement with art, 
M is capable of relating the present moment to her past experiences and future 
decisions. In the past, her own mother-in-law never tried to develop a good 
relationship with her, and this affected negatively M’s relationship with her 
husband. So she can imagine how her negative perception of D – if it ever 
manifests itself – may have a negative influence on her son’s relationship to his 
wife. Having a strong imagination, M is able to imagine things from the 
perspective of D and combine this picture with her past experience as a young 
woman, before making any moral judgments. M tries to put herself in D’s shoes 
and picture what it is like to be so young and inexperienced. She is able to 
imagine that meeting M has probably been an intimidating experience for D. By 
closely attending to D she can see how D is quite uneasy and anxious in her 
presence. That is why, instead of being calm and collected, D acts clumsily and 
awkwardly. M can imagine how, being a mother, her strong emotions and her 
desire to protect her son can prevent her from being fair and impartial towards D. 
She is conscious of the fact that her son’s strong love for D hurts her ego and this 
can make her jealous and judgmental. (She can picture this particularly well 
because she experienced being jealous and judgmental in her imagination a while 
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ago, while reading a novel about the destructive consequences of jealousy). 
Despite her feelings of jealousy, she makes an effort to see D in her own right, 
and not allow her attachment to her son to affect her fair judgment of D and her 
respect for D as an independent person. Instead of judging her harshly for being 
immature and naïve, she patiently attends to D. This careful and disinterested 
attention leads M to see D in her own right. Being – to some extent – unaffected 
by her biases and her selfish motives, M can feel for D and empathise with her. M 
does not only see D more justly, but also more lovingly. So M’s experience of 
attending to different artworks is in fact practising love, which in Murdoch’s view, 
is the highest moral virtue. 
Conclusion 
Murdoch contends that an artist’s intention when creating a work of art is 
not didactic. Nevertheless, participating in works of art is “the most educational of 
all human activity”.507 Throughout her philosophical work, while discussing her 
moral view, Murdoch uses the example of art as a significant means to facilitate 
the process of moral development. As I constructed a Murdochian account of the 
educational role of art in the moral life out of her various writings on the topic, I 
identified three ways in which attention to art can be morally educational, drawing 
upon my discussions of Murdoch’s moral view in earlier chapters. I used 
Murdoch’s concept of ‘attention’ and its distinctive qualities to argue that 
understanding the educational role of art fundamentally comes down to the 
qualities of one’s ‘attention’. I discussed the ways in which a good work of art has 
the potential to trigger the individual’s careful and truthful ‘attention’, which is 
one of the main abilities that an individual needs to develop in their moral quest. 
The main quality of such attention is that it is directed ‘away’ from the self, 
towards something that is not ‘for’ the self. In Murdoch’s view, when one attends 
to an artwork one is fully present. One does not use the artwork in an ordinary 
sense, but instead cherishes and contemplates it. Just as one does not treat the 
artwork as a ‘thing’ to be used, one should not attend to other people as ‘things’. 
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Through the experience of fully attending to an artwork, one learns to attend to 
other people carefully in their own rights.  
Through experiencing the transient reality depicted in an artwork, one 
experiences its beauty. Experiencing beauty in art makes it easier for one to 
understand the Good, as beauty and the Good have similar qualities. This is 
particularly important to Murdoch because she puts forward an objective account 
of morality, where the authority of the Good determines whether the individual’s 
decisions are morally good. I argued that perceiving beauty in an artwork is not 
always as simple as Murdoch seems to suggest. However, as I explained, 
regardless of the difficulty of appreciating beauty in an artwork, the audience of 
art needs to exercise ‘obedience’ – the state of being fully receptive and fully 
present to an artwork. In this state, the audience may not experience the artwork, 
especially some modern artworks, as ‘pretty’, but they are capable of experiencing 
the ‘beauty’ of the artwork, which is the depth of reality that the artist has 
successfully presented herein. According to Murdoch it is easier for the individual 
to appreciate beauty in art than the Good in life, because it is easier for them to be 
impartial and unbiased towards the reality presented in art. Practicing the states of 
obedience and impartiality towards the beauty of art is an exercise of obedience 
and impartiality towards other individuals, and ultimately, more vividly 
experiencing the Good. That is another way in which attending to art can 
contribute to our moral education. 
I finally discussed the idea that the content of an artwork, while inspired 
by the random reality of the world, is the product of the artist’s imagination. 
Experiencing a work of art helps the audience to expand their imaginations as 
well, which is important in their moral lives and moral progress. Through 
experiencing art, the individual experiences some aspects of reality that they 
would not otherwise experience. This makes them pause and contemplate 
different possibilities in their imagination when encountering other people in real 
situations. Instead of making hasty moral decisions, they entertain different 
possibilities in their imagination and assess those pictures. With a more developed 
imagination, the individual becomes able to picture the more complex aspects of 
each event. They can combine their present experience with their past experiences 
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and compare this combination to future possibilities. They try to put themselves in 
other people’s shoes and see the world from their perspectives. A stronger 
imagination and the ability to picture different possibilities help the individual to 
become more sensitive and compassionate towards other people, which is the core 
of Murdoch’s ethics. Moreover, a better figurative and metaphorical 
understanding of life helps the individual to gain a more in-depth understanding of 
important concepts, such as the Good. A better appreciation of the Good 





In order to address my research question, “How can art contribute to our 
moral development?”, I have, over the course of this thesis, developed a 
Murdochian account of morality, the value of art, and the role of art in moral 
education. By way of concluding the thesis, I would like to present a short 
summary of the overall view that I find in Murdoch’s work. Murdoch develops 
her own distinctive account of virtue and virtuous action. ‘The Good’, in her view, 
is the condition of all human experience. Morality is objective, in the sense that 
we all share an a priori concept of the Good. But the objectivity of morality does 
not mean denying the impact of circumstances on moral judgments. Although all 
societies and cultures adopt some kind of moral code, these are tailored to the 
particular conditions that exist within a society, with the result that different 
societies have different moral codes. However, it is always a grasp of ‘the Good’, 
as perfection, that provides a sense of moral orientation and guides our decision-
making. To develop moral virtues, we have to obtain a better understanding of the 
Good. 
Virtues are character traits that are morally admirable and form an 
important part of our identity. Developing the moral virtues is valuable in itself, 
rather than for any instrumental gain. The most important of all virtues is the 
virtue of love, a form of empathy, which requires us to acknowledge the fact that 
the interests, experiences, and values of other people differ from our own and that 
they too matter. Love is a core virtue that is required for all the other virtues. In 
order to acquire the virtue of love – and thereby the other virtues – we have to 
make an effort to obtain an accurate understanding of the other person and their 
particular situation by selflessly attending to them. This will allow us to make 
moral judgements and decisions that are not just and true, but also empathetic. 
Moral growth involves obtaining a better vision of reality and developing 
an ability to see other people more accurately, justly, and lovingly. The action that 
accompanies this vision is a virtuous action. This means that regardless of any 
cultural or circumstantial differences between us, right vision and the virtue of 
love lead us to do what is morally good. Moral development, then, is about 
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developing moral vision (a vision of the Good) and the virtue of love, and this 
requires a consistent and on-going effort to attend to the world around us. We use 
our imagination to picture the circumstances of other people, their emotions, 
thoughts, motives, and ultimately everything that we are unable to experience 
directly. If we do not try to attend to others more closely, we will (most likely) not 
have a good understanding of their reality (which is the prerequisite for the virtue 
of love) and our judgments of them will not be accurate or just. Using our 
imaginations to picture morally challenging situations from different points of 
view (and to do away with false impressions, which are products of our fantasy) 
enables us to put ourselves in other people’s shoes, and to make better judgments 
about how to act or behave towards them. 
In light of this view of morality and moral development, Murdoch argues 
that engaging with good art can be one of the most effective ways of growing 
morally. Good art is a kind of art that depicts a version of reality that has been 
shaped by the imagination of the artist. In good art, the artist does not avoid 
picturing human misery and the pointlessness of human life. The defining 
characteristic of good art is that it is still beautiful (in the sense of being true-to-
life and intellectually stimulating, within the limits of art forms) even when it is 
depicting the most appalling aspects of life. The beauty of art can engage us 
intellectually with what we may be appalled by in real life. By appreciating beauty 
in good art we begin to develop an appreciation of what is good. The form of 
attention involved in the encounter with art is similar to the form of attention 
involved in morality (a form of obedience or submission to reality), in so far as 
there is no hope or possibility of gaining any material benefit. Engaging with the 
imagination of the artist helps our imagination to grow. An enlarged imagination 
enables us to picture what other people may be going through, to put ourselves in 
their shoes, and to love them and empathise with them, in spite of all the ways 
they differ from us. 
Engaging with Murdoch’s work enabled me to understand the experience I 
had when reading Dostoyevsky’s The Brother’s Karamazov and to explain the 
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profound influence the novel has had on me.508 Although I had been entirely 
occupied with the mundane routines of my everyday life, when reading the novel 
my attention was fully focused on its content; and it was a different kind of 
attention, one that was both disinterested and obedient. The skill of the artist and 
the authority of the artwork helped me to see and experience, in my imagination, 
the misery of the child more intensely and from a different perspective. I could 
see more clearly the pain of the innocent child enduring the abuse of her parents. 
Although I had always been aware of child abuse and human pain in a general 
sense, the quality of my attention and the ability of the artist to fully engage it led 
to a deep change in my inner world – in my way of seeing the pain of other people, 
beyond the veil of my self-occupied mind. When reading the book, I was fully 
attentive and submissive to the authority of reality and beauty (the beauty which is 
the artistic form of the novel and the mastery of Dostoyevsky in implementing it), 
and therefore, the change in me was deep and lasting. Reading the novel also 
helped me to piece together the fragments of my childhood experiences in my 
imagination, and to connect those experiences to the experiences of other children 
who endure suffering and pain. It prompted a change in what Murdoch would call 
my whole “fabric of being” – my inner life and my view of other people. This 
experience enabled me to be more humble and more obedient in the face of reality. 
It helped me to be more attentive and more sensitive to the pain of other people, 
because I could imagine more clearly what they were going through, and thus, to 
be more compassionate towards them. As Murdoch would put it, I learned to love 
– not a blind love, but rather a just and compassionate attention to the reality of 
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